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ABSTRACT 
Transmitting the Transition: Media Events and  
Post-Apartheid South African National Identity 
 
South Africa came late to television, and its enjoyment of the medium was diminished by 
the fact that just as a national television service was acquired, the rest of the world began 
to shun the country because of apartheid. While the ruling National Party feared the 
integrative effects of television, they did not foresee the negative impact that exclusion 
from globally unifying broadcasts would have on political rule. Television helped to 
facilitate the sporting and cultural bans and played an important, mostly unexamined role 
in the transition to democracy. 
While South Africa was barred from participating in some of television’s greatest 
global attractions (including sporting events such as the Olympics and contests such as 
Miss World), with the release of Nelson Mandela from prison – one of the world’s most 
memorable media events – came a proliferation of large-scale live broadcasts that 
attracted the gaze and admiration of the rest of the world. At the same time, the country 
was permitted to return to international competition, and its readmittance played out on 
television screens across the world. These events were pivotal in shaping and 
consolidating the country’s emerging post-apartheid national identity.  
Using Dayan and Katz’s theory of “media events” – those historic and powerful 
live broadcasts that mesmerise mass audiences – this thesis assesses the socio-political 
effect of live broadcasting on South Africa’s transition to democracy and the effects of 
such broadcasts on post-apartheid nationhood. The thesis follows events chronologically 
and employs a three-part approach: firstly, it looks at the planning behind some of the 
mass televised events, secondly, it analyses the televisual content of some of the events; 
and thirdly it assesses public responses to events, as articulated in newspapers at the time. 
Live broadcasting was used first by the rest of the world as a means of punishing 
apartheid South Africa and then by the emerging NP–ANC alliance as a means of 
legitimating the negotiation process. In particular, media events served as a powerful 
means of securing support for the country’s first democratic president, Nelson Mandela. 
At the same time, the apparent transparency of live broadcasting helped to rejuvenate the 
poor reputation of the South African Broadcasting Corporation, perceived as a 
government mouthpiece under apartheid and, like South Africa itself, in need of an image 
overhaul. The thesis argues that just as print media had a powerful influence on the 
development of Afrikaner nationalism, so the “liveness” of television helped to 























for Madeleine and Juliette, 




























Abbreviations and Acronyms x 









1. Media Events and  
South African National Identity 
 
6 
2. Apartheid and Absence: South Africa’s Exclusion 




3. The Shamanising Ayatollah:  




4. Disrupting the Centre: “Liveness” and the Negotiation 




5. The Televised Birth of the Rainbow Nation: 




6. Consolidation: South Africa’s Return  




















 viii  
Timeline 
 
This timeline focuses on some of the relevant occurrences leading up to the main 
televised events discussed in the thesis as well as a few additional political events that 
help contextualise South Africa’s history. It is not representative of the country’s national 
chronology in any way. 
 
21 March 1960 In what becomes known as the Sharpeville massacre, police open fire on 
marchers protesting against pass laws, killing 69 and injuring 186. 
8 April 1960 The ANC and the PAC are banned in South Africa. 
August 1960 The Summer Olympics are held in Rome; Apartheid South Africa participates in 
the Games for the last time until 1992. 
11 July 1963 The Rivonia treason trialists are arrested and later sentenced to life imprisonment. 
20 July 1969 American astronauts land on the moon and the event is broadcast live across the 
world. 
15 December 1969 The South African government sets up the Meyer Commission to investigate the 
desirability of acquiring a national television service. 
23 March–7 April 1973 The South African Games are held in Pretoria. 
5 January 1976 The first television broadcast is screened in South Africa. 
16 June 1976 The Soweto uprising begins when police open fire on around 10 000 students 
protesting against Afrikaans as a medium of instruction in schools. 
1976 Twenty-six African countries boycott the 1976 Montreal Olympics in protest 
against apartheid. 
1977 South Africa participates in Miss World for the last time until 1991. 
12 September 1977 Stephen Biko dies in detention in Port Elizabeth. 
24 July 1978 Miss South Africa Margaret Gardiner is crowned as Miss Universe. 
9 October 1978 PW Botha becomes prime minister of South Africa 
25 July 1981 The SABC attempts to broadcast the first live rugby match from abroad to 
citizens, but protests in Hamilton lead to the match’s postponement. 
29 July 1981 The wedding of Prince Charles of Wales and Lady Diana Spencer is broadcast to 
audiences around the world, including in South Africa. 
20 August 1983 The UDF is launched in opposition to the introduction of the Tricameral Parliament. 
September 1984 PW Botha becomes state president of South Africa. 
11 December 1984 Archbishop Desmond Tutu is awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. 
February 1985 President PW Botha offers Nelson Mandela and several other political prisoners 
conditional freedom. 
10 February 1985 Nelson Mandela’s daughter, Zindzi, reads out her father’s reply to Botha’s offer at 
Soweto’s Jabulani stadium. 
18 March 1985 Ted Koppel’s Nightline, airing from South Africa for a week, features a live debate 
between Desmond Tutu and Pik Botha. 
15 August 1985 PW Botha’s “Rubicon speech” is broadcast live to audiences in South Africa, 
America and Britain. 
November 1985 COSATU is formed. 
May 1987 The CP replaces the PFP as the official opposition in South Africa’s general 
election. 
10 July 1988 The Mandela Birthday Tribute concert is held at Wembley Stadium. 
20 September 1989 PW Botha resigns in August and FW de Klerk becomes state president in 
September. 
October 1989 FW de Klerk releases Walter Sisulu and several other political prisoners. 
2 February 1990 FW de Klerk announces the unbanning of several liberation movements, 
including the ANC, and the impending release of various political prisoners, 











11 February 1990 Nelson Mandela is released from Victor Verster Prison. 
April 1990 The Mandela “Release” Concert is held at Wembley Stadium. 
9 August 1991 Police clash with AWB members at what becomes known as the “Battle of 
Ventersdorp”. 
20 September 1991 The government and 18 political parties establish CODESA and sign a 
declaration of intent.  
28 December 1991 South Africa participates in Miss World for the first time since 1977. 
February 1992 The CP defeats the NP in the Potchefstroom by-election. 
22 February–25 March 
1992 
South Africa participates in the Cricket World Cup for the first time. 
17 March 1992 The National Party holds an all-white referendum to establish support for reform. 
13 April 1992 Nelson Mandela announces his separation from Winnie Mandela. 
17 June 1992 Over 45 people are killed in what becomes known as the Boipatong massacre 
when IFP supporters attack residents of Slovo Park squatter camp. 
June 1992 The ANC withdraws from CODESA in protest against the Boipatong massacre. 
7 July 1992 The South African national football team plays its first international game in two 
decades, beating Cameroon 1–0. 
25 July 1992 South Africa participates in the Olympic Games for the first time since 1960. 
15 August 1992 South Africa plays its first international rugby match since 1981. 
7 September 1992 Twenty-nine protestors are killed when the Ciskei Defence Force opens fire on 
ANC protestors in Bisho. 
September 1992 The government and the ANC sign a record of understanding and CODESA talks 
resume. 
12 December 1992 South Africa hosts Miss World at Sun City. 
10 April 1993 Chris Hani is assassinated and senior CP member Clive Derby-Lewis and Polish 
immigrant Janusz Waluś are arrested for his murder. 
19 April 1993 Chris Hani’s funeral is broadcast live throughout South Africa. 
7 May 1993 The Afrikaner Volksfront is established by 21 right-wing groups demanding self-
determination.  
25 June 1993 The Afrikaner Volksfront and the AWB storm the Kempton Park World Trade 
Centre where negotiations are taking place. 
25 July 1993 Eleven people are killed and 58 are injured when APLA cadres open fire on the 
St James Church congregationalists in Cape Town. 
1 May 1993 Five people are killed when masked gunmen attack the Highgate Hotel in East 
London. 
25 August 1993 American Fulbright scholar Amy Biehl is murdered in Gugulethu, Cape Town. 
10 December 1993 FW de Klerk and Nelson Mandela jointly win the Nobel Peace Prize. 
30 December 1993 Four people are killed when APLA cadres attack the Heidelberg Tavern in Cape 
Town. 
11 March 1994 Forty-five people are killed in Bophuthatswana when President Mangope calls for 
assistance from white right-wing groups to quell resistance to his decision to 
withdraw from the forthcoming election. 
28 March 1994 In what becomes known as the “Shellhouse massacre”, at least 55 people are 
killed when IFP members march to the ANC Shell House office in protest against 
the forthcoming election. 
14 April 1994 A live televised election debate is held between presidential candidates Nelson 
Mandela and FW de Klerk. 
27 April 1994 South Africa holds its first democratic election and the ANC wins 62.6% of the 
vote. 
10 May 1994 Nelson Mandela is inaugurated as president of South Africa. 











Abbreviations and Acronyms 
 
 
AAM  Anti-Apartheid Movement 
ANC  African National Congress 
APLA  Azanian People’s Liberation Army 
AR  Audience Rating 
AVF  Afrikaner Volksfront 
AWB  Afrikaner Weestandsbeweging  
BBC  British Broadcasting Corporation 
CCV  Contemporary Community Values channel 
COM  Campaign for Open Media 
COSATU Congress of South African Trade Unions 
CODESA Convention for a Democratic South Africa  
CP  Conservative Party 
DP  Democratic Party 
FA  Freedom Alliance 
GNU  Government of National Unity 
HNP  Herstigte Nasionale Party (Reconstituted National Party) 
IBC  International Broadcasting Centre 
ICC  International Cricketing Council 
IEC  Independent Electoral Committee 
IFP  Inkatha Freedom Party 
IOC  International Olympic Committee 
IRB  International Rugby Board 
KZN  KwaZulu-Natal 
MK  Umkhonto we Sizwe 
MWASA  Media Workers Association of South Africa 
NOCSA National Olympic Committee of South Africa 
NMT  New Media Technology 
OOC  Olympic Organising Committee 
PAC  Pan Africanist Congress 
PFP  Progressive Federal Party 
PSB  Public Service Broadcaster 
SAARF  South African Advertising Research Foundation 
SABC  South African Broadcasting Corporation 
SACP  South African Communist Party 
SACOS  South African Council on Sport 
SAHRC  South African Human Rights Commission 
Sanef  South African National Editors Forum 
SAP  South African Police 
SAPA  South African Press Agency 
SARB  South African Rugby Board 
SARFU  South African Rugby Football Union 
SARU  South African Rugby Union 
SCSA  Supreme Council for Sport in Africa 
TEC  Transitional Executive Council 
TRC  Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
UCB  United Cricket Board 
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Who can assess the social, political and economic impact of TV on South Africans?  
It will probably be more significant than we think. 
– Financial Mail, 19751 
 
In the mid-1980s, South Africa’s apartheid government was feeling pressure from all 
sides. Support for the disinvestment campaign was mounting as foreign reporting on the 
state’s violent attempts to quell unrest increased; the rand, which had previously been a 
strong currency, slumped; Britain and the United States began adopting employment 
codes for companies operating in South Africa; and the country was excluded from 
virtually all global competition. 
The ruling National Party (NP) also faced internal challenges. Activists 
increasingly heeded the ANC’s call to “make the townships ungovernable”; the newly 
formed Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)2 and the United Democratic 
Front (UDF)3 were gathering strength, organising mass stayaways and strikes that 
disrupted the economy; and, in 1987, steps taken towards reform met with resistance 
from many white South Africans, and the Conservative Party (CP)4 overtook the 
Progressive Federal Party (PFP)5 in the national election. South Africa’s position was 
succinctly summed up by Time magazine in August 1986: “Pressurising South Africa: If 
not now, when? If not this, what?” The country had become the pariah of the 
international community. 
                                                
 
1 Cited in Randall Harrison and Paul Ekman, “TV’s last frontier: South Africa”, Journal of 
Communication, 26 (1) (Winter), 1976, 106 (originally: “All you ever wanted to know about TV but were 
afraid to ask”, Financial Mail, Special Supplement, 14 March 1975, 36). 
2 COSATU is a powerful trade union federation in South Africa, launched in 1985. The organisation 
arranged many effective strikes as a means of mobilising opposition to apartheid. 
3 The UDF was a powerful anti-apartheid coalition that united hundreds of community-based organisations, 
including a number of churches and worker and student bodies. It was formed in 1983 and remained active 
throughout the 1980s. 
4 The Conservative Party was formed in 1982 by NP members who were opposed to reform. It became the 
official opposition to the NP in 1987 when it surpassed the Progressive Federal Party (PFP). 
5 The PFP, established in 1977, was a liberal, white-supported party that favoured power-sharing over 












In 1987, two years after PW Botha’s televised “Rubicon speech” had failed to 
impress the world, his communications advisor, Jack Viviers, reportedly came up with a 
plan. In order to revive the country’s flailing international reputation, Viviers believed 
that South Africa needed to engineer its own version of the moonlanding, since that event 
had “changed global perceptions of America”.6 Because the moon had already been 
conquered, Viviers devised an alternative: to haul icebergs from Antarctica to South 
Africa’s West Coast. He proposed that the huge blocks of fresh water then be used to 
irrigate the arid western Karoo, magically creating a lush paradise and “earning the South 
African administration the envy and respect of the world”.7 This, he told colleagues, 
could be South Africa’s moonlanding. 
 By all accounts, Viviers’s proposal was never taken seriously, and today of course 
the idea seems laughable. But the former journalist was right about South Africa’s status 
needing a paradigm overhaul as well as about the effect of the televised moonlanding, 
even if he was hopelessly off target about what would work to secure similar benefits for 
the apartheid state. South Africa needed a true “crossing of the Rubicon”, or at least a 
symbolic event that would convince the rest of the world that the country had embarked 
on an irrevocable path of reform. 
The country did eventually get its own version of the moonlanding, but it came in 
a vastly different package from the one imagined by Viviers. The broadcasting of Nelson 
Mandela’s release from prison – after 27 years’ incarceration – is remembered by many 
as one of television’s greatest moments. The release led to the dismantling of apartheid 
and paved the way for South Africa’s reintegration into the “family” of Western nations, 
a return that was visibly played out through a number of mass televised events, 
particularly sporting mega-events. It helped to shuffle off South Africa’s pariah status 
and sowed the seeds for the country’s rebirth as the “rainbow nation”. 
 All of this astonished the rest of the world, earning South Africa the respect that 
Viviers and Botha’s government had hoped for. South Africa’s transformation from 
                                                
 
6 Dave Steward, personal communication, interview conducted by candidate, 31 March 2011. 
7 Peter Murphy, “Almost sober”, Hotpress magazine, no date, (Available at: 











apartheid state to democratic nation was lauded as a “miracle”, and a host of new national 
symbols and metaphors rapidly accumulated support from citizens. 
Media events – those rare, powerful and historic-seeming broadcasts identified by 
Daniel Dayan and Elihu Katz8 – played an important role in this process. During the 
transition period (1990–1994), when the national broadcaster seemed actively involved in 
securing mass support for the country’s reform, the increase in live broadcasting and the 
proliferation of media events helped to develop the new civil religion of post-apartheid 
South Africa.  
This thesis tracks the role of live broadcasting in the lead-up to South Africa’s 
transition and during the period itself, looking at the ways in which media events worked 
to secure support for South Africa’s transformation, as well as media events’ role in the 
development of a post-apartheid national identity, what I refer to in Chapter 5 as the 
“televised birth of the rainbow nation”. 
For the most part, the chapters follow historical events chronologically, but there 
is inevitably some crossover, particularly between Chapters 4, 5 and 6. Chapter 6, for 
example, focuses on popular media events and discusses South Africa’s return to the 
Olympics in 1992 after the analysis of Mandela’s inauguration in 1994 in Chapter 5, 
which focuses on state-driven media events. Where chronological structure seemed out of 
place, I have grouped events of a similar nature in the same chapter. 
The first chapter, “Media Events and South African National Identity”, looks at 
Dayan and Katz’s theory of media events and the ways in which it applies to national 
identity and to some of the televised occasions that facilitated South Africa’s 
transformation from an apartheid state into a democratic nation. The chapter examines 
the two main critiques of the theory and explains why South Africa serves as a fitting 
case study via which to explore media events theory.  
Chapter 2, “Apartheid and Absence: South Africa’s Exclusion from the Media 
Events of the 60s, 70s and 80s”, discusses the advent of television in South Africa, 
arguing that the arrival of the medium coincided with the country’s exclusion from many 
of the major broadcasting events of the latter half of the twentieth century. Media events 
                                                
 












became a prime site for highlighting South Africa’s pariah status and, on several 
occasions, their power was harnessed by the anti-apartheid movement. The chapter 
argues that the pleasure associated with media events converts to displeasure at exclusion 
from such events, and that this was one of the primary factors leading to white acceptance 
of reform in South Africa. 
Chapter 3, “The Shamanising Ayatollah: Mandela and the Dismantling of 
Apartheid”, examines the lead-up to what is arguably the country’s most important media 
event: the release of Nelson Mandela from prison. The chapter shows how this rare 
televised occasion drew power from several preceding media events, all of which worked 
to imbue Mandela’s image with extraordinary charisma and symbolic capital. The chapter 
argues that this process was not, however, easy to direct. The mass televised broadcasts 
associated with Mandela illustrate the extent to which media events, as with many forms 
of power, are inherently difficult to control and “own”. 
In Chapter 4, “Disrupting the Centre: ‘Liveness’ and the Negotiation of Disaster 
During the Transition”, we look at “liveness” from a different perspective, examining the 
unplanned broadcasting of disaster during the turbulent period between Mandela’s 
release and the country’s first election on 27 April 1994. Although these broadcasts were 
not transmitted “live”, according to Dayan and Katz’s definition, they are equally 
powerful televised moments in South Africa’s history. A number of smaller media events 
– direct addresses and the live broadcasting of funerals – helped to “contain” some of the 
uncertainty of the period, and again we see Mandela’s status benefiting from these. The 
chapter argues that the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) became an 
active player in the transition process at this point and that media events theory requires a 
broader definition of “liveness” to include the unplanned broadcasting of history. 
In Chapter 5, “The Televised Birth of the Rainbow Nation: The Election and 
Mandela’s Inauguration”, I analyse some of the state-sponsored attempts to generate 
support for a “new” South Africa through mass televised events such as the election and 
the inauguration. The chapter argues that, although hegemonic and to a certain extent 
integrative, these events were still highly contested and they favoured the emerging NP–











Chapter 6, “Consolidation: South Africa’s Return to the Global Fold and the 
Making of Madiba”, revisits South Africa’s interaction with popular global televised 
events and tracks the country’s return to the international stage via occasions such the 
1992 Olympics. Since these are occasions of overt displays of nationhood, analysis of the 
events provides a good means of tracking the emerging post-apartheid national identity. 
The final event discussed – the 1995 Rugby World Cup, held in South Africa – illustrates 
the way in which Mandela managed to generate support for the new rainbow nation 
through deft handling of national symbols. The chapter argues that Mandela’s image and 
post-apartheid national identity drew strength from one another, helping to consolidate 
the myths and symbols associated with the “new” South Africa. 
 
The question of socio-political change is complex, and at no point does this thesis mean 
to suggest that the televised events acted as a substitute for real political change in South 
Africa, or that they were solely responsible for the country’s reform. The real agents of 
change were of course the men and women who devoted their lives to the fight against 
apartheid, many of whom had a canny understanding of how to use television to achieve 
their political aims. That said, as discussed in the Chapter 2, and as pointed out by Ron 
Krabill and Rob Nixon,9 the National Party (NP) was right to fear the revolutionary 
effects of the medium on Afrikanerdom, although television’s role in South Africa’s 
reform was realised very differently to the way those who feared it predicted. It was 
much more diffuse and difficult to control. Even though the medium was government-
controlled, and the guidelines for the national television service were based on the 
arguments of those opposed to television, TV still became a useful weapon in the fight 
against apartheid. Media events served as the central arena for this battle. 
 
                                                
 
9 Ron Krabill, Starring Mandela and Cosby: Television and the End(s) of Apartheid (Chicago and London: 
University of Chicago Press: 2010); Rob Nixon, Homelands, Harlem, and Hollywood: South African 













Media Events and South African National Identity 
 
The study of the ritual significance of live televised events can be traced back to the early 
1950s. Kurt and Gladys Lang’s groundbreaking analysis of the broadcasting of the 
MacArthur Day Parade in Chicago in 1951 compared the experiences of television 
viewers with the accounts of those who were present at the parade, finding that television 
viewers were actually more enthralled by the experience.1 While General MacArthur’s 
homecoming from the Korean War did not constitute a global media event, it was 
important in founding the study of live televised events. The British Broadcasting 
Corporation’s (BBC’s) broadcast of Queen Elizabeth’s II’s coronation on 2 June 1953, 
however, can be considered an extraordinary moment in television’s history and it 
provided the next event for analysis, which was taken up by Edward Shils and Michael 
Young.2 After considerable debate in parliament (with Churchill opposing the idea out of 
fear that the presence of cameras would disrupt the sanctity of the occasion),3 the Queen 
insisted on her subjects’ right to participate in the event. Television sales skyrocketed 
with the announcement of the impending broadcast and an estimated 20 million viewers4 
watched the event around the world. Applications for BBC television licences rose by 
50% in the aftermath, and the event is often credited with having “made” the BBC.5  
                                                
 
1 Kurt Lang and Gladys Engel Lang, “The unique perspective of television and its effect: A pilot study”, 
Official Journal of the American Sociological Society, 18 (1) (Feb), 1953, 3–12. 
2 Edward Shils and Michael Young, “The meaning of the coronation”, Sociological Review, 1 (2), 1953, 
63–81. 
3 For more on the controversy over the broadcasting of the coronation, see Arthur Asa Briggs, The History 
of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom, Vol. 4, Sound and Vision (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979). 
4 Roger Parry, The Ascent of Media: From Gilgamesh to Google via Gutenberg (London & Boston: 
Nicholas Brealey Publishing, 2011), 296.  
5 Paddy Scannell, Radio, Television and Modern Life: A Phenomenological Approach (Oxford: Wiley-











How do we explain the mass interest in such events? Lang and Lang found that, 
for television viewers, MacArthur’s homecoming better fulfilled expectations of the 
occasion and that the “significance attached to the video event overshadow[ed] the ‘true’ 
picture of the event”.6 The coronation has been noted mainly for its integrative effect on 
society;7 Shils and Young concluded that “the Coronation was the ceremonial occasion 
for the affirmation of the moral values by which the society lives. It was an act of 
national communion”8 made possible by television technology.  
The celebratory “communion” of the events was also enabled, in part, by the fact 
of their “liveness”. The ability to share in and witness proceedings as they unfold has 
marked several key moments not only in television’s history but also in the history of the 
twentieth century. Other mass televised events such as JF Kennedy’s funeral (1963), the 
moonlanding (1969), and Prince Charles and Lady Diana Spencer’s wedding (1981) also 
constitute major moments in national and global memory. Lang and Lang went on to 
study several subsequent mass televised events including the Kennedy–Nixon debates to 
the congressional hearings of the Watergate scandal, arguing that in both cases live 
television played an important role in political change.9  
A related work, Daniel Boorstin’s 1964 book, The Image: A Guide to Pseudo 
Events in America, critiqued the proliferation of events constructed solely by media 
agents in American culture.10 Boorstin focused on the ways in which media create 
versions of reality – “pseudo events” – that have little to do with people’s everyday 
experiences, and his approach led to the development of a different tradition – marginal 
to this study – focusing on pseudo-events and spectacle and influencing later theorists 
such as Guy Debord.  
                                                
 
6 Lang & Lang, “The unique perspective of television”, 3. 
7 Henrik Örnebring, “Revisiting the coronation: A critical perspective on the coronation of Queen Elizabeth 
II in 1953”, Nordicom Review, 25 (1–2), 2004, 176. 
8 Shils & Young, “The meaning of the coronation”, 67. 
9 In the case of the Kennedy–Nixon debates, they concluded that, although the debates did not lead to 
dramatic shifts in allegience, they tended to work in Kennedy’s favour and made it easier for America to 
accept the final election results (Kurt Lang and Gladys Engel Lang, Television and Politics, New Jersey: 
Transaction Publishers, 2002 [1984]). In the case of the Watergate scandal, they argue that television took 
an “active role in the conflict”, helping to “move impeachment sentiment along” (Kurt Lang and Gladys 
Engel Lang, “Polling on Watergate: The battle for public opinion”, The Public Opinion Quarterly, 44 (4), 
Polls and the New Media: A Symposium, Winter 1980, 532). 












While these studies have proven to be insightful analyses of the role of live 
broadcasting, most remain unique to the contexts that produced them. They examine 
specific events and do not provide a general theory of live television events. It was not 
until the publication of Daniel Dayan and Elihu Katz’s pioneering 1992 book Media 
Events: The Live Broadcasting of History that these powerful broadcasting events were 
analysed as a kind of television “genre”, aiding scholars in a variety of disciplines 
(including sociology, history, media studies, politics and anthropology) to understand the 
symbolic influence of such events on society as well as the sometimes contradictory ways 
in which television helps to unify societies. Dayan and Katz posit that in addition to the 
banal, everyday consumption of television, a unique, ritualised and extremely powerful 
genre emerged during the first forty years of broadcasting. Based on intensive research, 
beginning with an examination of Egyptian President Anwar-Sadat’s 1977 televised visit 
to Jerusalem, and continuing with similar events throughout the 1980s, they make a case 
for the study of rare, preplanned live broadcasts that operate as a modern conduit for 
public and historical ceremonies. In line with Shils and Young, they argue that the mass 
interest in certain televised events can be explained by the pleasure derived from sharing 
in an expression of society’s “sacred centre”.11 
 
What Are Media Events? 
Media events, as Dayan and Katz term them, are typically remote (i.e., they occur outside 
the studio), they monopolise broadcasting channels by enthralling mass national (and 
sometimes global) audiences and they are credited with exceptional historic value. The 
events, which conquer “not only space but time”, “have the power to declare a holiday, 
thus to play a part in the civil religion” of a nation. 12 Importantly, “even when these 
events address conflict, as they do, they celebrate not conflict but reconciliation”, 
differing markedly from the “daily news event, where conflict is the inevitable subject”.13 
As such, media events can be seen as extremely effective nation-building tools; in the 
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words of the authors, “these broadcasts in egrate societies in a collective heartbeat and 
evoke a renewal of loyalty to the society and its legitimate authority”.14  
While real-life ceremonial events (such as the 1953 coronation) provided early 
content for these kinds of broadcasts, the genre is not limited to such subject matter, and 
the televising of ceremony alone does not necessarily constitute a media event; instead 
the events themselves serve as a kind of modern-day ceremony in the Durkheimian sense. 
Media events are thus rituals that work to hold society together. Their ceremonial nature 
extends to their viewing context; frequently, media events are highly social occasions, 
often accompanied by the special preparation of food and after- and/or before-parties.15 
In fact, as some studies have found, the act of viewing a media event alone can be 
distinctly alienating as it somehow inhibits participation in the event.16  
Their ceremonial nature is also realised in their structure. The authors distinguish 
between three different narrative types or “scripts”: the Contest, the Coronation and the 
Conquest,17 all linked to Max Weber’s forms of authority – rational-legal, traditional and 
charismatic – in some way.18 Added to this, and frequently excluded from discussions of 
the theory, is a rare sub-genre of the Conquest, the shamanising media event,19 arguably 
the most powerful form of media event. 
The first type, the Contest, includes events that “celebrate”, ironically, some kind 
of conflict, competition or clash – usually a challenge between two men or teams, with a 
set of rules accepted by all parties. The viewer is positioned as the absent “judge” of the 
event, which is mediated by a non-partisan TV presenter. Because Contests are usually 
recurrent or cyclical events, they are also the most frequent form of media events, and 
sporting competitions provide the most pervasive examples. Other forms include election 
debates and televised senate hearings. Scholars soon started to use media events theory to 
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shed light on specific sports mega-events and vice versa. Recently, for instance, a 
collection of essays on the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games edited by Monroe Edwin Price 
and Daniel Dayan uses the mega-event to examine the changing nature of the media 
events genre.20  
Post-apartheid South Africa enjoyed a proliferation of Contest-style media events, 
including a one-off pre-election debate (see Chapter 5) and a glut of sporting matches 
whose impact was increased because of the country’s exclusion from such events under 
apartheid (see Chapters 2 and 6). 
The second type of media event, the Coronation, includes the live broadcasting of 
ceremonial occasions, such as weddings, inaugurations and funerals, which are bound by 
the rules of tradition. Their fascination stems from the magic of ritual; “they deal in the 
mysteries of rites of passage”, pitting “society and culture against nature”.21 The TV 
presenter usually adopts a reverent tone, while the viewer is positioned as a witness to the 
ceremony. Princess Diana’s wedding (1981) and funeral (1997) provide some of the most 
memorable examples of this script in the Western world, and numerous scholars have 
found media events theory useful in uncovering their significance for British society.22 In 
the South African context, the inauguration of Nelson Mandela (see Chapter 5) falls into 
this category. 
 Conquests, the third script, are the rarest form of media event because they are 
unique (i.e., once-off) and because, unlike Contests and Coronations, they tend to break 
rules. Typically, they involve the charisma of a televised hero, who crosses geographical 
or symbolic borders to reach some goal and proclaim “a new symbolic order”.23 The 
audience withholds disbelief, while the television presenter adopts a bardic tone. The 
1969 moonlanding provides the most famous example of this script. In South Africa, 
there were various attempts (not always successful) at staging Conquest-style media 
events, including PW Botha’s failed Rubicon speech (see Chapter 2) and FW de Klerk’s 
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parliamentary address on 2 February 1990 (see Chapter 3). In some ways, the South 
African election played out as a kind of conquest media event. 
 Shamanising media events constitute an even rarer form of this kind of broadcast. 
While the other three scripts are hegemonic or “reinforcing” – reminding “societies to 
renew their commitments to established values, offices and persons” – shamanising 
events are “transformative”24 and “seek to influence a future reality”.25 The function of 
the shamanising media event differs from the “restorative” function of Contests and 
Coronations; even if they may be hegemonic in origin, they “involve a discernable 
change in both the symbolic and the real”.26 Also, unlike the sporting contest or wedding 
ceremony, for example, shamanising media events do not rely on any external event: 
 
The ceremonies contain their events within them: they are the event … 
There is, of course, a general context from which the event takes its 
meaning and a genre of ceremonial protocol that is called upon. But as 
far as specific events are concerned, the ceremony is the event and the 
event is the ceremony.27  
 
Dayan and Katz mention here Sadat’s 1977 visit to Israel and Pope John Paul II’s visit to 
Poland in 1979 when it was still under communist rule. Both cases involved historic 
“firsts”: Sadat was the first Arab leader to visit Israel, while John Paul II was the first 
pope to visit a communist country. Mandela’s release from prison after 27 years’ 
incarceration (see Chapter 3) also falls into this category. In Dayan and Katz’s analysis, 
these are the televised occasions that have the potential to trigger longer-term political 
effects. 
While there is considerable debate over the validity of Dayan and Katz’s approach 
to media events (discussed below), few would disagree that they are worthy of study. 
Firstly, as the authors point out, they attract the largest audiences in the modern world. 
Importantly, these are audiences with “veto power”;28 for a television broadcast to qualify 
as a media event, mass audiences are required – something that is often forgotten in 
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discussions on their relationship with power. Audiences must willingly accept, promote 
and celebrate their importance, and media events can thus serve as barometers of national 
and global feeling. Because of this, Dayan and Katz assert that media events are 
essentially a phenomenon of democratic societies; totalitarian states are limited to 
ceremonial “establishment initiatives” which in democratic societies might not proceed 
without appropriate endorsement.29 For this reason, perhaps, the theory has also proved 
rich in analyses of sporting and cultural events associated with the Western-democratic 
world, such as the Olympics30 and Miss World.31 Because of their link with democratic 
nations, case studies also often emerge from societies in transition. Since the mounting 
and reception of media events can reveal much about the political context in which they 
are produced, scholars have focused on media events’ role in Germany’s reunification,32 
for instance, and the invention of a new Russian tradition.33 This may also well be 
because, as Dayan and Katz point out, dramatic examples of shamanising media events 
are “provided by the live broadcast of the mass demand for political change in Eastern 
Europe in the fall of 1989”,34 and their own work draws on events in countries such as 
Czechoslovakia. South Africa’s transformation offers another fruitful context in which to 
examine the workings of media events. 
Secondly – and this is no doubt part of their magic – media events “realise the full 
potential of electronic media technology,”35 collapsing boundaries of time and space. 
“Liveness,” Wendy Davis argues, “is a feature of all television images”,36 and media 
events, Jérôme Bourdon points out, are moments of “maximum liveness”,37 fulfilling, or 
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almost fulfilling, television’s underlying promise of transmitting reality directly. Paddy 
Scannell’s comment on the liveness of television accounts for the mesmerising nature of 
media events: 
 
The liveness of the world returns through the liveness of radio and television 
– their most fundamental common characteristic. This liveness is here 
understood as the specific temporality, the phenomenal now of broadcasting: 
and this now is magical.38 
 
While live transmission is not the only characteristic of media events, it is perhaps the 
most important. Liveness, as the subtitle of Dayan and Katz’s work suggests, has the 
power to historicise events almost instantly39 – a function that is surprising; as John Fiske 
points out, “liveness, presence and immediacy, in most conventional senses, are 
implicitly opposed to history as closed, absent or past”.40 Of course, broadcasters 
consistently make claims for the future “historic” importance of their content. While 
Fiske dismisses this, saying, as early as 1992, that “there is too much history, as nearly 
everything is historical at one point or another”,41 media events offer up true historic 
moments, thereby contributing to the promotion of national consciousness (discussed 
below) and aiding events-oriented historical processes. The question of liveness threads 
throughout this thesis and is linked to both audience pleasure and attempts to legitimate 
broadcasting (and state) authority in South Africa in the post-apartheid period. 
Thirdly, according to Dayan and Katz, media events have the power to “create 
their own constituencies”, albeit “momentarily”.42 In the South African transition context, 
this function is of paramount importance. The several “mini-nations” created by 
apartheid’s policy of separate development were (and still are) required to unite on a 
social, cultural and political level. The integrative possibilities promised by media events 
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were implicitly accepted by the South African government, as can be seen by its bids to 
host sporting mega-events (such as the 1995 Rugby World Cup, the 2004 Olympics, the 
2006 FIFA World Cup, the 2007 Cricket World Cup and, most recently, the 2010 FIFA 
World Cup). 
The significance of Dayan and Katz’s work was recognised almost immediately, 
with various reviews anticipating the usefulness of the theory. George Gerbner described 
Media Events as “the first full-fledged scholarly treatment of a phenomenon that merits 
continuing attention and study”,43 while Robert Snow claimed it was “a major 
contribution to the effort to legitimize the study of television within the discipline of 
sociology”.44 But perhaps more important than the reviews is the future research that 
Media Events has encouraged. As David Kertzer anticipated, the theory provided “an 
important stimulus to future research, a challenge to social scientists to bring the study of 
television into the mainstream of political analysis”.45 
 
Critiques of the Theory 
Much of the subsequent research has developed from what Dayan and Katz were not abl
to examine in Media Events, from what they left out or overlooked. In addition, 
technological developments have led to changes in broadcasting structures, altering the 
way in which mass televised events are staged, and various scholars have taken the 
theory forward to develop new ritual genres.  
Early reviews of the book were quick to identify some of the limitations of their 
approach. Two major, interlinked critiques emerged. The first focuses on what George 
Gerbner termed their “optimistic”46approach to the supposedly independent relationship 
between broadcasters and political officeholders in democratic societies. Snow, for 
instance, argues that “[i]n discussing how it may reshape reality they ignore the question 
of ideology and focus on how the performance of events through television alters 
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particularly the emotional experience of the event”,47 while Susan Davies bewails the fact 
that, in her view, political power is absent from the discussion at a time when “an 
understanding of societies as structured by power relations or riven by inequalities seems 
more or less unavoidable”.48 Davies and Snow are no doubt reacting to Dayan and Katz’s 
claim that the manipulative potential of media events and the vulnerability of their 
audiences are diluted by the separation between broadcasters and government in 
democratic societies.49 As Marxist, feminist and political economy theory have shown, 
state abuse of power is but one form of political manipulation.  
A more sustained critique of this view comes from Nick Couldry, whose chapter 
“Rethinking media events” in Media Rituals: A Critical Approach argues that the 
weakness of media events theory stems from Dayan and Katz’s “desire to make it work 
for neo-Durkheimian ends”.50 While Couldry’s reading of Dayan and Katz is more 
nuanced than some of the early reviews and he recognises that the authors are “hardly 
naive about the ideological conflicts involved in constructing media events”,51 he is 
nevertheless sceptical of the claim that media events “always have positive, hegemonic 
effects”52 and argues that this is only so because Dayan and Katz place extra (and 
unnecessary) limitations on their definition of the genre.  
Couldry’s call for a rethinking of the theory arises from his discomfort with the 
idea that mass televised events act as conduits for modern ritual. Describing their 
approach as “functionalist”, he sides “with those who are suspicious of ‘events’ as the 
source of deeper truth”53 and doubts the integrative effects of events such as the funeral 
of Princess Diana.54 He calls for further unpacking of the relationship between 
broadcasters and the construction of societal myths: “Media events,” he claims, “are in 
crucial respects constructions, not expressions, of the social order, processes which 
construct not only our sense of a social ‘centre’, but also the media’s privileged relation 
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to that centre.”55 He makes a case for a broader, less ambitious redefinition of media 
events as “those large-scale event-based media-focused narratives where the claims 
associated with the myth of the mediated centre are particularly intense”.56   
While it may be true that Dayan and Katz do not establish a set of identifying 
principles via which media events are staged, they do in fact encourage the study of such, 
even if they don’t explore specific instances themselves. In their section on why scholars 
should take note of the genre, they posit that, although media events are not the same as 
the “staged events of revolutionary regimes”, “the question of hegemonic abuse must be 
asked continually”, especially since the events are mainly “establishment initiated, and 
only rarely, one suspects, do broadcasters say no”57 to their transmission. The suggestion 
is that the manipulative potential of media events is perhaps more subtle, and their theory 
does not, in my view, preclude analysis of power. On the contrary, understanding the 
aesthetic demands and potential effects of the genre aids such analyses. As Dayan has 
emphasised elsewhere, “[by] stressing the ritual dimension, you tend to narrow your 
corpus, but you get a better focus on the symbolic power of gestures”.58 
 The question of the integrative effects of media events is more controversial and 
more difficult to determine. As is often the case with media effects claims, it is near 
impossible to establish direct causal links because of the wide range of additional 
influencing factors. The use of sociological ritual theory doesn’t necessarily make it 
easier. As Couldry points out, the problem with neo-Durkheimian analyses of ritual is 
that it is difficult to prove that society is held together by a shared set of values: 
 
The fact that societies are stable (in the sense that they are not in the throes 
of civil war) does not necessarily mean that they have a shared set of 
values … or (even if they do) that it is these values, rather than something 
else entirely (inertia, coercion in its various forms, despair – the list of 
possible causes is endless!) that ‘holds them together’.59 
 
                                                
 
55 Ibid., 56 [original emphasis]. 
56 Ibid., 69. 
57 Dayan & Katz, Media Events, 18–19.  
58 Esther Chin, “Bearing witness – Between the professional and the personal: An interview with Daniel 
Dayan”, PLATFORM: Journal of Media and Communication, 2 (1) (Jan), 2010, 37.  











Indeed, others, Couldry included, wonder about the integrative effects of media events in 
diverse societies. Robert Compton notes that “Dayan and Katz exclude an examination of 
how media events, as they narrowly define them, are situated within a broader system of 
news production and civil society – a civil society stratified along social cleavages such 
as class, race and gender”.60 And in their introduction to Media Events in a Global Age, 
Couldry, Hepp and Krotz ask what happens to the supposedly unifying effects of media 
events once one moves beyond national frameworks: 
 
The problem with this account of media events if understood from this 
perspective [i.e., that they are rituals based on a common set of values 
holding society together] lies in the implicit understanding of societies being 
stable and marked – an assumption that is highly doubtful if we consider 
contemporary, fragmented ‘late’ or ‘post’-modern societies, and has perhaps 
always been doubtful.61  
 
South Africa in the early 1990s provides an interesting case study, as it tests this critique 
of media events. The transition period catches the country at a unique time, when the 
racially divided groups created by colonialism and apartheid were required to unite under 
a shared national identity within a democratic context, just as the country was opening its 
borders and airwaves to global competition. In many ways, the country needed 
nationalism just when nationalism was going out of fashion.62 As Gerhard Maré put it: 
“[T]he contemporary world is characterised by the conflicting, if related, pressures of 
globalisation and fragmentation, while South Africa has to deal with these same issues 
overlaid onto the apartheid social contours and erosions.”63 The role of media events in 
responding to these challenges is potentially fascinating. 
Suffice to say, Dayan and Katz reserve claims about the truly transformative 
effects of media events for the very rare shamanising genre. The broader claims about the 
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effects of the genre are limited to the momentary consideration of the possibility of 
change: “Even if the situations in which they are immersed are short-lived and do not 
institutionalize new norms, at least they provoke critical awareness of the taken-for-
granted and mental appraisal of alternative possibilities.”64 Moreover, while the effects of 
the liminality of media events may offer transformative possibilities, Dayan and Katz 
acknowledge that these might be flitting and argue that, except in very rare cases, they 
tend to remain at the level of reaffirmation. They curtail overly grand claims for media 
events with various provisos throughout the book: 
 
The message is one of reconciliation in which participants and audiences are 
invited to unite in the overcoming of conflict or at least in its postponement 
or miniaturization.65 
 
They call for a cessation of hostilities, at least for a moment, as when the 
royal wedding halted the street fighting in Brixton and the terror in Northern 
Ireland.66 
 
Thus the media have the power not only to insert messages into social 
networks but to create the networks themselves – to atomize, to integrate, or 
otherwise to design social structure – at least momentarily.67 
 
It is characteristic of such events that they bring former antagonists to 
reconsider, or at least to suspend, their antagonism.68 
 
Conquests require their audiences to adopt a ‘commissive’ role. They are 
converts, at least for a moment, to a new definition of the possible.69 
 
Even so, as Scannell points out, Dayan and Katz provide little empirical evidence to 
suggest that these moments of integration actually exist, and the book lacks “historical 
depth”.70 Dayan and Katz claim that the reason for this is because “very few events have 
been studied empirically from the point of view of their effects”.71 It is thus left to 
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subsequent case study analyses to test the assumptions about the events and to provide 
more detail on how media events operate in specific national and historical contexts. 
A number of critics have also argued for the inclusion of mass televised events that 
are not integrative in their effect, leading to the second broad critique of the theory, more 
firmly located within the discipline of media studies. This critique argues that the 
categories of media events are too “narrow” as they overlook the ritual (and political) 
significance of unplanned live broadcasting events, events that are equally powerful and 
attract equally large audiences. Kertzner suggested that “one obstacle to Dayan and 
Katz’s approach in judging the political impact of the live broadcasting of political events 
is their restriction of media events to those that are staged, that is, that have official 
organizers and a timetable”.72  
James Carey went on to make a case for the significance of television formats that 
serve not as unifying ceremonies but as rituals of excommunication, shame and status 
degradation.73 Similarly, Tamar Liebes conceptualised the genre of “disaster marathons” 
– ongoing, live reporting on unfolding disaster – a genre that shares a high number of 
characteristics with media events – in that it monopolises and interrupts everyday 
viewing, but which focuses on unplanned and unexpected events.74 I  2007 Katz and 
Liebes co-wrote a supplement to Media Events, arguing that changes in broadcasting 
technology necessitated a revision of the original theory. Because of increasing audience 
disenchantment and segmentation, they argued, television was experiencing a rise in the 
live broadcasting of war, terror and disaster. Scholars of media events thus need to take 
account of what they term “disruptive” events, “co-productions of broadcasters and anti-
establishment agencies”.75 Dayan, too, has examined the afterlife of media events and the 
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effect of growing audience cynicism on the genre.76 The key element in all these 
reworkings is that of preplanning. 
Chapter 4 of this thesis looks at some of the other television events that were 
important during the South African transition, particularly the unplanned televising of 
disaster and violence. Granted, the period examined precedes the development of 
television technology that allowed for immediate broadcasting (and the instances 
examined were usually broadcast fter they occurred), but all the signs of the 
forthcoming changes identified by Katz and Liebes are evident in the symbolic meaning 
of these televised moments. 
 
Media Events Today 
The overall consensus is that the heyday of media events – and the idea of televised 
media occasions promoting unified effects – was linked to a particular era of 
broadcasting that is fast vanishing or has indeed vanished. Technological developments – 
including multichannel broadcasting, which has segmented audiences, and the increased 
ubiquity of television cameras, which allows for an increase in the live broadcasting of 
unplanned events – mean that classic media events seldom capture the attention of 
audiences as they used to. The book anticipates this, and both authors, in separate 
accounts, have written about the ways in which the broadcasting of integration (of which 
media events forms a part) is on the wane, arguing that television is following the path of 
radio in becoming a medium of segmentation. Katz argues that: 
 
The television of ‘sharedess’ – of nation-building and family togetherness – 
is no longer with us, having made room for a television of hundreds of 
channels, of ‘niche’ broadcasting, of portability, one that is part of a system 
that integrates with the Internet and the other new media.77 
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Dayan notes that there is an ever-increasing number of “‘almost’ media events”,78 putting 
the genre at risk of banalisation. This in turn has led to audience “disenchantment”, while 
technological developments such as the mobile phone have led to increased audience 
distraction. Scannell’s review also pointed out that the genre’s lifespan would be 
threatened by the “pay-per-view and pay-per-channel phenomenon”, going so far as to 
say that media events might already “be a part of ‘the world we have lost’ – a trace 
memory of the past rather than the shape of things to come”.79 
While there is something nostalgic about Dayan and Katz’s account, it remains to 
be seen whether the genre can adapt to take account of its challenges, including 
technological changes, the competition from more conflict-driven television formats, 
economic changes affecting television access, as well as the growing “disenchantment” 
of audiences. US President Barack Obama’s 2008 victory speech, which attracted mass 
global audiences, seems to suggest a mutation of the genre to draw on the collected 
strength of a variety of New Media Technologies. The Chilean miner rescue operation in 
2010 was frequently likened to the moonlanding and many noted the integrative effects 
of the 22-hour broadcast, which combined both the disaster marathon and the media 
event. The wedding of Prince William and Kate Middleton in 2011 also attracted large 
television audiences, peaking at 24 million in the United Kingdom.80 But whether these 
events will occupy a place in global collective memory remains to be seen.  
 It is perhaps true to say that media events theory is most useful to scholars 
looking at the historical context of national broadcasting, as Dayan has subsequently 
pointed out.81 This thesis uses the theory to aid analysis of South Africa’s recent 
broadcasting history. South Africa came late to both television (see Chapter 2) and 
democracy, giving it only a small window period during which to bask in the integrative 
effects of broadcasting genres associated with democratic processes and nation-building. 
In addition, because of television’s late arrival, it is likely that broadcasting trends were 
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slightly out of date in the country, giving it a slighter longer period during which to 
experiment with the power of media events. At the same time, the SABC was appeared to 
be striving for national unity, experimenting with subtitles and multilingualism within 
broadcasts and attempting to cater for a wider, more unified national audience. Although 
M-Net, the country’s first subscription television service, was launched in 1986, it was 
too expensive to pose too much of a risk to the broadcaster. The assumption, thus, is that 
in the early 1990s television (and media events specifically) aided the country in 
overcoming the challenge of a lack of national identity and worked as a unifying force. 
This is another reason why South Africa’s recent history provides a potentially 
fascinating case study for media events theory.  
 
Media Events and National Identity 
While, as Michael Billig argues, studies in nationalism have tended to focus on extreme 
and “peripheral” forms of the phenomenon, studies on the link between national identity 
and the media have highlighted ubiquitous, everyday media forms. Billig’s own theory of 
“banal nationalism” highlights the ways in which national identity is constantly “flagged” 
in the everyday symbols and deictic language used by national media, keeping 
nationhood alive in modern Western countries.82 And Benedict Anderson’s theory of 
“imagined communities” links the development of national consciousness in Europe with 
the rise of what he terms “print capitalism” and the habitual consumption of 
newspapers.83 In some ways, as Katz himself has pointed out,84 media events theory 
serves as a supplement to Anderson’s work. Like Dayan and Katz, Anderson’s “imagined 
community” is based on the assumption that mass, simultaneous consumption has an 
integrative effect: 
 
The obsolescence of the newspaper on the morrow of its printing … 
creates this extraordinary mass ceremony: the almost precisely 
simultaneous consumption (‘imagining’) of the newspaper-as-fiction. … 
The significance of this mass ceremony – Hegel observed that newspapers 
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serve modern man as a substitute for morning prayers – is paradoxical. It 
is performed in silent privacy, in the lair of the skull. Yet each 
communicant is well aware that the ceremony he performs is being 
replicated by thousands (or millions) of others of whose existence he is 
confident, yet of whose identity he has not the slightest notion.85 
 
But, unlike the daily consumption of newspapers, performed in the “lair of the skull” 
(private, but paradoxically mass), the viewing of media events is rare rather than 
everyday because their content is historic.86 Anderson’s “mass ceremony” would equate 
to watching national news on a daily basis – a habitual ritual closer to Billig’s theory 
rather than a ceremony in the sense described by Dayan and Katz. Katz’s subsequent 
work on the effects of multichannel broadcasting suggest that this form of “daily 
communion” is also on the wane.87 
While Anderson is in agreement with Billig about the omnipresent nature of 
national flagging in everyday television formats such as the news and the weather report, 
his comments on sporting occasions such as the Olympic Games suggest a special role 
for media-event style broadcasts in the development of a sense of nationhood: 
 
The rise of the Inter-Nation Olympic Games historically occurred close to 
the arrival of the League of Nations. They seemed like a harmless substitute 
for war. But television changed everything, giving a new kind of importance 
even to intra-nation athletics. The enormous amount of watching time 
devoted to sports shows us the modern importance of a continuous parade of 
perfect national bodies – healthy, strong, fast, powerful, elegant, beautiful 
and often ‘winning’.88 
  
It would seem that media events offer occasions for heightened national identity 
formation, multiplying the potential effects of the everyday consumption of television on 
national consciousness. Not only do they offer a more extreme form of mass, 
simultaneous consumption, they are also often occasions at which national symbols are 
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displayed and celebrated, often to the rest of the world. This is particularly true of the 
most common script, the Contest, which explains why studies on media events and 
national identity have tended to focus on sporting mega-events. These events also serve 
as prime sites of interplay between national and global interests. 
In addition, media events are pivotal in the creation of collective memory, which 
various scholars have identified as one of the core prerequisites of nationhood, even if 
what is required is often, as Ernest Renan’s famous 1882 definition pointed out, a 
somewhat selective memory of the past.89 Writing about the link between collective 
memory and sport, Grant Jarvie identifies three requirements as integral to the formation 
of collective identity: “a sense of continuity between the experiences of successive 
generations”; “shared memories of specific events and personages which have been 
turning points for a collective or national history”; and “a sense of a common destiny on 
the part of those groups sharing those experiences”.90 Media events are uniquely placed 
to meet all three of these requirements. Not only do they often serve as historical 
highlights, frequently engaging with historical destiny, but, as Dayan and Katz point out, 
their viewing context provides an intimate experience of events, because “[f]amily 
members experience the event together, thus strengthening group memory and 
generational ties”.91  
Indeed, the growing discipline of “memory studies” has identified a number of 
these broadcasts as pivotal in the formation of collective memory, both global and 
national. Dayan and Katz’s assertion that “media events and their narration are in 
competition with the writing of history in defining the contents of national collective 
memory”92 is borne out by several studies. Bourdon’s analysis of the television memories 
of forty life stories found that viewers recalled “the strong and pleasant emotions 
connected with the sense of participating in mass ceremonies (re)instating major social 
norms”.93 Ingrid Volkmer’s broader examination across cultures and generations found 
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that television news, and media events specifically, contributed not only to a sense of 
national history but also to the formation of global collective memory.94 In the long term, 
media events can thus be seen as important contributors to the creation of a national 
mythology and the sense of a shared past; in the shorter term, their viewing bolsters the 
processes of globalisation.  
In spite of these obvious connections, as Scannell pointed out in his review of 
Media Events, the authors do not pursue “the question of the historical development of 
nationalism, and the use of ceremony and spectacle to forge national identities”.95 In 
addition, further studies have tended to focus on media rituals that reaffirm national 
identity, even though several of the events identified in the book deal with the 
renegotiation of nationhood. Sabina Mihelj notes that “the main focus is on media rituals 
which affirm and re-enact existing national institutions and balances of power. The fact 
that media events may also be involved in processes of national identity transformation or 
deconstruction is largely ignored”.96 South Africa during the period under review 
provides a fertile site for the exploration of these possibilities, as the terms “old”, “new” 
and “post-apartheid” South Africa imply. 
 
Approaching Media Events 
Studies have found that South Africans rapidly developed a strong sense of civic 
nationalism in the early 1990s.97 Because of the country’s divisive history, this is 
somewhat surprising; Mahmood Mamdani remarked that few would have predicted that 
the violence in Africa in 1994 would be in Rwanda and not South Africa.98 Given media 
events’ role in the formation of a civil religion, I am interested in what these events can 
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tell us about South Africans’ relationship with “the centre” during the transition – 
arguably the most turbulent time in the country’s history – and I believe that the different 
ways in which intranational groups consumed and celebrated televised occasions is 
potentially revealing. 
But, as critics have pointed out, while Dayan and Katz’s work elucidates the 
potential effects of mass televised events, there are few guidelines about how to go about 
studying them. Their chapter “Reviewing media events” provides some clues about 
where to start. In it, they propose several points of interest, including the “inside” effects 
on participants of the event (including organisers and principals, broadcasters and 
viewers) as well as the “outside” effects on institutions (including public opinion, 
political institutions, leisure, religion, public ceremony and collective memory). Many 
(but not all) of these are discussed at some point in this thesis. Mandela’s release, for 
instance, lends itself to a discussion on the effects on the South African broadcaster or 
collective memory, while an event such as the 1995 Rugby World Cup has generated 
much debate about the effects on viewers.  
In an attempt to gauge the effect of media events on post-apartheid South African 
national identity, and also to “fill in” some of the historical detail lacking from Dayan and 
Katz’s original work, I have tried to place all of the events discussed within their 
historical context. Media events do not of course happen in a vacuum, and I argue that the 
power of certain events (such as Mandela’s release) builds upon the mounting influence 
of previous high-profile media occurrences, some of them media events or “mini” media 
events in themselves. I have tried to gather information about the planning and intended 
effects of each event and then compared these to viewer responses insofar as they are 
expressed in national (and international) newspapers at the time. To a certain extent, 
viewership figures, obtained from the South African Advertising Research Foundation 
(SAARF), have also been useful in determining citizens’ investment in televised 
occasions. 
Henrick Örnebring99 points out that classic media events studies focus exclusively 
on broadcasting, yet tend to use “media” as a general term. He proposes looking to a 
                                                
 











broader range of media when studying their construction. There are two good reasons for 
this: one is that other media forms clearly contribute to the construction of media events; 
media events frequently interact with print media symbiotically (although they sometimes 
disagree on the meanings of occasions) and newspapers are partly responsible for 
ensuring mass viewing by celebrating the occasion in the days leading up to the 
broadcast. As Compton points out, “a crucial aspect of these media events is the extent to 
which cultural performances so thoroughly resonate throughout the mediascape”.100 The 
second is that analysing other forms of media provides a gauge of varying public 
reactions to media events, since newspapers also often analyse their meaning in post-
event coverage and reproduce iconic imagery of the event. If one is interested in 
examining multiple discourses around an event, as Örnebring argues one should, then 
newspapers in particular provide good empirical material. This is especially true when 
engaging in a historical study such as this.  
Certain events – particularly those involving speechs and symbols of national 
significance – lend themselves to content analysis, and I have tried to assess the effect of 
these on the growing acceptance of South Africa’s new post-apartheid identity by 
identifying national metaphors and iconic images that originate from media events. 
YouTube – which can be seen perhaps as a kind global visual archive – has been useful 
in determining the relationship between media events and collective memory, and many 
of the events I discussed have been uploaded by viewers wishing to remember significant 
televised occasions.  
Also of use was Friedrich Krotz’s application of Pierre Bourdieu’s work on 
“capitals” to media events theory.101 Arguing for the importance of assessing the political 
interests behind media events, Krotz suggests that media events organisers frequently 
invest some form of capital – be it economic, cultural, social and/or symbolic – in the 
hope of generating a return. Looking at the “capital” investment and gain of media events 
illuminates the risks associated with their staging. Because they require buy-in from other 
media platforms and from audiences, their effects are not guaranteed. In the South 
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African case, there are several examples of failed media events or media events that 
generated unexpected forms of capital (see Chapters 2 and 3). This model can be seen in 
the country today even; there was much discussion over the state’s economic investment 
in the 2010 FIFA World Cup and whether the symbolic and economic return of hosting 
the mega-event was justified by the monetary outlay. With each event discussed, I have 
tried to assess the forms of “capital” invested and recouped. 
 
Various scholars have noted the link between some of the larger media events and South 
Africa’s transformation to democracy. Kirsten Skare Orgeret, for instance, has written 
about Nelson Mandela’s inauguration as a Coronation;102 Eric Louw has noted the effects 
of the Mandela freedom concerts, as well as Mandela’s televised release;103 nd Ron 
Krabill and Charmaine McEachern have both written about South Africa’s Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) as a media event.104 But this is the first full-length 
historical study of the role of live broadcasting during the transition. The hope is twofold: 
(1) that Dayan and Katz’s theory will elucidate more about the symbolic role that live 
broadcasts played in this fascinating and critical stage in South Africa’s history, and (2) 
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Apartheid and Absence: South Africa’s Exclusion from 
Media Events of the 60s, 70s and 80s 
 
An event is seen from a given place; this place and its distance from the centre of the 
event tells you (and others) who you are. 
– Daniel Dayan and Elihu Katz 1 
 
Much of the power of the live broadcasting events of the early 1990s stemmed from 
apartheid South Africa’s non-participation (and restricted participation) in the global 
televisual spectacles of the 1960s, 70s and 80s. The joyous embrace of the country’s new 
post-apartheid national identity should be seen in the context of South Africa’s growing 
exclusion from televised international events during television’s heyday.  
Initially, South Africa’s “separate development” from the rest of the world was 
self-inflicted, determined by internal rather than external politics because of the NP 
government’s so-called “ban on TV”. With no television service in the 1950s or 60s, the 
country missed the integrative effects of global media events such as JF Kennedy’s 
funeral and the moonlanding.  
When, in 1969, increased sophistication in satellite technology presented an even 
greater threat than a national television service, giving citizens the option of acquiring 
international television, the National Party (NP) capitulated, but SABC TV still only 
began broadcasting in 1976, about two decades later than most developed nations.  
                                                
 











The arrival of television presented new challenges to Afrikaner hegemony. 
Increasing globalisation altered the make-up of nation states, making it more and more 
difficult for older forms of ethno-nationalism to survive. As mentioned in Chapter 1, 
Anderson points out that the rise of the inter-nation Olympic Games occurred at much the 
same time as the arrival of the League of Nations and that, in the process of normalising 
the nation state, “television changed everything, giving a new kind of importance even to 
intra-nation athletics”.2 Not only did television serve as a primary means of raising 
awareness of fellow citizens within the nation, it also transcended domestic boundaries 
and increased awareness of other nations, often providing a platform for nations to 
compete against and display themselves to each other. In the South African context, 
Jonathan Hyslop argues that the socio-political changes of the 1970s and 80s meant that 
“for all but the most recalcitrant whites, explaining themselves to imagined external 
interlocutors became a central concern” and “nothing did so much to create this desire for 
accounting than the coming of television”.3 While media events are primarily studied for 
the integrative effects of their viewing in a national context, this period of South Africa’s 
history demonstrates the ways in which they also began to function globally as 
instruments of exclusion. 
The need to “account” and to secure global approval helped to effect and 
consolidate the political transition. There were various reasons why television helped to 
disarm white resistance to change.4 Firstly, white South Africans’ growing exclusion 
from the international community precipitated a bitter sense of shame and resentment; 
secondly, television helped to widen the chasm between English and Afrikaner interests, 
making it harder for Afrikaner nationalism to endure; thirdly, exposure to the televised 
products of other countries (particularly when they involved South Africa) sowed distrust 
in the national television service and sparked the desire for a public rather than state 
broadcasting service; and, fourthly, television fostered white South Africans’ “ability to 
conceive of themselves as part of the same nation as Black South Africans”.5  
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Media events were particularly influential in these processes. The popularity of 
key international contests such as the Olympics grew in conjunction with the evolution of 
television and they soon became the most powerful means of projecting national identity 
in the global sphere. Yet, access to these platforms was limited and controlled, 
establishing television as a prime site not only for the articulation of changing senses of 
national identity but also of entrenched political ideologies, giving power blocs such as 
the United Nations the means to publicly “punish” and “reward” countries when they 
disapproved or approved of their domestic policies. Television became a stage for the 
playing out of political grudges and the staging of alliances. Thus, even after finally 
acquiring a television service, South Africa found that it was excluded from a number of 
popular celebrations of national identity, events that were more often than not televised. 
As the civil rights movement gained momentum in other countries, and as escalating 
numbers of African states achieved independence, the country was set apart as a pariah 
state, as the “polecat” of the world. 
In addition, South Africa’s ability to enjoy the cultural products of Britain was 
diminished by the trade-union Equity ban, making it difficult for the NP to satisfy the 
cultural appetite of the English-speaking white community at a time when it was growing 
more and more reliant on their votes.6 Increasing (white) emigration suggested 
dissatisfaction with the politics, economy and culture of the country and saw the loss of 
much needed skills.  
There were a number of key media events that exacerbated the situation, 
including the Olympics and a variety of other sporting contests, the Miss World and Miss 
Universe contests and the 1981 royal wedding of Prince Charles and Lady Diana 
Spencer. While South Africa attempted on several occasions to stage its own media 
events, for the most part such endeavours were limited and ineffective, though they 
succeeded in temporarily quelling the thirst for international competition. In addition, 
failed media events, such as PW Botha’s Rubicon speech, exposed the NP’s ineptitude at 
orchestrating global displays as well as their limited understanding of international 
perceptions of the country. 
                                                
 











As televised events, fuelled by technology, became an increasing part of everyday 
life elsewhere in the world, so the exclusion from such events – and the inability to stage 
them – became more and more humiliating for South Africans, who began to feel 
themselves as “set apart”, cut off and shamed.  
 
‘Out of this World’: Television, Exclusion and the Moonlanding 
The conservative NP was famously suspicious of television. JAM (Albert) Hertzog, the 
Minister of Posts and Telegraphs from 1959 until 1968, was the medium’s most 
outspoken critic, referring to it as the “little bioscope” and the “evil black box”. Although 
the Reithian model of television – to educate, inform and entertain – is frequently seen as 
an ally in the fostering of national consciousness,7 Rob Nixon points out that the NP 
government feared that it would do the opposite, and that the party shared with theorists 
such as Albert Schiller an anxiety that television would operate as a Trojan horse for 
cultural imperialism and global homogenisation.8 I  the 50s and 60s, debate focused on a 
number of different challenges to the acquisition of a television service, including the 
scarcity of programming resources (which would result in a reliance on the cultural 
products of other nations), the high costs involved,9 the potentially corrosive moral 
effects on urban black South Africans,10 and the possible Anglicisation that would 
accompany the medium. For the most part, the Nationalists opposed television because 
they feared it would become an unmanageable vehicle for American values and 
communist ideology.11  
The “ban on TV” quickly became a weapon in the opposition’s arsenal, with the 
United Party using the slogan “Want TV? Vote UP” in the 1966 election.12 As increasing 
numbers of citizens experienced the pleasures of television via contact with other 
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countries and as escalating numbers of other African countries acquired television ahead 
of South Africa, popular support for a national television service grew.  
The turning point came with what was arguably the world’s first global media 
event: the moonlanding. Missing a spectacle watched by a large proportion of the 
industrialised world13 sowed acute discontent among South Africans, and Rob Nixon, 
Carin Bevan and Ron Krabill14 all argue that dissatisfaction over South Africa’s 
exclusion from the moonlanding was a major reason for the eventual introduction of 
television.  
Apart from the recorded twenty tourists who flew to London to view the event in 
a hotel as part of a special chartered “moon tour”, most South Africans had to make do 
with radio, a medium that was not as satisfactory as the 1969 SABC report made out.15 
Some were lucky enough to see moving images of Neil Armstrong’s first steps when, as 
consolation for the absence of television, the Rand Daily Mail (an outspoken advocate for 
TV) and Tedelex (a visionary electronics company) arranged for free public screenings of 
recordings of the moonlanding dubbed “Moon” or “Space” television. The week-long 
screenings were extremely popular – after four days the Rand Daily Mail estimated that 
67 000 people had attended;16 Rob Nixon puts the eventual figure at over 100 00017 – yet 
only sections of the moonlanding were screened and they were limited to (whites-only) 
locations in Johannesburg and Pretoria.18 Even for those who were able to attend Moon 
television, the viewing experience was compromised by the fact that the visuals were 
screened three days after the event and therefore lacked the immediacy, excitement and 
unifying power of the live broadcast. Bevan notes that the South African public was well 
aware of this deficiency, since newspaper articles referred to “the fact that overseas 
audiences would be able to see a step-by-step account of the two-and-a-half-hour moon 
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walk, as it happened, on their television sets”.19 Nixon goes so far as to say that viewers 
felt “defrauded” by the viewing.20 
The experience of “missed experience” must have been exacerbated by the 
tumultuous terms the print media used to welcome the event: the Sunday Times described 
the day of 20 July 1969 as “the most momentous in history”; the Star declared that “none 
of us will be quite the same again”, while Hoofstad claimed that it was “undoubtedly the 
most sensational technical accomplishment of man”.21 Indeed, South Africans would not 
be quite the same again. Days after the event, one commentator summed up the sense of 
collective disappointment in a letter to the Cape Argus, asking, “What have we missed, 
what are we missing, what will we miss?”22 
Elsewhere in the world, the event played out as a media event Conquest as 
defined by Dayan and Katz. Defined as the “live broadcasting of ‘giant steps for 
mankind’”, Conquests are the rarest form of media event. They typically involve heroes 
“pushing back frontiers” and transcending the laws of nature and society, and television 
commentators resort to the use of biblical quotations and epic prose.23 Of course, the 
magnitude of the moonlanding also illustrated television’s potential and was a triumph 
not only of space technology but also of communication technology. Bevan notes that the 
miracle of the moonlanding was twofold: the success of setting foot for the first time ever 
on a celestial body was accompanied by the technological accomplishment of 
broadcasting the event live, as it happened, to millions of viewers around the world. This 
is integral to Dayan and Katz’s definition of the media event genre of the Conquest: “Life 
is not the same after a televised Conquest because of the great achievement itself and 
because of the broadcasting of the great achievement”.24  
The event came at a time when white Afrikaner identity was entering a period of 
flux.25 With collapsing tradition and the emergence of an urban middle class with new 
material and leisure interests, exclusion from this pinnacle of human achievement 
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coincided with a more cosmopolitan and progressive sense of identity. Just two years 
earlier, South Africa had distinguished itself as a world leader in medicine, with 
Christiaan Barnard’s pioneering human heart transplant, and months before the 
moonlanding he performed the operation again, for the first time on a woman. These 
achievements attracted a great deal of positive international media interest for the 
country. Dozens of cameramen and journalists arrived in Cape Town to interview 
participants for foreign television viewers and Barnard soon became known as the “film 
star surgeon”. Without television, however, South Africans were unable to fully 
participate in the flurry of (mostly positive) interest in events on their home soil, a 
situation that likely resulted in a degree of frustration. With the moonlanding, the return 
of the global media’s gaze to events in the United States also likely heightened South 
Africans’ sense of exclusion from world events. At the same time, a fear of being 
perceived as “backward” was attached to missing the screening of the Apollo 11 mission. 
The humiliation of being “reduced to twiddling the dials on their wirelesses” threatened 
white South Africans’ “technological self-assurance and their sense of racial 
superiority”.26  
Two days after the moonlanding, Cape Argus columnist The Wanderer launched a 
poll inviting readers to vote for a national TV service. An overwhelming 96% were in 
favour,27 and the United Party capitalised on the disgruntlement, calling for a referendum 
on the issue.28 The moonlanding, more than any other event before it, exposed what 
Jonathan Hyslop describes as the state’s “attempt to create an image of technical 
modernity while at the same time quarantining whites from external influences”,29 and 
citizens rejected the NP’s paternalism. A Bob Connolly cartoon from the Rand Daily 
Mail (see Figure 2:1) poked fun at the idea that those who had been “infected” by the 
experience of watching space television would transmit the liberalising effects to more 
conservative South Africans. Nixon puts it succinctly: 
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For many whites – already rendered paranoid by the growing force of 
their exile from world affairs – South Africa’s inability to partake of 
such a singular moment of ‘global’ community came to seem like an 
exasperating self-inflicted disinvitation. A Rand Daily Mail editorial 
captured this sense of let-down perfectly with the snappy headline ‘Out 
of this World’.30 
 
The moonlanding also appears to have shifted the state’s 
own perception of global politics. In spite of the universal 
humanist “giant step for mankind” discourse, the political 
saliency of the accomplishment was well understood, 
suggesting that media events affect even those who do not 
watch them. Just one year before, live transmissions 
crossed the Iron Curtain for the first time when Yuri 
Gagarin’s outer-space orbit was broadcast to millions of 
viewers in the USSR and Western Europe, penetrating, 
for the first time, “the televisual manifestation of the Iron 
Curtain” and “depicting Soviet space heroes and military 
prowess”.31 The moon served as the winning post in the 
space race, and the moonlanding marked the triumph of 
(American) capitalism over (Russian) communism in 
their efforts to claim world supremacy during the Cold 
War. Although the defeat was entirely symbolic – no 
national territory was gained,32 no armies were defeated and no leaders were usurped – 
across the world, including in South Africa, the (de)feat was celebrated as a kind of 
military victory.33 South Africa positioned itself as an American ally and State President 
Jacobus “Jim” Fouché sent “warmest congratulations on an achievement unparalleled in 
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the history of mankind” on behalf of the Republic, and newspapers across the country 
bowed to America’s dominance. Die Vaderland noted:  
 
Although the emphasis was on the universal value of this moon 
endeavour right from the start, the fact remains that the United States 
achieved it; that she could not only mobilise the human ingenuity, but 
also the means to carry it out. Thereby the United States irretrievably 
confirms its leadership in the world.34 
 
Beeld narrativised the moonlanding as a kind of tortoise-over-hare victory: “That it can 
be Americans landing on the moon first, nobody would have believed a few years ago … 
The first Russians circled the earth when America was still struggling to boost her first 
man only just over the threshold of space.”35 
America’s dominance was understood as a necessary condition for world peace 
and Die Transvaler stated that “the triumph of Apollo 11 will also facilitate the future 
orderly development of mankind”.36 
The political ramifications of the moonlanding are important because not only did 
the space race triumph signal America’s global dominance in the political sphere, it also 
marked the nation’s triumph over satellite technology. As James Schwoch points out, the 
second lesser-known achievement of the moonlanding was the “inauguration of a 
televisual American-led satellite network”:  
 
Just nineteen days before mission launch, the final International 
Telecommunications Satellite Corporation (INTELSAT) satellite needed 
for live worldwide television (TV) networking became operational over the 
Indian Ocean, meaning that American television coverage of Apollo 11 
could be globally distributed as it happened, live via INTELSAT, to all the 
national TV networks of the world. Virtually every nation in the world 
telecast at least some of the Apollo 11 moon mission … [T]he 1969 
moonlanding was not only the culmination of the superpower space race 
and a global triumph for American science, it was also a global triumph for 
American television.37 
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Throughout the period of NP opposition to television, America had been perceived 
alongside the Soviet Union as a one half of a dual threat to Afrikaner culture and the 
continued power of the nation state, whereas the moonlanding appears to have resulted in 
an “if you can’t beat them, join them” change of heart and a repositioning of perceived 
adversaries. As Nixon points out: 
 
In 1968, just a year before the moonlanding, the American student revolts had 
fuelled the cause of laager nationalists who sought to prevent TV from spewing 
American decadence into South Africa. Armstrong, Edwin Aldrin, and Michael 
Collins unwittingly helped turn that view around.38 
 
To compound matters for opponents of television, 1969 was also the year in which 
developments in satellite technology gave rise to the possibility of citizens acquiring (at 
very little cost) their own TV sets and satellite dishes and tuning in to international 
broadcasts. This, together with the disenchantment about the moonlanding and the 
appointment of a new Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, led to the establishment of the 
12-person Meyer Commission in 1969, which was tasked with investigating the 
“desirability or undesirability” of a national television service in South Africa. Perhaps to 
quell the profound frustration in the wake of the moonlanding, before even commencing 
with its inquiry the Commission focused on the “desirability” of TV and spoke of the 
medium’s arrival as a foregone conclusion, declaring that it would have to be 
multilingual, that it would not be an extension of the film industry and that it would be 
strictly controlled.39 It would take another six years before the Commission’s 
recommendations would be implemented, however. 
 
Everybody Wants to Be on TV: Sports boycotts and Media Events 
On the night of the opening broadcast on 5 January 1976, the apartheid government 
announced its vision for television not only to educate, inform and entertain, but also to 
serve as a means of cementing some form of national identity. Prime Minister BJ 
Vorster’s televised address to the nation focused on the SABC’s understanding of 
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television as medium through which to “converse” with the international community: “It 
is a big task, not only to bring the world to South Africa, but also (and perhaps 
especially) to show South Africa to the world as it is in its rich diversity and everything it 
has to offer.”40  
Initially, television was strictly controlled, and transmission was restricted to 
English and Afrikaans broadcasts in a scattering of urban (mainly white) areas. With 
viewing hours limited to 37 hours per week until 1980, when the hours increased to 42, 
few events were considered important enough to warrant the expense of live interruption 
of this routine, although it is clear from SABC annual reports that what was referred to as 
“direct transmission” was seen as a marker of the national service’s progress. The SABC 
was quick to ensure that key national and global events, principally sporting events, were 
relayed live. In television’s first year, in addition to the opening of parliament, a number 
of sporting events enjoyed direct transmission, including the controversial All Black 
Rugby Tour, the Olympic Games opening ceremony, the Cape to Rio yacht race, the 
world boxing championship between Victor Galindez and Pierre Fourie, the Grand Prix 
and the world snooker and bowls championships.41  
But Vorster’s vision “to show South Africa to the world” was compromised by an 
increase in sporting bans, which in effect barred the country from participating in global 
identity displays, driving home its pariah status. Much has been written about the 
political effects of the sports boycotts,42 but what is often overlooked is that the sporting 
bans advanced as communication technology developed. Political pressure on South 
Africa increased as more and more sporting events were broadcast live globally. Thus, 
while the eventual arrival of television meant that South Africa could enjoy live 
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transmission of the Olympic ceremony, it also served to highlight the country’s absence 
from the event and the pleasure of global integration remained elusive. 
Sport enjoys a privileged amount of media coverage, particularly television 
coverage, although live broadcasting really only began to flourish after the Second World 
War, following a “post-war thirst for pleasure and leisure”.43 Since then, the relationship 
between sport and live transmission has developed substantially, so that it is now a fairly 
routine occurrence as well as a lucrative industry involving a variety of stakeholders, 
including sponsors, advertisers, broadcasters, managers and the players themselves. For 
this reason, the broadcasting of mega-events such as the Olympics is a much studied 
affair.44 Although smaller-scale sporting events were the earliest to be broadcast live, the 
Olympics – as the first sporting contest involving countries from all five continents – was 
the first to command a truly global audience. In participatory terms, televised events such 
as the Olympics offer a platform to nations “unrivalled by any cultural and political body, 
even the United Nations”,45 resulting, Dayan and Katz argue, in the coming together of 
the Third, Second and First Worlds46 and “giving a big push to the introduction of 
television in the Third World”.47 
Live television coverage of the Olympic Games was first made available in 1956 
(from Melbourne), but it was only really in 1972 in Munich – after various negotiations 
over broadcasting rights – that they attracted global television audiences, partly because 
of fascination with the unplanned elements of the media event, the Munich terrorist 
attacks,48 anticipating the role that terror, disaster and war would play in television’s 
future.  
But by the time South Africans were able to enjoy live coverage of the 
proceedings in 1976, they had already been banished from the Games. In 1960, in spite of 
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international outcry following the Sharpeville massacre, the International Olympic 
Committee (IOC) permitted South African teams to participate, but thereafter the 
country’s involvement came under fire. Under pressure in the wake of the 1956 sports 
policy49 and after widespread condemnation of its 1960all-white team sports policy, 
which declared that white and black South Africans must compete separately in the 
country, South Africa made attempts to put forward a more representative team in 1964, 
selecting (via racially separate trials) seven non-white Olympic representatives to join a 
team of 69. Nevertheless, in 1963, under pressure from the South African Sporting 
Association (SASA), led by Dennis Brutus, the IOC withdrew South Africa’s invitation 
to participate in the 1964 Tokyo Games, after the government refused to comply with the 
committee’s ultimatum that nothing short of a public dismissal of racial discrimination 
(in newspapers and on radio) would secure it a place in the Games. The NP refused. 
In a bid for readmittance to the 1968 Games, South Africa overhauled its sports 
policy, declaring that white and black South Africans could now compete alongside and 
against each other outside the country’s borders but not within. They promised greater 
representation of black and coloured50 athletes, but once again insisted on separate trials. 
A commission led by the IOC’s Lord Killanin visited the country and recommended 
South Africa’s inclusion in the Games on the basis that progress was being made. Yet, 
boycott threats erupted from African-American athletes, the USSR and, following 
decolonisation, a wave of Supreme Council for Sport in Africa (SCSA) nations. The 
SCSA insisted that the black South African Olympians would be nothing but “trained 
monkeys … shown at the fair”.51 In total, no fewer than 39 countries threatened to 
boycott the Games,52 and host country Mexico, in a show of support for developing 
African countries, insisted that the invitation be withdrawn. The IOC eventually 
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announced that the Mexican government could not guarantee the safety of the South 
African team, and the Springboks did not compete. 
In 1968, another blow came from the United Nations General Assembly, which 
proposed a resolution calling for all countries to break sporting ties with South Africa.53 
By 1970, the message was clear – “No normal sport in an abnormal society”54 – and the 
IOC indefinitely expelled South Africa for violating the Olympic charter, which had 
always decreed that selection should not be discriminatory in any way. The country’s 
earlier hopes of actually hosting the Games seemed increasingly distant and increasingly 
absurd. 
South Africa’s Olympic swan song coincided with the surge of media attention 
given to the Games from 1960 onwards. Studies have shown that, because of the growing 
“allure … of being where the action is”, the total number of audiovisual media 
representatives at the Olympics grew from 1 442 in 1960 to 15 740 in 1988 in Seoul.55 
South Africa missed out on several years of inclusion in what was popularly dubbed the 
“greatest show on earth”. 
In an attempt to compensate white athletes for their exclusion, the government 
supported the establishment of the South African Games, and the country’s first 
supposedly multinational athletic sporting event was held in Bloemfontein in 1969. But 
the attempt to bring the mountain to Mohamed was a poor substitute for the real thing; 
because of South Africa’s insistence on separate games (the black South African Games 
were held in Pretoria in 1970), a number of African countries threatened to boycott the 
upcoming 1972 Olympic Games if countries participated and, in the end, only a few 
athletes from West Germany, Britain and New Zealand competed – many of whom 
claimed they were competing as individuals rather than representatives of their nations. 
Dubbed the “mini Olympics”, the 1973 event was a far grander affair, largely 
because the apartheid government made some important concessions. Held in Pretoria 
between 23 March and 7 April, a number of sporting bodies were invited, and 
international athletes were enticed by allowing all races to participate and compete 
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against each other. For the first time on South African soil, interracial sporting contact 
was allowed and the contest was billed as an “open international”. The domestic teams, 
however, participated as South African rather than Springbok teams, as the Springbok 
colours were reserved for white teams56 and only black athletes belonging to the white 
federation of their representative sport were allowed to participate, effectively excluding 
any black sportspersons who had attempted to level the playing field in their country by 
joining non-racial sporting bodies that rejected government policy.57 
These domestic details were overlooked, however, and the Games were 
considered relatively successful, even by official opposition parties in the country: over 
800 South African and nearly 700 (mainly Western) international athletes from 33 
nations participated.58 The government Department of Information report of 1973 
compared all aspects of the event with the Olympics and noted proudly that on the 
tournament’s second day, a public holiday, some 21 000 spectators attended – the largest 
athletics spectator crowd ever to attend an event in the country.59 The South African 
media, particularly the English-language press, hailed the Games as a turning point for 
the integration of sport.60 Though the desired effects of the Games – and their substitute 
Olympic status – were diminished by the continued absence of television in the country, 
the print media responded almost a  if the Games had played out as a media event. Jon 
Swift, a columnist for the Star, described them as “essential to the development of South 
African sport”, while another Star columnist, John Kennedy, noted joyously that 
spectators shouted “Come on, South Africa!” for both white and black South African 
boxers. Even Colin Eglin, leader of the Progressive Party, stated that, “while the debate 
of the Government’s motive and intentions would no doubt continue, the Games 
themselves had made an important dent in the psychology of apartheid”.61 This outcome 
suggested sport’s potential to unite South Africa’s diverse citizens under a national 
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banner – a characteristic that would be utilised to great effect in the post-apartheid era, 
when the new government wished to consolidate political power in popular arenas (see 
Chapter 6). 
At this point, however, non-racial national unity was not the result sought by the 
apartheid government. In addition to soothing the disappointment of South Africa’s 
exclusion from the Olympics, “the intent of the South African Nationalist Party in 
sponsoring the Games,” George Vandergriff Wright, Jr. noted at the time, “was to lobby 
the officials of the international sporting competition for readmittance into international 
competition”.62 Yet both these aims remained elusive. The event could never compete 
with the international Olympic Games. It lacked televisual support, for one, so although 
the event drew crowds, relatively few South Africans could actually be “where the action 
was”. Moreover, the Games were not widely broadcast internationally, so although 
foreign athletes competed, without mass viewership their role was limited and the kind of 
national identity display that had come to be associated with the Olympics did not take 
place. 
In addition, there was some vehement backlash. Stan Wright, a black United 
States Olympic track and field coach commented in the American magazine Track and 
Field News: 
 
I was sitting in the VIP section (of Pilditch Stadium) and I’m looking at this 
section for the Bantus or blacks. That’s the hypocrisy of it. I’m a black guy, 
plus I’m a VIP from another nation, so I get treated differently. But the black 
guy who’s native to that country exists under the apartheid rule. He could 
not buy a ticket to sit where he wanted by choice.63 
 
The international condemnation and the “undesirable” domestic side effects of the event 
meant that apartheid South Africa did not attempt any major multinational events on 
home soil again.64 Citizens had to make do with news of other countries competing in 
international sporting events. 
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 South Africa’s absence was often conspicuous, however, and it became more so 
when television eventually arrived; in 1976 boycotters used the Games to demonstrate 
their political dissatisfaction with countries that had competed in other sports contests 
with the pariah state. Rugby was identified as the Afrikaner’s Achilles’ heel, and even 
though the IOC pointed out that a number of other countries had competed in other sports 
contests against South Africa, the SCSA politicised New Zealand’s participation in the 
1976 Montreal Olympics. A traditional nemesis of the South African rugby team, the All 
Blacks had forged ahead with their June 1976 tour in the wake of the tragic Soweto 
uprising – witnessed by South Africa65 and the rest of the world via a number of graphic, 
now iconic, visual images. In response, the SCSA insisted on boycotting the Olympics 
unless New Zealand was ousted. The IOC repeated its earlier declaration that rugby was 
not an Olympic sport, compelling a total of 26 African countries to shun the Games. The 
official opening ceremony television commentator was obliged to remark to the entire 
world, including South Africa, that “unfortunately, politics struck again and almost 
twenty countries – most of them African – have boycotted over other countries’ links 
with South Africa.”66 Thus, although excluded from athletic competition, South Africa 
was still, in a sense, a major player in the Games, and the SCSA succeeded in upping the 
ante of the anti-apartheid movement. As Mason points out, while the results of the 
boycott were often indirect, they were still powerful: 
 
Although the South African Government and sport policy was not 
directly altered by the African boycott of the Montreal Olympic 
Games, two very important implications resulted from black Africa’s 
unified proclamation: first the high profile of the Olympic Games 
ensured that the word ‘apartheid’ appeared in many newspapers and 
on television worldwide … Second, the African-led boycott may 
have had a more direct implication on the anti-apartheid movement in 
South Africa. The united stand of black Africa was seen throughout 
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the world … significantly rais[ing] the morale of the black youth 
protestors.67 
 
Similar patterns of exclusion and expulsion occurred in other sports. In 1970, when the 
Springbok cricket tour of England was cancelled, following widespread protests led by 
boycotter Peter Hain, a “Rest of the World” team (comprising the best non-England 
cricketers) was hastily assembled, allowing five South African players to compete 
alongside top players from Australia, the West Indies, Pakistan and India. Although the 
match was initially recorded as an official test in Wisden Cricketers Almanack, the status 
was revoked three years later. 
Next to rugby, cricket was the biggest thorn in the apartheid state’s side, as it 
received much support from white South Africans, who widely believed that the 
Springbok team would prove to be the best in the world if only it were given a chance to 
compete. The belief was not wholly unjustified. Although not permitted to compete 
internationally on an official level, the South African team had a series of successes 
during the so-called rebel tours held between 1982 and 1990. Yet, as with the “Rest of the 
World” match, none of these successes was ever officially recognised by the International 
Cricket Council (ICC). 
Football, too, was not exempt from politics, although the football boycott did not 
receive as much attention in the South African press. Although there was growing interest 
in England’s professional leagues, locally, football was seen as “the port of the 
disenfranchised black masses”68 and their interests were not widely covered in the 
mainstream media. Of course, the sport’s popularity with black audiences also 
complicated matters for the boycotters, as they risked ending up hurting those in whose 
interests they were acting. Nevertheless, from 1963, South Africa was excluded from the 
FIFA World Cup – an event that was fast overtaking the Olympics in attracting mass 
audiences. The government’s proposal to enter all-white and all-black teams in the 1966 
and 1970 World Cups was, unsurprisingly, rejected.  
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Sports of a more individual nature tended to be better at skirting the effects of the 
boycott, because they didn’t require teams representative of the nation. International 
golfers, for instance, would not compete on South African soil but many still competed at 
the annual Million Dollar Challenge staged at Sun City – a luxurious casino resort in 
Bophuthatswana, one of the supposedly independent Bantustans or homelands, 
established by the apartheid government for the Tswana-speaking people in 1961. 
Competing in Bophuthatswana allowed sportspersons to compete without appearing to 
contravene the United Nations sporting ban. 
Formula 1 was one of the last sports to abandon apartheid South Africa. The race 
was sponsored by the Citizen (the most pro-NP English-language newspaper) for many 
years and thus had direct ties with government. The boycott movement eventually caught 
up with the sport in 1985 when Renault and Ligier shunned Kyalami, drawing attention 
to the hypocrisy of the other contestants’ participation. Although the Formula 1 
Association was still considering future races in South Africa, their interest waned when 
several television companies refused to broadcast events.69  
Although it is difficult to determine the full effect of the sporting boycott on 
apartheid politics, it is clear that it at the very least relaxed white South Africans’ opinion 
on mixed sport. Die Burger noted that in 1968, only 17% of whites favoured mixed sport; 
by 1976, the year in which the country received television, this figure had risen to 63%.70
Thus it seems likely that the desire to participate in sporting mega-events worked in 
favour of reform. 
 
(Dis)Invitations: The British Equity Ban and the Royal Wedding 
In addition to isolation in sports, the British Equity ban similarly compromised South 
Africa’s ability to keep up with the rest of the world, diverting transnational media flows 
and causing widespread grievance among South Africans with British heritage. The 
Equity ban was first established in the 1960s by the Actors’ Equity Council, which 
banned exports to South Africa of all recorded material involving British Equity 
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members; it was extended to television in 1978, forcing the SABC to look elsewhere for 
resources. The SABC manoeuvred its way around the ban by importing programmes 
from other countries, and even by sometimes adapting British programmes. Bevan notes, 
for instance, that the animated children’s programme Rupert the Bear, which featured 
voices of Equity members, was dubbed from English … into English.71  
Importing American shows helped to staunch some of the disappointment with 
cultural exclusion, and in the 1970s and 80s, hugely popular shows such as Dallas and 
The Cosby Show ere favoured among white South Africans.72 But the ban presented a 
seemingly insurmountable hurdle in 1981 when South Africa was very nearly excluded 
from the heart of the world’s next largest media event after the moonlanding: the 
wedding of Charles and Diana. As Dayan and Katz point out, there were few grey areas 
with the broadcasting of the ceremony: “In the case of the royal wedding, either you are 
in the church (that is, a guest of the royal family) or you are outside the church.”73 
The BBC and commercial television initially stood by agreements with Equity; 
many Equity members were to perform during the ceremony at St Paul’s Cathedral and, 
in what was quickly called “the blackout”, it was reported that South Africans would be 
barred from the 70-minute marriage ceremony. The ban meant that viewers would be 
restricted to pre- and post-ceremony footage, essentially ruining the wedding experience, 
which, by definition, requires witnessing. To make matters worse, even the radio 
broadcast was in jeopardy because of Equity member Richard Burton’s role as 
commentator.74  
South Africans greeted the possibility of missing the wedding with much distress. 
That the USSR had been granted broadcasting rights added insult to injury, drawing 
attention to South Africa’s increasing distance from the Western world, in spite of its 
Christian leanings (see the cartoon from the Daily News, Figure 2.2).  
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Figure 2.2: A cartoon by Jock Leyden from the Daily News, highlighting the 
perceived hypocrisy of South Africa’s “disinvitation” from the televised royal 
wedding, July 1981 
 
South African editorials pinned the blame on the “noisy minority outscreaming the silent 
majority”,75 singling out Vanessa Redgrave (labelled an “extremist political agitator” in 
the Citizen) as the ringleader. The Sunday Express called the blackout “downright 
ridiculous”76 and the Rand Daily Mail stated “that South Africa will be the one and only 
country to be treated in this way makes it all the more bitter”.77  
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The possibility of missing the wedding also drew attention to Afrikaner–English 
tensions in the country. The English-language newspaper the Cap  Times ran a cartoon 
ridiculing Afrikaner interest in the wedding and emphasising the extent to which South 
Africa was becoming anglicised (see Figure 2.3).  
 
Figure 2.3: A Tony Grogan cartoon depicting the irony of Afrikaner interest in 
the royal wedding, Cape Times, 24 July 1981. 
 
In it, a conservative Afrikaner couple sit in a living room adorned with photographs of 
famous Afrikaner nationalists (including HF Verwoerd, who as editor of Die Transvaler 
had famously refused to cover the royal visit of 1947). Ironically, the couple express their 
disappointment about missing the televised wedding. Another cartoon visualises the 
collective sense of being “left in the dark” (see Figure 2.4), by now a familiar experience 












Figure 2.4: A Charl Marais cartoon from Die Volksblad, July 1981 
 
Eager not to see a repeat of the disappointment associated with missing the moonlanding, 
the SABC entered into negotiations. Satellite technology had of course developed to the 
extent that material could be pirated, and it would have been impossible for the BBC to 
prevent South Africa from receiving the wedding without cutting off the rest of southern 
Africa.  
There was no need, however, as an agreement was reached. Because of the 
country’s historical links with Britain and its status as a former Commonwealth member, 
and because the massive worldwide media interest in Lady Diana Spencer gave Britain 
the opportunity to stage an event whose power would transcend national boundaries, a 
compromise was reached and South Africans were (partially) permitted to take their place 
alongside the rest of their world in the viewing of the live spectacle. While footage of the 
ceremony was shown, the music played by Equity members was withheld – a problem 
that the SABC, by now adept at the practice of dubbing, easily circumvented by playing 
prerecorded music performed by non-Equity members. Original singing was excluded 
from the broadcast, however, so that one of the wedding highlights, Kiri te Kanawa’s 
rendition “Let the Bright Seraphim” from Handel’s Samson was lost. The Economist 












The luckless South Africans, royal wedding mad, were deprived of this 
delight. Equity and the Musicians’ Union insisted that the products of their 
labour should not be used to entertain the country of apartheid. The South 
African Broadcasting Corporation agreed to freeze the picture at the moment 
any of their members were seen or heard, leaving only the bare bones of the 
service, and the crowd scenes for their viewers.78 
 
The viewing experience was not quite as disrupted as The Economist made out, however; 
most South Africans had little awareness of what they were missing, and, as was the case 
elsewhere in the world,79 the wedding unfolded as a “Coronation” media event,80 
interrupting ordinary routine and demanding attention.81 Coronations are “all 
ceremony”;82 they “deal in the mysteries of rites of passage”; their tension stems from the 
question of whether or not organisers can pull them off, whether they will run smoothly 
or not.83 In the case of the royal wedding, suspense was boosted not only by a number of 
pre-wedding media rituals, but also by the arrest, just one day before the wedding, of two 
royal footmen who were in possession of explosives.84 Dayan and Katz note that the 
wedding itself allowed England to enter into a “liminal period”, seducing citizens (and 
the world) into dreaming about what reality should or could be instead of what it actually 
was.85  
Interestingly, this effect was also noted by the newly established Sowetan – an 
anti-apartheid publication freely distributed to inhabitants of Soweto. In a cynical 
editorial written on the day of the wedding, the Sowetan maintained a careful distance 
from proceedings: “Britain sorely needs this kind ethereal nonsense to take her mind off 
the harsh realities of the day,” declared editor Joe Latakgomo. The editorial advised 
against getting caught up in the magic of the wedding, when South Africa is “left a dour, 
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plodding prosaic nation” with “another toilsome week ahead”.86 The implication, in the 
spirit of black consciousness, was that black South Africans should resist the hegemonic 
seduction of the (white) wedding and remain focused on their reality and their struggle to 
change it. South Africans belonging to this group are good examples of those who those 
who do not “abandon their distant role of spectator” in response to a media event. As 
Dayan and Katz point out, media events do not always work; some people “refuse to 
suspend disbelief” or they “snub” them and engage in oppositional or alternative 
readings.87 
White South Africa, however, lapped up the fairytale narrative, with the Beeld 
editorial showing little restraint: “Today South Africa rejoices with millions of people all 
over the world about a bond which is going to be solemnised between a real live prince 
who found his dream princess”.88 The newspaper – arguably the most progressive of the 
Afrikaner-language papers – also hinted at the extent to which anti-royalists were 
overwhelmed by wedding fever, as well as the gendered nature of media events. A 
cartoon (see Figure 2.5) features several women gazing at the new princess on television, 
while a disgruntled male rugby supporter looks on.  
 Indeed, Die Volksblad (a staunch NP supporter) was clearly a little overwhelmed 
by the national response, declaring that “there is no unhealthy adulation, but simply lively 
interest, and because of that we join enthusiastically and without any feelings of guilt in 
the spectacle of the Great Marriage”.89 
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Figure 2.5: A Willem Loots cartoon from Beeld, 31 July 1981. 
 
The royal wedding provides a prime example of the ways in which a media event can be 
variously received by intranational groups, and it is tempting to speculate about the 
effect of power relations on the enjoyment of the event. Because South Africa’s 
historical link with Britain was complicated by the Anglo-Boer War, the celebration of 
the glorious traditions of one of the world’s oldest nations came with reservations, 
particularly for Afrikaners whose power can be said to have been under threat. Nearly 
missing the wedding drew attention to English–Afrikaner tensions by reminding South 
Africans of their marginalised status in the world – a situation for which English-
speaking South Africans increasingly blamed Afrikaners. The fact that the SABC 
treated the broadcast of the wedding as a priority suggests an increase in the social 
capital of English-speaking white South Africans. At the same time, the least powerful 












Spoiling the Fun: Hijacking Media Events 
Isolation and disinvitation were not the only methods of harnessing the power of media 
events in the fight against apartheid. Protesters also staged a number of visual spectacles, 
sabotaging media event opportunities and disrupting televised ceremonies in order to 
articulate their political viewpoints in a popular arena.  
The inherent risk involved in live broadcasting is part of its attraction; there is a 
certain suspense attached to even the best-planned occasions, and disruption throws 
things off course in ways that often reveal the intended allure of the event. Dayan and 
Katz use extreme examples (such as the Munich Olympics) to demonstrate the appeal of 
media events to advocates of revolutionary causes, but the end result is similar. Though 
anti-apartheid demonstrators cannot be situated alongside terrorists, hijacked events 
transcend the reconciliatory spirit of the televised ceremony and become news events. 
The transition compels broadcasters to “look uneasily to their contracts”,90 uncertain 
whether they should revert to their role as journalists or remain faithful to the politics of 
the media event agreement.  
In the South African context, sabotaging televised contests forced commentators 
to note the demands of those opposed to apartheid, and to bring South Africa’s racist 
policies to the attention of viewers. Hijacking events also led to increased isolation, as 
hosting Springbok teams became more and more expensive, even dangerous.91 
Cricket and rugby matches were most frequently targeted. Nixon points out that 
sport’s “prime-time profile” attracts mass audiences whose nationalist sentiments are 
roused, making it a “particularly seductive sphere” for boycotters who are able to turn the 
“special relation that has arisen between sport and television to their advantage” by 
staging “interventionist spectacles”.92 To this end, a variety of tactics were employed, 
including littering rugby fields with fish hooks, destroying cricket pitches before play, 
and, if play went ahead, releasing smoke and paint bombs, flashing mirrors in players’ 
eyes and blowing whistles indiscriminately.93  
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On more than one occasion, eager sports fans were left in limbo in front of their 
televisions waiting for expected play to begin or for disrupted play to continue as 
broadcasters tried to restore calm. Two events in 1981 demonstrated the power of 
attacking would-be media events, both part of the controversial Springbok rugby tour to 
New Zealand: the July 1981 match in Hamilton and, later that year, the test at Eden Park 
in Auckland. 
New Zealand remained South Africa’s fiercest rugby opponent, and in spite of the 
1976 Olympic boycott, the rivals frequently played against each other. But the televised 
shambles of 1981 put an end to New Zealand’s long-standing involvement with the 
Springbok rugby team. In July 1981, amid intense political controversy in New Zealand 
because of Paul Muldoon’s loose interpretation of the Gleneagles agreement,94 th  
Springboks toured the country. Widespread demonstrations preceded each match, most 
memorably on 25 July, in the same week that South Africa’s application for readmission 
into world cricket was rejected by the ICC. Hundreds of protestors overwhelmed the 
rugby stadium at Hamilton, forcing the cancellation of the second match of the tour. The 
match had the distinction of being South Africa’s first ever live rugby broadcast from 
overseas, undoubtedly attracting large audiences in the country.95 TV1 had shifted 
outside of normal broadcasting hours,96 adding to the excitement of the match by 
requiring fans to wake up early to catch events live. The disappointment was profound. In 
gowns and slippers, South African audiences watched unfolding images of the protest 
instead of the long-awaited contest. The following Monday, The Vaderland editorial was 
at a loss for words, stating: “It’s difficult to describe what happened on the rugby field at 
Hamilton on Saturday”.97 Though many of the newspaper editorials interpreted the event 
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as an unruly and unfair intervention – “the roughshod riding over of the silent majority by 
the rowdy minority”98 – they also agreed that it was somehow a turning point. Die 
Vaderland concluded that the event “contains a lesson that South Africa dare not 
overlook”,99 while the SABC deplored the fact that “attempts to regain entry into 
international sport have for too long been a losing battle”.100 
Apart from the anti-climax of deferring the match, the disrupted media event must 
have awakened ordinary South African viewers to the gravity of the situation, and to 
foreign perceptions of the country’s policies, at a time when they sought more outside 
affirmation. As Black and Nauright point out, “while these events traumatised New 
Zealand … [South African] whites must have been rudely awakened to the depth of 
animosity felt by the New Zealanders towards their boys”.101 
Games involving the Springboks often required riot p lice, which had the further 
effect, Nixon notes, of recreating – via television – an “atmosphere of a police state in 
countries unaccustomed to such levels of public violence”.102 Already associated with 
brutal images of quelling insurrection, South Africa’s link with added images of police 
shields, barbed wire, truncheons and dogs – in what is ordinarily a festive atmosphere – 
enhanced its reputation as an oppressive state. 
Additional protests erupted in September on the fourth anniversary of black 
activist Steve Biko’s death103 in what became known as the “flour bombing”. South 
Africa was playing the All Blacks at Eden Park, Auckland, and there was mayhem again, 
when protestors threw rocks and overturned cars outside the stadium.104 A Cessna 172 
aircraft flew over the grounds, dropping flour bombs, pamphlets and pink flares. The 
game proceeded, to the astonishment of the commentators, who alternated between 
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commenting on the play and remarking on the behaviour of the protestors.105 The protest 
had the potential effect of turning the integrative media event into a conflictual news 
event. But, careful not to break Dayan and Katz’s “contract” of the media event (which in 
this case was to keep politics out of sport), the New Zealand commentators chose not to 
return to their roles as journalists; though they identified the visuals, they made no 
references to Biko or apartheid. The message was not lost on the crowd, however: 
balloons, bearing Biko’s name, drifted hauntingly down towards the field in his honour, 
and the cameramen obliged the protestors by focusing on the mesmerising sight. 
The demonstrators did not succeed in stopping play, which in the end probably 
worked in their favour, as the pilot, Marx Jones (jailed for six months for his part in the 
protest), later concluded.106 South Africans’ experience of New Zealand animosity (once 
again channelled via live television) must have been intensified by the Springboks’ 
eventual defeat: All Black Allan Hewson took a penalty kick in extra time (awarded 
because of the delays caused by the Cessna) and the Springboks were doubly humiliated. 
The experience heralded the end of international competition for a number of 
years, and the last decade of apartheid was characterised by increased pressure and 
isolation. The United Nations 1980 “register of sports contacts with South Africa”, 
naming and shaming any sportspersons who competed with the country, kept would-be 
competitors in check. South Africa was excluded from the first two Rugby World Cups, 
and although “rebel” cricket and rugby tours provided temporary relief, they were always 
contentious and frequently damaged to participants’ reputations and careers. Former 
England captain Mike Gatting, for instance, was banned from test cricket for three years 
on account of the 1990 rebel tours. In addition, although it was generally considered safer 
to stage sporting media events within the country’s borders, apartheid opponents took up 
the habit of rooting for the opposing team whenever the Springboks played. Famously, 
even in the post-apartheid era, Trevor Manuel announced his support for the All Black 
rugby team because of his inability to identify with South Africa’s all-white team. 
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Out of Miss World: Apartheid and the Politics of Beauty Pageants  
Similar exclusionary and disruptive strategies were used at other televised competitions, 
most notably the beauty contests for the titles of Miss Universe and Miss World, 
spectacles whose popularity also grew with the advent of television. The Miss World 
pageants (initially) attempted to exploit the subjunctive mode of media events, evoking 
“thoughts of what might be or what should be, rather than what is”.107 Yet, while on the 
surface beauty contests may appear as frivolous spectacles removed from the realm of 
politics, like sport they have been unable to transcend the political events of their time. 
On the national stage, the choice of a reigning beauty sheds light on the nation state’s 
relationship with cultural and religious values, as well as its attitude towards race; on the 
international stage, dominant political viewpoints not only determine which countries are 
eligible to compete, they also influence voting patterns. South Africa’s relationship with 
both Miss World and Miss Universe revealed the world’s discomfort with its lily-white 
national identity.  
The Miss World pageant started in 1951, with officials promoting the idea of a 
“world family” and describing the contest as “all the world on one stage”.108 South Africa 
started competing after the first Miss South Africa pageant was held in 1956 and had 
early success with Penny Coelen’s crowning as Miss World in 1958. Under pressure to 
allow black contestants to compete, in 1970 South Africa decided to send two 
representatives, one white (Miss South Africa) and one black (Miss Africa South). 
Unsurprisingly, as with the separate sporting trials, the move met with protest, 
and the 1970 contest organisers had to fend off criticism not only from feminist groups 
who labelled the competition as a “cattle market” but also from anti-apartheid 
demonstrators. The young liberal Peter Hain, active in galvanising support for sport 
boycotts, well understood the political uses to which media events could be put and was 
already much hated by many white South Africans. Hain rallied support from the militant 
youth wing of Britain’s Liberal Party and argued that allowing two contestants from 
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South Africa to compete was an implicit acceptance of the country’s policy of 
apartheid.109  
It appears that the feminist protestors made the biggest fuss, disrupting the contest 
by throwing smoke, stink and ink bombs onto the Royal Albert Hall stage. Comedian 
Bob Hope, who was to crown Miss World, tried to lighten the atmosphere by making 
jokes about how pleased he was to be participating in this particular cattle parade, yet his 
stage appearance was briefly interrupted by whistles, rattles and pamphlet-throwing until 
pageant officials managed to restore calm. The 5 000-strong audience booed the 
protestors, and Hope declared that anybody wanting to disrupt such proceedings had “to 
be on some kind of dope”.110  
 The feminist and anti-apartheid protests were “advertised” in advance, helping to 
draw attention to the contest, and Miss World 1970 reportedly became “the single most-
watched television broadcast of the entire year in the United Kingdom”.111 Although the 
effect of the protest was hardly felt in South Africa (again, without television, the country 
could not share in the live broadcasting of the event), the protestors’ tactics were beamed 
live to an international audience of 25 million.112 The anti-apartheid protesters rode on 
the coat tails of the feminist outcry, as world attention turned to the political and 
ideological implications of the competition and noted the awkwardness of South Africa’s 
dual entry. Pageant director Eric Morley had intended to quell protests against South 
Africa’s participation by allowing the two participants to compete, but the presence of a 
black and white beauty queen not only raised awareness of the country’s racial policies, 
but it also arguably affected the eventual crowning. There was much speculation about 
the winners of the 1970 competition, as it was also the year in which the first black Miss 
World was crowned – Miss Grenada, Jennifer Hosten. Moreover, South Africa’s black 
contestant, Miss Africa South, Pearl Jansen, was first runner-up, trumping Miss South 
Africa, Gillian Jessup, who was fourth runner-up. Although the pageant claimed to adopt 
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a non-political mantle, in the wake of the outcry 
judges seemed intent on communicating their own 
non-racial stance – a move that viewers did not 
receive well. After the final crowning, switchboards 
on London newspapers were reportedly jammed by 
phone calls from viewers complaining that the 
contest had been rigged and that the results were 
“racist”.113  
 Media interest in Jansen focused on her 
identity as an oppressed South African, drawing 
attention to her “coloured” classification in her 
home country. In years to follow, South Africa’s 
dual entry for Miss World was increasingly 
publicised and satirised. For instance, in 1975 artist 
Tom Phillips drew attention to the respective social contexts of Miss South Africa South 
and Miss South Africa in an ironic artwork titled “Oh Miss South Africa”, juxtaposing a 
white blonde woman with a Zulu maiden. It soon became clear that South Africa’s 
continued involvement with the Miss World contest had an expiry date. Although success 
came again in 1974 when Miss South Africa Anneline Kriel was crowned Miss World,114 
in 1976, the presence of a black Miss Africa South and a white Miss South Africa drove 
nine countries to withdraw in protest, and in 1977 ten countries boycotted the contest. 
Thereafter, Miss World organisers refused South African contestants, until 1991, after the 
release of Mandela and the unbanning of the ANC (see Chapter 6). 
 With South Africa out of Miss World, Miss South Africa hopefuls turned to Miss 
Universe, the American version of the British Miss World. There was brief respite when, 
in the following year, Margaret Gardiner was crowned Miss Universe before an estimated 
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Figure 2.6: Tom Phillips: “Oh Miss 











global television audience of millions,115 to the delight of South Africans who could now 
watch her crowning live on television. 
There were various innovations and ironies of the 1978 pageant that made for 
iconic and surreal television; it was the year in which electronic voting was first used, 
allowing audiences to view scores as they were cast and adding to the suspense of the live 
broadcast. But, more importantly, the competition once again tended towards a Utopian 
vision of racial harmony. The reigning Miss Universe was Janelle Penny Commissiong 
from Trinidad, the contest’s first black queen, meaning that the ceremonial handover of 
the crown – the very heart of the pageant – involved a surreal moment of interracial 
handover. Natasha Barnes described the viewing experience:  
 
Just as no one predicted Trinidad’s victory the year before, no one could 
have dreamed what was going to happen next: the 1978 crown was going 
to go to Miss South Africa, a white representative of Vorster’s 
government, whose troops had mauled black Soweto schoolchildren two 
years before and whose citizens were virtually banned from all global 
sporting and entertainment events.116  
 
The event organisers, instead of punishing South Africa, used the competition to “stage” 
their political fantasy for the country’s future – a vision that involved black and white 
embrace and which was well articulated by Gardiner herself when she replied to her final 
question that what she’d learnt from the pageant was that “all nationalities can get along 
together”.117  
 This move, together with the earlier Miss World decision to crown a black Miss 
World in the wake of anti-apartheid protest, suggests the overlap between different media 
event scripts; while one would expect Miss World, as a competition, to fall into the 
category of media event Contest, it has many of the qualities associated with Dayan and 
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Katz’s scripted Coronation. Like the Academy Awards, it may find its roots in Contest,118 
but it has since evolved into a Coronation. With its parades and crowning, the pageant, as 
the early feminist protestors were apt to note, involves more ceremony than the media 
event Contest, which is more concerned with the playing out of a set of agreed-upon 
rules,119 although there is obviously some interplay between the two. The Miss World 
and Miss Universe events were better suited to creating a Utopian spectacle – employing 
the subjunctive mode of the media event Coronation – than castigating South Africa for 
its political stance. There is thus more focus on what South Africa couldbe than on its 
current reality. This is in keeping with their genre: “Coronations,” Dayan and Katz state, 
“more than other events, keep their distance from reality, since time and place and 
ceremonial symbols must all be kept unpolluted.”120 
 In the wake of the crowning, media speculation about the appropriateness of the 
winner focused on Gardiner’s national identity. Despite the fact that, on her return to 
South Africa, a relieved local media reported that she said she had “experienced little 
political pressure”,121 the international press did not turn a blind eye; in one interview she 
was asked if she would ever marry a black man. She famously answered, “I am willing to 
marry any man that I love”,122 giving insight into her ability to negotiate the political 
paradoxes of her reign. 
This form of Utopian staging could not continue indefinitely, however, and South 
Africa’s relationship with the Miss Universe organisers grew increasingly fraught. In 
1985, despite the organisers’ apparent commitment to a non-political show, Miss South 
Africa, Andrea Stelzer, pulled out of the competition after Miami anti-apartheid 
protestors threatened mass demonstrations. The withdrawal was met with much outcry 
from the South African media. A Beeld editorial described the protestors as “petty”: “The 
mentality of South Africa’s enemies, who try to get at the country even by threatening the 
life of a young girl is a constant source of amazement.”123 The Citizen described the 
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incident as a “lousy intervention by mindless racialists-in-reverse who cannot stand 
anything South African, even a beautiful girl”,124 and a cartoon in the Transvaler (see 
Figure 2.7) captured the frustrated mood of the era, sweetening the disappointment of 
Stelzer’s exclusion by alluding excitedly to the forthcoming rebel cricket tours.125  
 
 
Figure 2.7: A Frans Esterhuyse cartoon from Die Transvaler, 20 May 1985. 
 
The cartoon suggests the extent to which sport and beauty intersected; though sport was 
definitely perceived to be more important, all forms of televised global competition 
mattered to South Africans, and the defensive tone of the editorials reveals an underlying 
hurt at international hostility. 
Stelzer went on to use her German ancestry to find her way back into international 
competition and in 1988 she won Miss Germany. This allowed her to compete in the 
                                                
 
124 Citizen, Editorial: “Exit Miss SA”, 20 May 1985, reprinted in South African Digest (week ended 24 May 
1985), 461. 
125 The cartoon’s predictions were, however, only partly realised; while the Australian rebel tour took place, 











1989 Miss Universe pageant and she made it to the semi-finals. She was, however, 
refused entry to the 1988 Miss World Pageant because of her South African heritage.  
 
National Identity Swaps and Media Event Flops: Banning Basil and Budd 
Two other examples of this tactic – acquiring a new national identity in order to achieve 
international recognition – illustrate both the power of the sporting ban and white South 
Africa’s contradictory response to it. At different points in South Africa’s sporting 
history, Basil D’Oliveira and Zola Budd both became British citizens to further their 
careers, but were treated differently by the media. While D’Oliveira’s “South 
Africanness” remained indeterminate until 1994 when post-apartheid cricket 
administrators tried to reclaim the “(once rejected) native son”,126 Budd was lauded as a 
sports representative of the country throughout her career, although the South African 
media’s fascination with her international performance came to a sorry end, again 
highlighting some of the risks of live broadcasting. 
Basil D’Oliveira is widely credited with raising global awareness of the plight of 
black South African sportspersons, and what became known as the D’Oliveira Affair is 
said to have kickstarted the sports boycott.127 As a coloured cricketer, D’Oliveira’s 
aspirations were frustrated in South Africa on account of his race, and so he emigrated to 
England where he was selected for the English national team in 1966. Allegedly 
anticipating that South Africa would refuse the British team entry for the 1968–9 tour if 
the side included D’Oliveira (the year before the All Blacks had been refused entry 
because of their inclusion of Maori team players), the Marylebone Cricket Club did not 
select him. As D’Oliveira himself put it, the “non-selection represented the best of both 
worlds for the Nationalist Government – there was no chance of me becoming a national 
hero on the cricket field and the tour would implicitly put the seal of approval on their 
apartheid policies”.128  
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Since he was undeniably one of England’s most talented players at the time, 
controversy broke out, escalating when D’Oliveira was finally picked to join the side 
after another player was injured. By this stage, the anticipated arrival of D’Oliveira in 
South Africa had stirred up support from coloured supporters, and South African 
president BJ Vorster refused the team entry, stating that South Africa was not prepared to 
receive a team chosen by anti-apartheid selectors.  
For the most part, the South African press remained indifferent to D’Oliveira’s 
adoption of a new national identity, only calling on him to voice support of rebel tours to 
South Africa in the 1980s.129 Zola Budd’s attempt to achieve international recognition 
was received differently. 
Budd achieved fame in 1984 when, at seventeen, she broke the women’s 5 000-
metre world record. Because she had run in South Africa, h wever, the International 
Amateur Athletic Foundation never ratified the record. At the suggestion of England’s 
Daily Mail, she acquired – in just two weeks – British citizenship through her 
grandfather, a move that received a mixed response from both South Africa and the 
United Kingdom. Yet, with the increase in anti-apartheid opposition, Budd’s support in 
her home country grew.130 She was affectionately claimed as a South African 
boeremeisie, as “our Zola”131 (both she and Andrea Stelzer, in spite of their attempts to 
shuffle off their South Africanness, had indigenous roses named after them).132  
There was intense interest in her 1984 Olympic performance, and Budd carried 
the weight of the South African nation – hungry for international competition and 
excluded from Olympic contest for over sixteen years – on her shoulders. The 3 000-
metre women’s track final was broadcast live in South Africa. Together with the frenzied 
coverage that preceded the event, the decision to make a kind of media event of the race 
must have encouraged viewers to invest immense national pride in Budd’s performance, 
even though she was running for Britain. Yet, the risks associated with live broadcasting 
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were well demonstrated by the incident, and the SABC may well have decided not to “go 
live” had it known what would follow.  
Halfway through the race, the barefoot Budd collided with American favourite 
Mary Decker, tripping her up to distracting boos from the crowd and going on to finish a 
dismal seventh.133 The media had billed Budd as Decker’s rival in the race, even though 
the eventual winner of the competition had broken Decker’s record a few months earlier. 
Decker had the Los Angeles crowd behind her, while in South Africa, viewers sat riveted 
in front of the television, hoping for a vindicating victory. The subsequent 
disappointment must have exacerbated the disappointment already felt on account of 
South Africa’s overall exclusion from the Games. The Sunday Times summed up the 
reaction of many white South Africans: 
 
For South Africans, too, a dream collapsed. Zola, the barefoot waif, had 
given us interest in the Games unparalleled since our expulsion from the 
Olympic movement. 
 With almost feverish desperation we willed the 18-year-old to 
carry out frustrated aspirations – albeit under foreign colours – all the 
way to the medals podium.134 
 
Interest in Budd’s athletic performance nevertheless persisted; and South Africans – 
instead of shunning her as a loser – continued to embrace her as one of their own, perhaps 
(mis)identifying with the resounding boos channelled via international television. The 
1985 SABC report notes proudly that it was “able to obtain live coverage of Zola Budd’s 
big races at very short notice”135 and the Argus represented her in a cartoon as having 
speedily outsmarted the sporting boycott when she officially claimed the world record in 
Lisbon in 1985 (see Figure 2.8). Internationally, however, her career was beset with 
controversy and she was suspended from international sport in 1988 when several 
African nations claimed that she had competed in an event in South Africa. The South 
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African media firmly opposed the decision, addressing its imagined adversaries directly 
in a burst of frustration. The Citizen, for instance, said to Budd’s enemies:  
 
You have inflicted the grossest persecution on a young and world-
renowned athlete, and if you have destroyed her international career – and 
we doubt whether she will ever run again overseas – you will stand 
condemned as bigots, blackmailers and political bullyboys.136  
 
Zola Budd – young, slight, barefoot and female – became the symbol of South Africa’s 
perceived persecution. 
 
Figure 2.8: A Mynderd Vosloo cartoon from the Argus, depicting Zola Budd’s 
eventual breaking of the 5 000-metre world record in 1985, 18 February 1985. 
 
Basil D’Oliveira’s treatment in the South African media was relatively cool in 
comparison (that is, until the post-apartheid era when he was included in a list of the 
century’s greatest South African cricketers). This was partly because D’Oliveira’s 
emigration was an attempt to transcend South Africa’s self-imposed sporting policy 
(rather than the globally imposed sporting ban), partly because his inclusion in an 
opposing national team made it difficult for South Africa to still claim him as one of the 
nation’s own, and partly because of his race. In keeping with the country’s policy of 
separate development, talented black athletes were relegated to the sidelines (except in 
                                                
 











the cases of Errol Tobias and Avril Williams – rugby players whose inclusion in the 
Springbok national side was arguably motivated by administrators’ desire to return to 
international competition).  
While D’Oliveira represented South Africa’s self-imposed restrictions, Budd 
embodied the way the country had been ostracised. Despite intense pressure from South 
Africa to continue competing,137 she returned to her home country, suffering from mental 
exhaustion, no doubt exacerbated by the ramifications of the failed Olympic media event, 
and retired from competition until the early 1990s, when the political climate in South 
Africa was assured of change.  
 
‘Why Can’t We Have Television Like This?’: 
Live on Nightline and Failing to Cross the Rubicon 
Political pressure on the South African government mounted throughout the 1980s; the 
anti-apartheid movement was assisted by the leakage to Western countries of emotive 
television images of unrest in townships,138 international sanctions against the country 
threatened the economic stability of the state; internal resistance found fresh strength in 
the newly formed UDF, and white emigration statistics soared. Since 1960, when whites 
had made up 20% of the total population, their demographic base had diminished, and by 
1985 they constituted merely 15% of the total population.139 In an attempt to prevent 
South Africa’s decline, numerous political concessions were made. In his 1985 
parliamentary address in February, State President PW Botha offered Nelson Mandela 
conditional freedom (see Chapter 3) and sought, unsuccessfully, to appease opposition by 
claiming that political representation for black South Africans was on the horizon, 
although he was unclear about what this meant exactly.  
 Internally, there was also growing pressure to “talk”, with various editorials 
calling for the exchange of ideas between black and white parties. “Dialogue” – albeit 
hypothetical – began to play out in the media, with editorials and columns contextualising 
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political debate and even answering urgent questions on behalf of liberation parties, 
whose direct comments were banned. 
For the most part, this approach was not reflected on television screens, as the 
SABC shied away from current affairs programmes and moved towards a steadier diet of 
pure entertainment with increased importation of American situation comedies and soap 
operas as well as the introduction, in March 1985, of the late-night sports and 
entertainment TV4 channel,140 which soon became more popular than TV1.141 There was 
one notable exception to this trend: a series of five political debates between state 
representatives and opposition leaders142 creened on Ted Koppel’s US show Nightline in 
March 1985, which the SABC agreed to broadcast to South African audiences too. 
The Nightline series made for groundbreaking television for both the United 
States and South Africa. For Americans, it was the first time the show had reported from 
a “remote” location (indicating the growing interest in South Africa’s domestic affairs), 
and for South Africans it was the first time that political adversaries had faced each other 
on a public platform. Johannes M Botes points out that, where other third-party efforts 
had failed, Nightline succeeded in establishing a space for dialogue, providing “both sides 
with a face-saving mechanism to open communications between them in an informal 
way”.143 By all accounts, it was an experiment for the government, who agreed to the 
broadcast (at the last minute) in the hope that it would afford them the opportunity to 
counter some of the negative coverage of the country.  
There were, however, still checks and balances in place. While the debates and 
interviews were screened live to American audiences, the SABC decided against live 
broadcasting and put a twelve-hour delay in place, presumably because of the risk of 
humiliation in front of domestic audiences. In the end, the broadcaster left the debates 
intact, but, to the disappointment of viewers, who were eager to get a sense of how the 
country was being represented overseas, they censored taped background inserts showing 
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unrest and inequality.144 Rapport suggested at the time that while there were probably 
“good reasons” for the censorship, broadcasting the complete programme “could have 
contributed to a better understanding by South Africans of how their country is portrayed 
abroad”.145 This was becoming an increasing concern for citizens.  
The opening debate was between Pik Botha and Desmond Tutu. Although the two 
were not in the same studio the debate was still live. As Dayan and Katz point out in 
reference to Kennedy and Nixon, the “reality” of debate is “not diminished for its being 
on the air, and in the living room”.146 In this case, Pik Botha was filmed in Cape Town 
while Desmond Tutu was recorded in Johannesburg with Ted Koppel mediating from a 
separate studio in Johannesburg. While Pik Botha had emerged as the “unphotogenic”147 
NP’s favoured television personality, Tutu, who had already won the Nobel Peace Prize, 
was ascending the global ladder of political stardom. Ted Koppel later recalled that Botha 
had gauged that, in the midst of international footage of the various states of emergency, 
“some good things about South Africa would also come out”.148 He used the opportunity 
to address, not just his debating opponent, but audiences at large. His opening comment 
confirmed the extent to which the apartheid government saw television, specifically 
American TV, as a means of addressing “the world”: 
 
We want to be part of the world because we believe we are not as bad as the 
world is trying to make us out to be. It would be interesting to make an objective 
list of status and standards of civil rights all over the world, in the respect of all 
the important fundamental rights like an independent judiciary, freedom of the 
press, democracy, regular elections, and a free enterprise system. We would very 
much like to go for such an analysis worldwide. We feel that we are the target of 
selective morality and selective indignation. We do not say that what has 
happened here is adequate. We realise the need for change and reform. But we 
believe we are right now being singled out for special punitive action as a result 
of selective morality.149 
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But Botha’s appeal was no match for the Nobel laureate, who was much more in tune 
with global perceptions of the country as well as internationally established political 
norms. Tutu disarmed both South African and American audiences by appealing to 
democratic and Christian values: 
 
South Africa claims that it is part of the Western community of nations; therefore it 
has been judged by those conditions. But let me just say: we are talking about a 
country that says it is democratic. It is a country that excludes in its most recent 
constitution 73 per cent of the people. I’m a Bishop in the church of God. I’m a 
Bishop of one of the most important Dioceses in South Africa. I’m 53 years old. 
You would, I suppose, say that I’m reasonably responsible. In my own country I do 
not vote. According to this government I’m not a South African. My travel 
document says of my nationality that it is indeterminable at present so that blacks 
have been turned into aliens in the land of the oppressed. Just last year, 16 000 
blacks were arrested because they tried to sell their labour, and therefore, because 
they did not have the right pass, they were not allowed to sell their labour. Men are 
made to leave their homes, to live in single-sex hostels for 11 months of the year. 
This Christian country destroys black family life deliberately. This Christian 
country has destroyed stable black communities, uprooted three and a half million 
blacks. And we are saying we seek to change the system. It’s no use talking about 
selective morality.150 
 
Tutu’s performance on Nightline must have jarred with contemporary representations of 
him in his home country. Both Tutu’s biographers point out that he was vilified by the 
South African media,151 a trend that presented a problem for the apartheid state when he 
received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1984. For the most part, the SABC reflected the “no 
comment” response of PW and Pik Botha; the first radio broadcast to carry news of the 
award positioned it as the last news item, and television news included a mere ten-second 
insert with no footage of celebrations.152 Rian Malan describes the overall effect of 
television footage of Tutu in the country:  
 
After Bishop Desmond Tutu won the Nobel Prize for Peace, it became impossible 
to ignore him entirely, so the SABC tried to portray him as an agitator, too. That 
was rather hard, given the Bishop’s generally moderate demeanour. The SABC did 
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its best to catch him wearing shades, which gave him a cool and predatory look, 
and saying something that could be construed as incendiary. To get the quotes they 
wanted, they often had to cut him off midsentence. The good Bishop would vanish 
from the screen in the midst of a subversive formulation, or the sound would die 
away, leaving him to mouth silently from the screen, a goldfish in a bowl.153 
 
But the sparkling persona who appeared on South African screens in 1985 must have 
seemed more like the beloved Bill Cosby figure than a dangerous radical, and Tutu’s 
lively, lucid and unedited presence on Nightline seemed to have a profound impact on 
white South Africans. Ted Koppel claims that Tutu’s opening monologue was cited in 
“nearly every South African news report on the debate”,154 and Botes argues that the 
speech empowered Tutu by giving him “direct access, via Nightline, to the public sectors 
that either influenced him or indirectly had the power to influence his predicament”.155  
Though some South African editorials were loath to admit defeat, arguing that the 
debaters had tied, international publications thought otherwise. The New York Times 
rejected Botha’s subsequent attempts to associate Tutu with violence: “The last 25 years 
of television have taught us that images carry their own truth. It was impossible to 
associate Bishop Tutu with violence, active or implied … Mr Botha, one thought, lost 
that debate.”156  
Tutu’s Nobel award had catapulted him into relative political stardom. At the time 
of the debate, he was also the most frequent representative of South Africa on the 
show.157 He brought with him a significant amount of moral capital, and foreign 
audiences were growing accustomed to him. The show highlighted the disjuncture 
between foreign and domestic readings of the country, which, in turn, focused attention 
on the state-controlled broadcaster and increased the South African public’s hunger for 
media transparency. As Dayan and Katz point out, “media events breed the expectation 
of openness in politics and diplomacy”. The Nixon–Kennedy debates, they argue, “put 
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steady pressure on the political system to arrange for similar confrontations”.158 In the 
South African case, this is strongly reflected in the print media’s response to the 
Nightline debate. One editorial declared that “[t]he most significant feature of the Pik 
Botha–Desmond Tutu debate … was that it was made possible through the cooperation of 
the state-run television service here”.159 Another praised the SABC as the actual “winner” 
of the debate, because of its courage in screening the material:  
 
The South African Broadcasting Corporation came out with the greatest kudos, in 
fact … Here was no selective presentation. Both men were allowed to trade their 
political punches, blow for blow – the Foreign Minister sometimes snapping at his 
Nobel Peace Prize opponent with frustrated impatience; the Bishop occasionally 
rolling his eyes or pursing his lips in characteristic disbelief at what he was 
hearing … It was all the things you wanted to know about South Africa, but 
which SATV has been loath to show us in the past.160 
 
Others, realising, seemingly for the first time, the selective nature of South African news 
reports, expressed frustration. Die Transvaler, an ardent NP supporter, asked, somewhat 
naively: “Why has the SABC never presented this kind of television? We have had to go 
and buy it from the Americans and interest among South Africans is intense.”161  
Reactions to the show forecast both television’s evolving role in political 
negotiation and South Africans’ increasing frustration with the SABC’s blinkered 
approach and constant critique of “‘sensationalist’ Western news-gathering practices to 
justify the pro-apartheid new [sic] bias in its own coverage of the insurrection”.162  
While South Africans may have begun to understand that broadcasters can select 
which versions of reality they wish to reflect, they were not yet accustomed to subtler 
treatment of visual images and the ways in which “liveness” can create an illusion of 
transparency. As a visual medium, television is of course suited to the suspension of 
disbelief, since it appears to offer unmediated access to reality. It follows from this that 
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live broadcasting – with its minimal editorial intervention – distils this power and 
operates as the most seductive form of television.  
Apartheid South Africa, which might be considered a quasi-totalitarian state, 
followed a mix of broadcasting traditions. Direct transmission was reserved for what 
Dayan and Katz refer to as “establishment initiatives”,163 the commemorative occasions 
typical of totalitarian societies, while the desire for acceptance by the Western world was 
reflected in the frequent bids for inclusion in television events associated with democratic 
societies (e.g. sporting contests, political debates and Conquest media events). The 
widespread welcome of Nightline’s approach had much to do with its seeming “liveness”; 
even if, as Croteau and Hoynes’ analysis of the show’s political debate has shown, 
Nightline came with its own liberal agenda.164 Liveness nevertheless creates an illusion of 
transparency, which in turn elevates the status of the broadcaster. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 
illustrate how the SABC of the post-apartheid era employed live broadcasting as a means 
of legitimising its new position and securing the trust of a cynical South African public.  
 Not all reactions to the Nightline broadcasts were positive, however. PW Botha – 
after hearing himself declare to the thousands of viewers watching the show, “I am going 
to keep order in South Africa and nobody in the world is going to stop me” – dismissed 
the show as “negative and one-sided”.165 He complained of factual errors in the series, 
and the experience no doubt resulted in his increasing suspicion of foreign media 
portrayals of domestic problems – a factor that came to a head later that year.  
Pik Botha, on the other hand, had come to realise that his country could no longer 
operate in a communication vacuum and he continued to seek to repair the country’s 
badly damaged image in the international press, stressing the government’s acceptance of 
the need for change. His efforts eventually led to South Africa’s next major television 
moment, a failed media event described as the “worst political communication by any 
country at any time”:166 PW Botha’s Rubicon speech. 
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Pik Botha’s endeavours to improve South Africa’s international standing were 
compromised by increasing unrest, and on 20 July 1985, a few months after the Nightline 
series, the government declared its first state of emergency in 36 magisterial districts, 
giving more powers to the police, the military and the state president. In response, Oliver 
Tambo, the leader of the ANC in exile, reissued his call, via foreign media, for the 
masses to make the country “ungovernable”, and foreign journalists reported widely on 
the civil unrest in the country. 
The government’s own communications policy did little to help matters. While 
they were well aware of South Africa’s poor reputation in the international media, they 
had an unsophisticated approach to managing the country’s image. Jack Viviers, who had 
come up with the “iceberg plan” (see Introduction), was Botha’s chief communications 
advisor at the time. According to Dave Steward, who would become FW de Klerk’s 
communications advisor, under PW Botha the government “had no conception of 
communication”.167 The Rubicon speech made this humiliatingly obvious. 
An informal “cabinet meeting” was held at Sterrewag observatory on 2 August to 
determine a response to the increasing violence, and it was here that the seeds of the 
Rubicon speech were planted. There is still little consensus on what was actually decided 
at Sterrewag. Historian Hermann Giliomee claims that, despite interviews with several 
attendants, the true course of events is still unknown.168 According to a newspaper report 
at the time, it appears that some sort of discussion was held on the following possibilities: 
the abolition of the homelands, the expansion of cabinet to include homeland leaders and 
the initiation of talks with the “true leaders” in exile.169 
What is clear is that, despite the fact that PW Botha had reportedly said very little 
at the meeting, Pik Botha represented it as a breakthrough. He embarked on a foreign 
affairs mission to resuscitate South Africa’s reputation, meeting with British, American 
and German representatives and alerting them to the imminent possibility of significant 
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reform, stating several times, according to Werner Scholtz, a South African diplomat who 
attended the briefings: “Gentlemen, we are crossing the Rubicon.”170 
There have been numerous suggestions as to why Pik Botha over-represented the 
situation. The first is that he had genuinely misinterpreted the president’s commitment to 
the proposals put forward at Sterrewag. The second is that he was engaging in a reactive 
form of damage control and did not foresee the possibility that an announcement of 
reform without follow-through would lead to disaster. The third, offered by Giliomee, is 
that Pik Botha interpreted the president’s silence at Sterrewag as indecision and gauged 
that creating anticipation of change would persuade him to agree to the 
recommendations. There is also, of course, the possibility that his portrayal of events was 
simply misinterpreted by the foreign ambassadors. 
Various speechwriters collaborated to write a draft for PW Botha’s address to the 
NP Natal Congress, announcing pioneering policy changes171 mbedded in stirring 
rhetoric. At the same time, the print media, foreign and local, began to set the stage for a 
media event of mammoth proportions. Newsweek drew on moonlanding discourse, 
referring to the forthcoming speech as a “giant step” away from apartheid. Time told the 
world to “expect the most important statement since Dutch settlers arrived in the Cape of 
Good Hope 300 years ago,”172 and international broadcasting networks clamoured to 
secure coverage of Botha’s address, the first time that live broadcasting had been 
bestowed upon a South African premier.173  
Behind the scenes, however, it seems that PW Botha had a change of heart, to the 
apparent astonishment of his advisors. Whether or not he had ever approved the 
Sterrewag proposals or whether he felt over-pressured by Pik Botha’s enthusiasm and the 
media’s expectations remains a point of substantial debate and it is unlikely that an 
agreed-upon version of events will ever emerge. Several accounts of what happened 
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mention PW Botha’s reaction to media speculation, and comments made in the actual 
speech suggest that media conjecture about the announcement played a pivotal role in the 
state president’s about-turn.  
Days before the Natal Congress address, the essence of the speech was reportedly 
leaked to the South African press, and, according to Jan Heunis, Giliomee and Botha’s 
biographer Daan Prinsloo, it was this, more than anything else, that enraged Botha, 
leading him to denounce the speech as “Prog”.174 The speech itself supports this reading. 
With more than a hint of sarcasm, Botha chastised the media’s predictions about what 
was to be broadcast: 
 
Most of the media in South Africa have already informed you on what I 
was going to say tonight, or what I ought to say, according to their 
superior judgement. 
Of all the tragedies in the world, I think the greatest is the fact that our 
electorate refrained so far to elect some of these gentlemen as their government. 
They have all the answers to all the problems. And these answers differ from day 
to day and from Sunday to Sunday.175 
 
The phrase “what I was going to say”, even with the proviso “what I ought to say”, does 
suggest that the content of the original speech was altered. Whatever the reason, Botha 
went on to deliver to an international television audience of over 200 million people, an 
amended version, with some of the rhetoric but little of the substance, retreating to the 
stereotype of the finger-wagging “ugly, irredeemable Afrikaner”.176  
The rest of the speech was an odd mix of widely convergent discourses. On the 
one hand, Botha made several defiant statements, particularly when addressing overseas 
audiences: “South African problems will be solved by South Africans and not by 
foreigners”; “It would also be wrong to place a time limit on negotiations. I am not going 
to walk into this trap – I am responsible for South Africa’s future”; “Many of the present 
perceptions of the South African situation overseas are, of course, erroneous. Nobody 
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would deny that we face problems that demand solutions, but every country has. I can 
name you quite a few countries who have more problems than South Africa.” 
On the other hand, the president spoke as if he were announcing a sea change in 
policy, repeating the phrase “we believe” in one section of the speech to great effect: 
 
We believe and wish to uphold religious freedom … 
We believe in democratic institutions of government … 
We believe our great wealth of divergent population groups must 
speak to each other through their elected leaders … 
We believe that our peace and prosperity is indivisible …177 
 
The speech concludes with the stirring words: “I believe that that we are today crossing 
the Rubicon. There can be no turning back.”178 
Patti Waldmeir described the result as a “spectacular failure of packaging” as “the 
old president’s twisted, hectoring visage dominated TV screens making it difficult to hear 
what he said”,179 and Steward blames the failure on an inability to read audiences:  
 
PW Botha showed an absolute lack of understanding of modern political 
communication. Instead of addressing his real audience of hundreds of 
millions of TV viewers in the West, he addressed the NP faithful. 
Instead of language that his real audience could understand, he used the 
rough and tumble idiom of South African political meetings. Instead of 
a short, well rehearsed tatement containing the message he wanted to 
convey, he delivered a long, rambling speech.180 
 
The aftermath of the Rubicon speech was catastrophic: the rand dropped sharply, US 
Congress passed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, prohibiting new investment and 
loans, and a number of banks refused to roll over South Africa’s debts, forcing the 
country to default and declare a unilateral moratorium on debt. Gerhard de Kock, 
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Governor of the Reserve Bank, famously remarked that the speech cost the country a 
“few million rand per word”.181 
 The response from the South African press was mixed. Some reflected the 
international media’s reaction and were clearly disenchanted. The Natal Witness 
described the speech as a “damp squib”,182 the Sunday Times urged PW to “forget about 
the verkramptes”,183 and Port Elizabeth’s Evening Post claimed that the speech “offered 
little cause for hope that the South African crisis is anywhere nearer resolution”.184 
Other, pro-NP editorials defended Botha, blaming the English-speaking press and 
the international media for creating false expectations. Oo terlig described it as a “strong 
and positive speech”,185 while Volksblad expressed disappointment in reactions to the 
speech, claiming that “greatness should be rewarded with magnanimity” instead of the 
“disappointingly neutral to sceptic” first responses to which the speech had been 
subjected.186 
But the failed expectations also led to further calls for talks. The Evening Post, for 
instance, claimed that “The talking must start”187 while even Volksblad conceded that 
there was “urgent need” for “meaningful Black–White discussions”.188 
These calls were not heeded, however. On the contrary, the Rubicon disaster 
likely affected Botha’s subsequent decision to clamp down on foreign media presence in 
the country. The reasoning behind this decision was hinted at in the speech itself, with 
Botha chastising journalists for promoting “revolutionary” agendas: 
 
I have a specific question I would like to put to the media in South Africa: 
How do they explain the fact that they are always present, with cameras et 
                                                
 
181 Ibid.  
182 Natal Mercury, Editorial: “Damp squib, but …”, 17 August 1985, reprinted in South African Digest 
(week ended 23 August 1985), 773. 
183 Sunday Times, Editorial: “It’s time PW had courage to forget about the verkramptes”, 8 August 1985, 
reprinted in South African Digest (week ended 23 August 1985), 772. 
184 Evening Post, Editorial: “The talking must start”, 16 August 1985, reprinted in South African Digest 
(week ended 23 August 1985), 771. 
185 Oosterlig, Editorial: “A manifesto for South Africa”, 16 August 1985, reprinted and translated in South 
African Digest (week ended 23 August 1985), 772. 
186 Volksblad, Editorial: “Across the Rubicon”, 16 August 1985, reprinted and translated in South African 
Digest (week ended 23 August 1985), 773. 
187 Evening Post, Editorial: “The talking must start”, 771. 











cetera, at places where violence takes place? Are there people from the 
revolutionary elements who inform them to be ready? Or are they perhaps 
representatives of the reactionary groups in the ranks of certain media?189 
 
The NP remained particularly suspicious of “sensationalist” visual media and the role of 
cameras in fomenting discontent in the country. Botha’s view was largely shared by the 
NP government. According to Dave Steward, then a foreign diplomat, the UDF, which 
well understood the role the media played, “would play to the cameras at every 
opportunity”, which culminated in the “imposition of draconian media quotations and 
regulations” in an attempt “not to stop the basic flow of information, but to stop the 
pictures”.190  
Increasing township violence continued to dominate global news coverage, and 
on 2 November, some three months after the Rubicon speech, two months after US 
president Ronald Reagan instituted sanctions and at the opening of the high-profile case 
of the Sharpeville six, Botha placed a ban on the use of cameras and sound equipment in 
areas of unrest unless journalists had received special permission from the police. 
Penalties were as high as ten years’ imprisonment and there was a gradual tapering off of 
coverage on events in the country.191 
Seeking further control, the government imposed further censorship on all 
domestic and foreign publication and barred foreign reporters from the country. This ban, 
implemented in 1987, effectively “knocked racial unrest off the world’s evening news”; 
the following year, it was reported that the number of stories about South Africa declined 
by two-thirds in the United States.192  
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The original plan for television to operate as a means of “showing South Africa to the 
world” was gradually scuppered, as the NP and the SABC realised they had little control 
over the country’s global image. In addition to socio-economic sanctions, the role of 
boycotters and the activities of anti-apartheid activists, the media events genre – those 
televisual moments that define, alter and create history – played an enormous part in 
bringing the country to the political impasse of the late 1980s. 
 Firstly, the various boycotts and bans resulted in internal pressure from a 
dissatisfied white elite, weary of South Africa’s shameful status and eager to enter the 
world of international competition which was played out principally through media event 
contests. Secondly, exposure to the events of other countries awakened South Africans’ 
sense of the way in which the rest of the world viewed the c untry; this in turn led to an 
increased desire for more transparent broadcasting. Thirdly, the state’s inability to 
execute its own media events resulted in further humiliation; while this resulted in 
increased censorship, ultimately, it helped to foster the stalemate of the late 1980s, which 
subsequently led to the negotiated transition. 
With the resignation of PW Botha and the inauguration of FW de Klerk came a 
new approach to television, with leaders who better understood the craving for global 
acknowledgement and the need for the appearance of transparency, both of which could 
be achieved through carefully staged live broadcasts. The bulk of the television 
broadcasting era intersected with the heyday of apartheid, resulting in a partial (and often 
frustrated) experience of television’s power and pleasure. But the events of the political 
transition dovetailed with the tail end of this era, and South Africa made up for lost time, 
as a proliferation of memorable media events characterised the next period of the 














The Shamanising Ayatollah:  
Mandela and the Dismantling of Apartheid 
 
 
Conquests represent the eruption of the charismatic model onto the political stage. 
– Daniel Dayan & Elihu Katz1  
 
 
Though the presence of a charismatic leader is not a requisite for all media events, the 
enactment of Max Weber’s “charismatic authority” is one of the active ingredients in 
Conquests,2 the rarest media event type. The seemingly swift erosion of apartheid led to 
South Africa’s global reacceptance, which in turn led to its return to international 
competition and its reintroduction to the world stage, visibly played out through a series 
of influential media events (see Chapter 6). Many of these events drew power from the 
presence of a captivating figure who was to become the country’s first democratically 
elected president: Nelson Mandela. Just as South Africa had been isolated from global 
events, so Mandela, imprisoned for over 27 years, had become an enigmatic figure, made 
all the more fascinating because of his role in anti-apartheid activism as an “absentee 
performer”.3  
This chapter looks at what is arguably the most important televised media event in 
South Africa’s history: Nelson Mandela’s release from prison.4 The release provided the 
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perfect platform for the “eruption” of Mandela’s presence onto the political stage, and it 
perfectly embodies the features of Dayan and Katz’s shamanising media event. But, as 
dramatic and unexpected as the release might have seemed, it was of course built upon a 
series of “mini” media events. In South Africa, PW Botha’s 1985 offer of conditional 
release once again exposed the apartheid state’s naïve understanding of political 
communication, inadvertently providing the ANC with the opportunity to craft a scripted 
reply that enhanced Mandela’s “moral capital”.5 Globally, the staging of the 1988 Nelson 
Mandela birthday tribute concert brought Mandela into the popular realm, and his image 
drew on the strength of the multitude of celebrity performers. These, and other smaller 
events, helped to establish worldwide suspense around his incarceration and subsequent 
liberation, setting him apart from ordinary human beings and endowing him with 
seemingly remarkable powers. The historic influence of the release is due to two factors. 
As Louw points out, “[t]he apartheid government effectively generated support for the 
Mandela by trying to demonise him”.6 This in turn encouraged the anti-apartheid 
movement to use Mandela as part of a deliberate, and as we shall see, sometimes 
uncontainable, strategy whereby he became a symbol of the unjust fate of all South 
Africans.  
 
The “Mandela Problem” and the Making of the Messiah 
Although the conditions of late apartheid provided fertile ground for charismatic 
leadership, which frequently “emerges in contexts where a serious socio-economic crisis 
exists and large groups of people experience distress”,7 Mandela’s global appeal finds its 
origins long before the end of apartheid. By the time of his release, his persona had 
already gained considerable symbolic meaning through a series of smaller media events. 
His mythologisation can be attributed, ironically, to the conditions of his incarceration, 
during which time it was illegal to publish his image and words. Hand-drawn 
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reproductions and illegal reprints of his likeness were thus circulated en masse by trade 
unions and other grassroots organisations.8 Louw points out that the UDF, which 
generated a great deal of anti-apartheid material, denied formal associations with the 
ANC (because of its banning) but nevertheless used Mandela iconography to signal its 
allegiances.9 
This led to the gradual iconisation of his 
image, which became a kind of logo for the 
struggle movement, and later for post-apartheid 
South Africa. During this period, principally as 
a means of castigating the apartheid state, 
various human rights organisations bestowed 
awards and honours upon him in absentia,10 
thus keeping his image alive in the global 
imagination. 
Mandela’s elevation accelerated with 
the onset of the 1978 Free Mandela campaign, 
prior to which he had appeared as a great ANC 
leader, but one among many. The Free 
Mandela campaign had in fact been initiated by 
Ahmed Kathrada after Mandela’s first arrest in 
1962, but it was taken up again with vigour by 
the anti-apartheid movement abroad. As Thabo 
Mbeki has pointed out, the tactic was unusual for the ANC, which tended to focus on 
collective leadership rather than the promotion of “anointed personalities”,11 and, as we 
shall see, there was uncertainty about the extent to which Mandela should serve as a 
poster boy for the struggle. 
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Figure 3.1: Poster of Mandela’s likeness 
distributed by COSATU, 1989 (from the 











Winnie Mandela was a central part of the strategy – perhaps because she herself had a 
good understanding of how to attract media attention – and she served as the visibly 
persecuted, “inseparable”12 and feminine half of the symbol – sometimes, particularly 
towards the end of Mandela’s imprisonment, without the desired outcomes, when there 
were various unsuccessful attempts to keep her in line with the ANC’s aims. Winnie’s 
rhetoric was sometimes at odds with the ANC’s projected image, and by extension 
Mandela’s reputation. At a speech in Munsieville near Johannesburg in 1986, for 
example, she publicly endorsed the controversial practice of necklacing,13 stating, 
“Together, hand in hand, with our boxes of matches and our necklaces, we shall liberate 
this country.” The comment was widely quoted (Winnie claimed out of context) in the 
South African and international media and it created negative publicity for the ANC, 
which had been at pains to point out that necklacing was not official practice. Oliver 
Tambo stated at a summit of non-aligned nations that, although the organisation was 
unhappy with necklacing, it would not condemn persons who had been driven to 
extremes by the situation in South Africa. Thus, the organisation never publicly distanced 
itself from Winnie’s comments. Oliver Tambo did apparently send instructions for 
Winnie to be “gagged”14 in an attempt to prevent further tarnishing of its (and Mandela’s) 
reputation. John Kane notes her ambiguous effect on Mandela’s global image: “If he 
avoided the category of the wholly mythical, it was largely by virtue of his conjugal 
attachment to the all-too-visible Winnie, whose abundant reality seemed to argue some 
sort of actuality for his own corporeal, if mysteriously isolated, existence.”15  
Mandela’s and, to a lesser extent, Winnie’s elevation were thus part of an 
exceptional and fairly deliberate effort to campaign for the release of political prisoners 
and “to present to the world … the brutality of the apartheid system”,16 and although 
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some have viewed Mandela as an “icon who outgrew his country”,17 in many respects, 
his image was in fact “encoded” abroad: “Once the global establishment press in New 
York, Washington and London started featuring Mandela as a martyr and potential 
problem-solver, the work of local journalists opposed to apartheid became easier. The 
publicity allowed them to circumvent the clamps on the press by the NP government.”18 
 The work of local journalists was also made easier by the 
fact that, unlike the campaigns abroad, the struggle did not 
require Mandela’s mythologisation in South Africa, where mass 
support for the ANC was already secured.19 Chapters 4, 5 and 6 
detail how the “celebration” of Mandela continued after his 
release, when it became plain that his popularity and 
accumulated “moral capital”20 made him marketable on the 
global stage as the ANC’s candidate for the presidency. At 
the launch of his book Communication Power in 2009, 
Manuel Castells spoke of the human face as the simplest and most powerful media 
message.21 In Mandela’s case, the mystery surrounding his changing appearance seemed 
to stand the party in good stead. Much like Che Guevara’s image, posterised images of 
Mandela’s face, along with the slogan “Free Mandela”, were easily reproduced in 
pamphlets, as graffiti, on buttons and T-shirts and they acted as a kind of visual shorthand 
for the anti-apartheid movement. After his release, Mandela’s face gradually came to 
embody two important political values: forgiveness and hope, both of which engendered 
trust, which Castells identified as the most important media message in politics.22 
Possibly, the constraints and challenges of underground communication, which 
necessitated strategic campaigning, gave Mandela and the ANC some insight into the 
power of symbolic gestures, particularly in their understanding of global media 
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platforms. While the apartheid state remained insular in its outlook, the ANC was reliant 
on overseas partners and developed a sense of the requirements of effective global 
communication. Later, some argue that this gave them the advantage over other political 
parties during the transition period.23 Even before the anti-apartheid movement gained 
momentum, Mandela had appealed to an international audience,24 deftly disseminating 
his political views via whatever media opportunities came his way. His first television 
interview with a British reporter from Independent Television News came in the wake of 
what was perceived as a failed stay-at-home strike in May 1961. Though the interview 
did not cause much of a stir in Britain at the time, because it was also the last interview 
he would give in over twenty years, it became stock footage for future mobilisation. 
His decision to represent himself in court in 1962 and 1964 also gave him a rare 
opportunity not only to articulate the political vision of his party to national and 
international journalists,25 but also to address the world as the country’s rightful leader. 
Raymond Suttner points out that at the trial “Mandela did not speak as a ‘dissident’, that 
is, a representative of a minority view, but projected a national vision,”26 and his final 
statement from the dock received an overwhelming response in the international press; he 
and his fellow Rivonia trialists were hailed in the N w York Times as the “new George 
Washingtons and Ben Franklins”.27 Mandela was of course acutely aware of these 
possibilities. In his biography of Mandela, Anthony Sampson remembers how, when he 
was a young journalist, Mandela asked him to assess the speech’s potential impact on 
overseas opinion.28 
Because the South African media was, from 1960 onwards, forbidden from 
printing the words of leaders of banned organisations, the global media (in collaboration 
with the anti-apartheid movement) played an increasingly important role in the political 
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battle for power, a situation which resulted in some bizarre forms of national and global 
broadcasting. 
For Botha’s government, the anti-apartheid movement’s strategy resulted in what 
was increasingly termed the “Mandela problem”,29 as more and more Western countries 
made demands for his release. Mandela and the ANC utilised this to their advantage by 
refusing to bargain about release conditions and adopting an uncompromising position on 
what his freedom should signal. This was made clear in 1985 when Mandela’s response 
to the state’s conditional offer of freedom was read out at a UDF rally. The event, 
although obviously not televised live in South Africa, attracted much international media 
attention and was shown in televised news inserts across the world. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, five months before the disastrous Rubicon 
speech, in his 1985 parliamentary address PW Botha offered to release Mandela on 
condition that he renounce the armed struggle. “All that is required of him now,” Botha 
declared, “is that he should unconditionally reject violence as a political instrument.” The 
parliamentary addresses were routinely broadcast live via SABC TV and radio, and were 
beginning to attract foreign media as well. Botha no doubt expressed the offer in this 
forum in an attempt to cast the NP in a more reasonable light in the eyes of international 
audiences. In Long Walk to Freedom, Mandela suggests the tactical planning behind the 
presentation of the offer: “I had been warned by the authorities that the government was 
going to make a proposal involving my freedom, but I had not been prepared for the fact 
that it would be made in Parliament by the president.”30 This was in fact the sixth offer of 
conditional freedom; previous offers had been dependent on Mandela’s going to reside in 
the Transkei and were rejected since the ANC did not recognise the legitimacy of the 
homelands.31 The conditions of this final offer were inspired by the president’s visit to 
right-wing German leaders, mainly Franz Josef Strauss, and an excited Botha told his 
cabinet on return that offering Mandela this form of conditional freedom provided a 
perfect solution, because if Mandela refused (as Botha fully expected he would),32 then  
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according to cabinet minister Kobie Coetsee, Botha believed “the whole world would 
understand why the South African government could not release him”.33 The president 
hoped that Mandela’s refusal would shirk off the martyr mantle and expose him as a 
violent terrorist.  
Some members of Botha’s cabinet were sceptical. Kobie Coetsee, Minister of 
Justice, and Louis le Grange, Minister of Law and Order, both felt that the ploy would 
backfire.34 They were right; the plan failed dismally. This was partly because Botha’s 
offer was not couched in the required rhetoric. As Coetsee pointed out, the offer needed 
to be phrased in a positive way, but their reported attempts to have Botha read a more 
acceptable version of the offer were rejected (as would be the case with the Rubicon 
speech later in the year – see Chapter 2). Instead Botha’s political intentions were 
patently clear. In his typically bombastic fashion, the president was quoted as saying, “It 
is therefore not the South African government which now stands in the way of Mr 
Mandela’s freedom. It is himself.” More importantly, however, while the state may have 
had control of the broadcaster and attempted to use it to inflate the importance of the 
offer, the anti-apartheid movement outwitted the NP by conceptualising a historic 
response that attracted media attention, disarming international (and local) audiences and 
giving the ANC the moral high ground. 
Botha’s offer was presented to Mandela at Pollsmoor Prison, where he had also 
apparently listened to the parliamentary address live on the radio.35 As Botha expected, 
the leader and fellow activists quickly decided to reject it.36 Winnie Mandela travelled to 
Pollsmoor to receive her husband’s official response, a trip that was widely reported in 
the media, amidst much speculation that Mandela would accept in spite of the fact that 
the ANC had already denounced the offer in Lusaka. The legal implications of Mandela’s 
statement were then studied by Arthur Chaskalson and George Bizos, with journalists 
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reportedly phoning incessantly for the official reply. According to Bizos, Winnie, who 
“stage managed events to achieve maximum effect”,37 was determined to read out 
Mandela’s response the following day at a UDF-organised rally planned in honour of 
Archbishop Desmond Tutu, who was returning from Oslo after having been awarded the 
Nobel Peace Prize. Because of Winnie’s banning order, which prevented her from 
speaking and appearing in crowds, she decided, according to Bizos, at the eleventh hour, 
that their 25-year-old daughter, Zindzi, should read out the response. It seems possible, 
however, that the decision to use Zindzi was made at Pollsmoor and that Mandela had 
always intended for her to read the reply, since the speaker’s identity is built into the very 
fabric of the speech. Whoever was responsible for the approach, it proved to be a canny 
decision that achieved the desired dramatic effect.38  
On 10 February 1985, at Soweto’s Jabulani Stadium before a crowd of over 9 000 
people, Zindzi was ushered onto the stage by the new Nobel Peace Prize winner, where 
she read out Mandela’s words, repeating the poignant phrase “my father says …”, words 
that were all the more meaningful because for the first two decades of Mandela’s 
imprisonment it had been illegal to publicise his comments. The state began to make 
allowances in the mid-80s and the “My father says” speech, as it became known,39 was 
the first occasion in over twenty years when the silenced prisoner’s thoughts were voiced 
in public.40 The speech, jointly drafted by Mandela, Ahmed Kathrada, Walter Sisulu, 
Raymond Mhlaba and Andrew Mlangeni at Pollsmoor Prison, was a dazzling piece of 
rhetoric: 
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I cherish my own freedom dearly, but I care even more for your 
freedom. Too many have died since I went to prison. Too many have 
suffered for the love of freedom. I owe it to their widows, to their 
orphans, to their mothers and to their fathers who have grieved and 
wept for them. Not only I have suffered during these long, lonely, 
wasted years. I am not less life-loving than you are. But I cannot sell 
my birthright, nor am I prepared to sell the birthright of the people to be 
free. I am in prison as the representative of the people and of your 
organisation, the African National Congress, which was banned. 
What freedom am I being offered while the organisation of the 
people remains banned? What freedom am I being offered when I may 
be arrested on a pass offence? What freedom am I being offered to live 
my life as a family with my dear wife who remains in banishment in 
Brandfort? What freedom am I being offered when I must ask for 
permission to live in an urban area? What freedom am I being offered 
when I need a stamp in my pass to seek work? What freedom am I 
being offered when my very South African citizenship is not respected? 
Only free men can negotiate.41 
 
The benefits for the movement were multiple. Firstly, addressing a planned mass rally 
secured the ready attention of the international media.42 Secondly, the response fed off 
the symbolic capital that was fast being accrued by Desmond Tutu (see Chapter 2), who 
was quoted in the international media as saying, “There is no hope in this country until 
the government talks to the real leaders … You have just heard from one of those 
leaders.”43 Thirdly, the use of Mandela’s daughter as spokesperson pulled at the 
heartstrings of the audience, simultaneously invoking the notion of sacrifice and 
demonising the apartheid state.  
The South African print media did not anticipate this response and, for the most 
part, bought into Botha’s strategy. Die Volksblad opined that if Mandela refused the offer 
“the world will see who is pursuing peace sincerely and who is prepared to move. It will 
also see who is hampering that striving and movement with fruitless clinging to an 
ideology of violence, personal ambition and concern for its ANC power base”.44 Rapport 
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saw Botha’s offer as “sincere”,45 and the Sunday Times called it a demonstration of 
“praiseworthy willingness”.46 Interestingly, most did not wholly condemn Mandela’s 
rejection, seeing it as a step towards further negotiation – which many papers were now 
promoting – with Beeld even suggesting that an alternative, less rhetorical response had 
been sent to PW Botha privately.47 The international media (and liberal South African 
media), on the other hand, responded with scepticism to Botha’s offer and glorified 
Mandela’s response. The Star called Botha’s offer a “Trojan horse”,48 while the Rand 
Daily Mail questioned the president’s offer, asking, “Was it a ploy, couched in such 
terms that Mandela had little choice but to reject it?”49 Time magazine described 
Mandela’s stage-managed rejection in dramatic terms:  
 
Dressed in the yellow T-shirt of the United Democratic Front, a 
rapidly growing antiapartheid movement, Zindzi Mandela, 25, at 
the side of Johannesburg’s Anglican Bishop Desmond Tutu, 
stood silently for a moment in Soweto’s Jabulani Stadium. Then 
she began to read to the 9,000 people gathered before her a 
message prepared by her father, Nelson Mandela, in his prison 
cell.50 
 
The “My father says” speech ended up being one of the key mobilising moments of the 
struggle. The circumstances leading up to the speech gave the ANC the opportunity to 
capitalise on global sympathy, and the state revealed its lack of understanding of the 
politics of global communication. Instead of demonising Mandela, as Botha had hoped, 
the conditional offer of freedom only succeeded in giving the prisoner “a veto over his 
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own release”.51 “In effect,” as Waldmeir points out, “[Botha] handed over control of the 
biggest political problem facing his government to the enemy.”52 
The “Mandela problem” intensified later in the year when the leader’s ailing 
health posed a challenge. The state responded nervously to health complications, first in 
1980, when Mandela was diagnosed with tuberculosis, and then again in December 1985, 
when medical examinations uncovered an enlarged prostate and urinary blockages. In 
both cases, the authorities gave orders for him to be treated immediately, signalling their 
fear of the likely consequences of his death in prison.  
The anti-apartheid movement (via the Mandela family) utilised the 1985 incident 
to great effect, since it gave them the opportunity to emphasise the injustice of political 
imprisonment. Mandela’s family’s journey to Cape Town to visit him before the 
scheduled surgery was dramatically reported, and his daughters, Zindzi and Zenani, were 
widely quoted in the international press alongside their mother.  
Time magazine aptly described the effective way in which personalising 
the anti-apartheid movement contributed to the “Mandela problem”, referring 
to Mandela alongside other historic figures of the twentieth century: “Put an 
inspirational leader in prison, and the movement he leads may turn into a 
crusade. That happened to Mahatma Gandhi in India and to Martin Luther 
King Jr. in the U.S.”53  
 
Mandela, the Rock Star: Apartheid, the Cultural Boycott and Popular Music 
In the latter half of the 1980s, the anti-apartheid movement strategy attracted the attention 
of the music industry, and Mandela’s image gained further symbolic meaning via popular 
culture. Just as the sporting ban helped to increase the reach of the movement’s political 
message, so the music industry targeted new, younger supporters. While the British 
Equity ban had isolated South African audiences from certain foreign products, the 
effects were limited to South Africa; expansion of the movement required mass events 
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outside of South Africa in order to reach large foreign audiences. Personalising the anti-
apartheid movement resulted in a series of televised mass music concerts, first held as 
general protests against apartheid and then, arguably more successfully, in Mandela’s 
honour. The growing appeal of celebrity culture fed into this, sometimes sitting 
awkwardly alongside the rhetoric of protest.  
At first, the politicisation of pop remained “in house”, in a manner of speaking, 
with the release of the song “Sun City”. Inspired by charity singles such as “We Are the 
World” by USA for Africa and “Do They Know It’s Christmas” by Band Aid, the multi-
performer track was organised by the group Artists Against Apartheid,54 founded by Jerry 
Dammers, of Special AKA, who wrote the hugely popular 1984 song “Free Nelson 
Mandela”.55 Unlike the charity singles, the message of “Sun City” was political rather 
than philanthropic and it was aimed at fellow musicians rather than audiences in general. 
A total of 303 tracks were mixed down to create the final version and a highly politicised 
music video accompanied its release.56 The “project” highlighted the hypocrisy of artists 
who continued – in contravention of the spirit of the cultural boycott – to perform at Sun 
City, a luxury casino in the Bophuthatswana homeland. Dubbed “Sin City”, the casino 
served as a pleasure park for white South Africans wanting to escape the political realities 
of the country. Since Bophuthatswana allowed gambling and titillating sex shows, it 
provided white South Africans with a fantasyland where they could forget their country’s 
Calvinist legislation and pariah status. As was the case with the sports boycott, the United 
Nations kept a list of artists who travelled to South Africa or who collaborated with South 
African artists. As the boycott gathered momentum, artists who overlooked the 
conditions usually damaged their professional reputations. (As seen in Chapter 2, this was 
also the case with sportspersons.) Because Sun City was located in Bophuthatswana, 
artists could perform there without contravening the conditions of the UN-sanctioned 
cultural boycott adopted in 1980. Although no Sun City performers were actually named 
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in the song, “Sun City” was a direct indictment on such individuals.57 The track featured 
54 popular artists, each individually repeating the word “I” and then together singing 
“ain’t gonna play Sun City”. Artists Against Apartheid managed to secure some big-
name musicians, including Bruce Springsteen, Bob Dylan, Ringo Starr, Lou Reed, Peter 
Gabriel, U2’s Bono and Keith Richards. Unsurprisingly, it received little to no airtime in 
South Africa, largely because the two more liberal independent radio stations – Capital 
and Radio 702 – were partly owned by Southern Sun shareholders, who also had interests 
in Sun City. 
Beyond South Africa’s borders, the song had moderate success: it managed to 
raise over a million dollars for the anti-apartheid movement and it was partially effective 
in penetrating new audiences – the video, for instance, was frequently played on MTV.58
Yet, although lauded in pop history as one of the great political pop songs, at the time the 
track was not nearly as successful as “We Are the World” and “Do They Know It’s 
Christmas”, or “Free Nelson Mandela” for that matter; it only reached no. 38 in the 
United States and no. 21 in the United Kingdom. Thomas Vernon Reed argues that the 
political message scared radio stations, unlike the “more politically vague famine relief 
efforts”.59 The song’s lack of airtime was also likely because of the specificity of the 
message, which required audiences to have a grasp of the socio-political significance of 
Sun City and South Africa’s Bantustan system. As the later concerts show, 
personalisation of the message through the figure of Nelson Mandela was more 
successful in reaching audiences. Furthermore, perhaps because of the unique 
relationship that exists between musical performance and “liveness”, it was the live 
broadcasting of mass Live Aid–style events that really broke down barriers. That said, 
negotiations behind the Mandela concerts also revealed the sometimes uncomfortable 
relationship between politics and popular culture; as Reebee Garofalo claims, “they 
embody all the contradictions that enable us to see the possibilities and pitfalls of mass 
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culture”.60 In addition, the concerts can perhaps be identified as one of the sources of the 
ambiguities that later attended the figure of Mandela himself. 
Artists Against Apartheid followed up “Sun City” with a mass concert in London 
in 1986: Freedom Beat. The concert was free and took place on Clapham Common, 
attracting an audience of around 250 000 people. Although it succeeded in attracted some 
high-profile performers, including Sting, Sade, Peter Gabriel and Boy George, the 
concert was a haphazard affair and it lost money, partly because it did not sell 
broadcasting rights. 
The concert was nevertheless important since it served as the forerunner to the 
hugely successful 1988 Nelson Mandela seventieth birthday tribute, which brought 
together the magic of live musical performance, the simplification of the anti-apartheid 
message via the enigmatic figure of Mandela, and the interest of global broadcasters. It 
was the first of many global media events held in Mandela’s honour. For this next 
concert, Jerry Dammers collaborated with Tony Hollingsworth, who was at the time 
developing a reputation as a major festival and events organiser, particularly those held in 
aid of socio-political causes. Hollingsworth recommended that Dammers begin by 
securing a high-profile act/celebrity in an attempt to attract the participation of additional 
performers. Dammers only managed to do this a year later, when Simple Minds 
expressed their conditional commitment to the concert. Discussion then focused on the 
kind of event that should be organised. While Dammers envisaged a repeat of the 
Clapham Common festival – essentially a non-televised concert – Hollingsworth had 
already conceived of a much more spectacular affair, a media event that would exploit 
television and link the concert to Mandela’s forthcoming 70th birthday. Over the years, 
Mandela’s birthday had become a key feature of the Free Mandela campaign; the anti-
apartheid movement “celebrated” the date of his birth as a means of drawing attention to 
the plight of political prisoners in South Africa,61 and the idea of a music festival 
provided a perfect opportunity to broadcast the anti-apartheid movement’s message. 
Hollingsworth saw the possibilities offered by television and mass culture; he wanted the 
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event to “be a campaign calling for [Mandela’s] release – the first step in ending 
apartheid”, and he wanted it to “be produced as a global television event… one that was 
created via a concert”.62  
Initially, this proposal did not receive the full blessing of the anti-apartheid 
movement; and some juggling of stakeholder interests was required. As Dayan and Katz 
point out, television events involve three partners – organisers, broadcasters and 
audiences – and it is “useful to think of such events as constituting a kind of ‘contract’ 
whereby each side undertakes to give something to the others in order to get something in 
return”.63 In this case, there were additional participants and much negotiation was 
required. Stakeholders included Hollingsworth, representing the production team; the 
anti-apartheid movement, representing the ANC’s political ambitions; the celebrity 
performers, each with individual career pursuits; the broadcasters, who were mainly 
interested in the commercial viability of the event; sponsors, seeking brand visibility; 
and, finally, audiences, the eventual measure of the success of the concert. The proposed 
focus of the show was hotly debated throughout 1987.64 Mike Terry, head of the 
movement, initially resisted the proposal because it did not sit comfortably with the 
policies of the ANC, which strove to emphasise collective leadership. This was somewhat 
surprising, because the anti-apartheid movement had for some time been utilising 
Mandela to articulate their wishes, but they appeared to be uncomfortable with the extent 
to which the concert wished to “celebrate” him. They were also no doubt sceptical about 
the corporate branding of the event, and turned down Pepsi Cola’s offer to act as the main 
sponsor of the concert.65 The anti-apartheid movement proposed a different focus, 
apparently based on Mandela’s wishes.66 Firstly, they wanted the concert to focus on all 
political prisoners, not only on Mandela; secondly, they wanted the event to spotlight 
apartheid as a whole; thirdly, they wanted the event to campaign for sanctions against 
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South Africa.67 Hollingsworth argued that over-politicising the message would scare 
away performers, broadcasters and audiences, thus minimising the potential impact of the 
event. He emphasised the importance of an affirming message, especially if the concert 
was to be aimed at a wide range of countries, including some where there might be little 
knowledge of, or indeed support for, Mandela. “The made-for-television event should not 
be ‘angry’,” Hollingsworth argued, “but a “positive” birthday tribute, calling only for 
Mandela to be freed:68 
 
If you are to take it [the message] to a mass of people and use the popular 
medias, you have to use every string you can, in terms of popular 
presentation. Create the logo, create the man as logo, appeal to 
everybody’s softest point, about him being seventy and his birthday and 
him being imprisoned. Make all those emotional points … That was the 
hardest thing for the political community … to accept; the idea that it 
was as soft as a birthday tribute. … So it’s a very soft way to do it. It 
wasn’t ‘Sanctions Now’. It wasn’t anything hard-hitting like the Anti-
Apartheid Movement had been doing in the past.69 
 
Eventually, it was agreed that the concert should be limited to a birthday tribute, with 
more overtly political campaigning providing the context.70  
Behind-the-scenes negotiations with performers revealed, perhaps, the most 
complex tensions. Booking artists was no easy feat, and Hollingsworth details the 
convoluted negotiations that took place.71 The first big-name act to agree to the concert, 
Simple Minds, insisted that they would perform only if another high-profile group also 
agreed. Dire Straits was the second group to take the bait, but only on condition that 
Hollingsworth secured further interest without mentioning their commitment to the event. 
Several top performers only agreed to perform at the last minute, once they were assured 
that they would be in good company. Furthermore, while some of the celebrity 
entertainers were happier with the idea of a birthday tribute as opposed to a protest 
contest, Simple Minds were displeased with the “watering down” of the political message 
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and the mainstreaming of the performance cast72 nd their discontent threatened to derail 
the whole process. As Garofalo points out, “the degree of ‘fit’ between artist and issue is 
one variable that can affect the public perception of a mega-event”,73 and there were 
some obvious contradictions in the decision to involve performers who had previously 
broken the cultural boycott (e.g. The Beach Boys, Tina Turner, Queen and Cher). There 
was also widespread criticism of the production team’s decision to book Whitney 
Houston, since she was well known for her apolitical stance and it was felt that 
associating her with the event would lessen its impact.74 As luck would have it, Houston 
turned out to be greatly admired by the imprisoned political elite in South Africa, and 
Ahmed Kathrada wrote a letter to the anti-apartheid movement, which they forwarded to 
Rolling Stone magazine, where he was quoted as stating: “You lucky guys! What I 
wouldn’t give just to listen to Whitney Houston!”75 In the face of this, her lack of 
political commitment no longer mattered. 
Some of these tensions were resolved by allowing individual acts the freedom to 
make more overt political statements within the framework of a tribute concept, and most 
performers eventually agreed that the benefits of involving less politicised acts 
outweighed the contradictions.  
 The seduction of broadcasters was dependent on two factors: firstly, the event 
required the commitment of high-profile celebrities, as this would in turn safeguard the 
interest of commercial advertisers and sponsors; and, secondly, the focus and atmosphere 
of the show could not conflict with the viewpoints and image of networks or sponsors.76 
The involvement of big-name stars such as Dire Straits and George Michael helped to 
attract a five-star cast, while securing a deal with the BBC attracted further networks, 
because the broadcaster’s respectable reputation bestowed legitimacy on the event.77 The 
precariousness of these negotiations was revealed by the fact that within hours of the 
BBC’s announcement of its decision, the South African consulate and 24 Conservative 
                                                
 
72 Ibid. 
73 Garofalo, Rockin’ the Boat, 33. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Cited in Garofalo, Rockin’ the Boat, 59. 












members of the British parliament protested against the proposed broadcast, claiming that 
participants would in effect be soliciting money for armed rebellion in South Africa.78 
This was not entirely negative for the BBC, who, as Hollingsworth explains, was at the 
time struggling to assert its independence from Margaret Thatcher’s government.79 The 
protests also created further publicity for the event80 and no doubt compensated for 
concerns that the initial concept had been overly depoliticised. The BBC’s level of 
commitment increased with the growing bill of top performers (from five to 11 hours). 
Hollingsworth eventually managed to get buy-in from 67 broadcasters around the world, 
and many African countries were given a free licence. On 11 July 1988, just over a week 
before Mandela’s birthday, an estimated 600 million viewers watched the event, 
excluding African audiences,81 200 million more than the Live Aid concert. 
 The televised experience varied greatly depending on broadcasters’ treatment of 
the event.82 Hollingsworth deliberately set up two stages (one with star acts and one with 
up-and-coming artists) to ensure a continuous supply of footage so that broadcasters 
would not need to add material between events. This, Hollingsworth claims, was also part 
of a strategy to reduce the possibility of broadcasters imposing their own narrative 
structure on the event.83 Most broadcasters televised the event live, using the feed 
provided by the production team, affording the production team ultimate editorial control. 
The importance of this is exemplified by the differences between watching the event in 
Rome versus the experience of viewing it in the United States, where the show was not 
broadcast live due to time differences. The Italian broadcast came out in complete 
support of the political objectives of the event. The programming was sponsored by Il 
Manifesto (an independent left-wing newspaper) and shown on Channel 3, the communist 
channel. A local political campaign was established, and the screening of the televised 
event was accompanied by a rally with a series of anti-apartheid speeches given by Italian 
and African political leaders. Critics generally agree that the political aims of the mega-
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event were only partially realised in the United States,84 where the conservative network, 
Fox Television, owned by Rupert Murdoch, broadcast a reframed version of the concert. 
The broadcaster insisted on billing the show as the “Freedomfest” concert, rejecting 
Hollingsworth’s plea to at least add “for Nelson Mandela”.85 The broadcast was 
“saturated with advertising, often by firms doing business in South Africa”.86 Coca Cola, 
which bought advertising time from Fox when it was rumoured that Pepsi was going to 
sponsor the event,87 was one such case and it was singled out as being one of the main 
reasons for the altered spirit of the show,88 ith many commentators speculating about 
the sponsor’s relationship with Whitney Houston, when the singer, who was under 
contract to Coca Cola, performed in front of a black backdrop instead of the usual banner 
of Mandela posters. (Hollingsworth claims that this was actually a misperception and the 
seeming censorship was due to an electrical problem.89) The eleven-hour concert was 
edited down to five hours, with many of the artists’ more strident introductions to songs 
being cut altogether. Peter Gabriel gave a particularly politically charged introduction to 
his rendition of “Biko”: 
 
Reading the press, people ask why we single out South Africa. South 
Africa is the only country in the world that has racism enshrined in its 
Constitution. This is a message from all of us, from all of you, to the 
sons and daughters of the South African government, that it’s time for a 
change. This song was written ten years ago for another man beside 
Nelson Mandela who had the courage to stand up and fight for what he 
believed in, to fight for his people no matter the cost to himself. He was 
imprisoned, tortured and killed in a jail. For Stephen Biko …90
 
These, and other such statements, were excluded from the Fox broadcast, to the outrage 
of some performers. Steven van Zandt (aka Little Steven), who was one of the drivers 
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behind the “Sun City” project, was reportedly appalled when he watched a recording of 
the Fox broadcast on his return to the United States, describing it as “a totally Orwellian 
experience”91 and stating in a New York Times editorial that “the show was neutered, the 
issue downplayed and the message muzzled” – a view that was repeated in a number of 
reviews of the broadcast.92  
The broadcast suggests the limits of politics in the popular realm and the ways in 
which television altered the nature of “cause concerts”. Critics noted, at the time, the 
overt differences between earlier festivals such as Woodstock: 
 
The model for today’s cause concerts isn’t the rent party or Woodstock-type 
festival, but the rock ’n’ roll commercial. The sponsors of both events recognize 
rock’s power to direct that motivation. Through context, television shapes the 
meaning of music. In one context a rock song about idealized love sells soft 
drinks; in another, it beats down apartheid.93 
 
The event, like Live Aid before it, typified one of the defining characteristics of Dayan 
and Katz’s media events, namely the “celebration of voluntarism – the wilful resolve to 
take direct, simple, spontaneous, o tensibly nonideological action”.94 As with “Sun City”, 
the Mandela tribute exemplified the extent to which humanitarian causes – as opposed to 
overt political rallying – better suit popular display. 
While there were of course other US broadcasters, Hollingsworth nevertheless 
decided on the trade-off because Fox offered a much higher viewership.95 In spite of the 
heavy editing, and contrary to some of the criticisms of the concert, a few of the 
performers’ heartfelt dedications to Mandela were still broadcast, and as Hollingsworth 
pointed out, the editors could hardly cut out the on-stage visuals, including 30-foot 
banners of Mandela’s image atop slogans such as “Isolate Apartheid” and “The Struggle 
Is My Life”. The Fox anchor also introduced the broadcast in aggrandised terms, 
describing Mandela as the Anti-Apartheid Movement’s “most visual and spiritual” 
                                                
 
91 Cited in Elman, “Nelson Mandela 70th birthday tribute”. 
92 Garofalo, Rockin’ the Boat, 57. 
93 John Leland, “Talking ‘bout a revolution: Rock’s summer of conscience”, Spin magazine, September 
1988, 27. 
94 Dayan & Katz, Media Events, 21 [my emphasis]. 











leader.96 That Mandela should be described as “spiritual” is interesting; there was in fact 
little knowledge of his religious beliefs, and the description anticipated some of the 
connotations – of saintliness, messianism,97 artyrdom – that would later attend his 
image. 
In Britain, the event was considered a success, and Robin Denselow, music critic 
and presenter of the BBC broadcast, later described it as “the biggest and most 
spectacular pop-political event of all time … a more political version of Live Aid with 
the aim of raising consciousness rather than just money”.98 In the week after the concert, 
membership of local anti-apartheid groups trebled, and a survey revealed that 75% of the 
population aged between 16 and 24 were aware of Mandela’s plight and supported his 
release. The effects of the concert even reached South Africa, where police broke up a 
concert held at the University of Cape Town in commemoration of the prisoner’s 
birthday,99 and recordings were smuggled into the country by South Africans returning 
from abroad. Furthermore, Hollingsworth claimed that one of the campaign’s main aims 
– to “stop television and radio news referring to Mandela as a ‘black terrorist leader’”100 
– had been realised, and the concert altered media references to the liberation movement:  
 
Before the concert, Mandela was routinely referred to on the BBC and in 
other media as the leader of a ‘terrorist’ organization; after the concert 
and its attendant publicity, Hollingsworth claims, this kind of 
representation was no longer possible. Even making allowance for a 
promoter-activist’s exaggeration, there is no doubt that events like the 
Mandela concert played a key role in transforming the image of Mandela 
and the African National Congress (ANC), not only in Britain but 
worldwide.101 
 
The effects of the concert went beyond this, however, and were important to Mandela’s 
reception in the years to come. The mega-event did much more than simply erase the 
“terrorist” label; it bestowed a significant amount of symbolic capital upon the ANC 
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leader. Dayan and Katz point out that media events radically redefine the status of central 
actors, sometimes in ways that cannot be controlled by event organisers or performers. In 
the case of the Mandela concert, the anti-apartheid movement’s nervousness about the 
extent to which the concert hinged on the personal fate of Mandela was perhaps due to 
their sense of Dayan and Katz’s point: 
 
Live broadcasting enhances the status of the principals, conferring both 
legitimacy and charisma during the events and after. The fact of 
addressing a world constituency places a new set of aims and 
responsibilities on the leader’s shoulders. Once validated by public 
response, what might have been a shrewd projected image y nvelop 
the actor himself. Media events make ‘celebrities’ of the supporting 
cast as well, whether they are astronauts, assassins such as Jack Ruby, 
or philanthropist-entrepreneurs such as Bob Geldof of Live Aid.102 
 
The “Free Mandela concert” undoubtedly helped to shape several celebrity careers; the 
previously unknown Tracy Chapman’s career was ostensibly launched by the concert.103 
But in the end most of its power was channelled towards the object of its celebration, 
Mandela himself, who, although absent, nevertheless accumulated legitimacy and 
charisma. The concert also demonstrated the success of using the machinations of global 
television (particularly live broadcasting) in legitimising the goals of the anti-apartheid 
movement. As Eric Louw points out: 
 
The anti-apartheid movement skilfully mobilised Nelson Mandela to 
evoke sympathy. But unlike other sympathy performers who achieved 
celebrity status, Mandela did not perform the role himself. Instead, 
during the 1980s he was cast into the role of an absentee performer, his 
role scripted and played out by anti-apartheid activists. The 1988 Free 
Mandela concert demonstrated the power of global television to 
popularize a celebrity who was not even present. That Mandela was in 
jail turned him into an extraordinarily powerful ‘celebrity’ because his 
own character and performance abilities did not get in the way – 
Mandela could be scripted as the ultimate polysemic persona. He 
became ‘pure imagery’ – a mass media image constructed from 
photographs taken prior to imprisonment, onto which was grafted an 
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heroic mystique and the notion of a hero-victim fighting tyrannical 
villains.104  
 
The potential problem with Mandela’s “polysemic” image or persona is that it 
could become vulnerable to forces beyond the organiser’s control and could be 
used to realise alternative agendas. As we shall see, in future years the 
popularisation of Mandela became something of a mixed blessing. Although it 
gave him a massive amount of political power, both locally and globally, and 
helped to facilitate South Africa’s return to the global stage, it also resulted in 
repeated misunderstanding and misinterpretations of his political ambitions, as 
well as a tendency to overlook his flaws. 
 
The Shamanising Ayatollah: Mandela’s 
Release from Prison 
After major media events such as the birthday 
concert, c lls for Mandela’s release escalated. 
The change in presidency in September 1989, 
after PW Botha suffered a stroke, and the fall of 
communism, saw a change in approach that 
heralded the end of apartheid. The new state 
president, FW de Klerk, immediately set about 
instituting reform, releasing Rivonia trialist 
Walter Sisulu from Pollsmoor Prison in October 
1989. This was a strong sign of the 
government’s commitment to reform, since 
Sisulu was a high-ranking ANC official and SACP member who had been actively 
involved in planning Umkhonto we Sizwe operations. 
The change in presidency also saw a change in communications management, and 
De Klerk’s communications team, led by Dave Steward, better understood the politics of 
global media and maximised efforts to secure good press for the NP government and the 
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country. The precursor to Mandela’s release came with another major televised event: 
FW de Klerk’s parliamentary address on 2 February 1990 in which he announced the 
unbanning of a number of political parties and the release of political prisoners. In the 
wake of the release of Sisulu, the world was anticipating the announcement of Mandela’s 
release. For this reason, perhaps, some international television networks planned to 
broadcast the address live105 and, according to Dave Steward, “there was greater media 
attention on South Africa at that time than at any other time in [its] history”.106 De Klerk 
later explained how he planned to take advantage of the situation: “I knew the world’s 
press was there, not because they wanted to hear me speak, but because they wanted to 
witness the release of Nelson Mandela.” De Klerk knew that the address would be 
televised live across the country and that the global media would be present. He later 
explained some of the planning that went into the event: “We had planned for February 2 
in great detail, and it is remarkable it didn’t leak … My objective that day was to 
convince both our friends and our foes alike that we had made the paradigm shift.”107 
The televised parliamentary address has many of the elements of the media event: 
it was preplanned and live; it played out as an interruption of ordinary routine and it 
served a “transformative function”.108 The BBC news insert from that day reported that 
the “streets erupted into rejoicing … after watching President de Klerk’s speech on 
television”.109 De Klerk had perhaps hoped that the parliamentary address would play out 
as a kind of Conquest media event, the message of which is that “great men and women 
still reside among us, and that history is in their hands. Some people get up in the 
morning, decide to do or say something and the world tomorrow is a different place”.110 
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What was missing from this event, however, was what Dayan and Katz refer to as 
“charismatic seduction”111 and the “aura of a hero”.112 Although De Klerk’s speech was 
lauded and the televised event constituted a key moment in national memory,113 it did not 
go down in history as a global media event, and there are ongoing and often resisted 
attempts to cement De Klerk’s legacy as the man who ended apartheid. 
This was largely because the De Klerk speech was swiftly eclipsed by the 
broadcasting of the release itself, the exact date of which remained unannounced until a 
press conference held one day before, on 10 February. Interestingly, in spite of the fact 
that foreign broadcasters clamoured to receive the news, the SABC did not broadcast live 
from the press conference because the timing clashed with a cricket match,114 but with 
the eyes of the world upon them, the NP’s new communications team did not need their 
assistance. After decades of exposure to the Free Mandela campaign, the global gaze was 
focused on events in South Africa. The event was made all the more suspenseful because 
nobody knew what he looked like. Famously, in the week preceding the release, the cover 
of Time magazine carried an artist’s impression of Mandela’s predicted appearance (see 
Figure 3:2). The historic nature of the event was also boosted by the fact that, as 
evidenced by Mandela’s response to Botha’s conditional offer of release, he had always 
insisted that his freedom should signal the collective liberty of “his people”. The 
uncertainty about the exact time of Mandela’s release also served to heighten excitement. 
In the week after De Klerk’s announcement, global channels emphasised the magnitude 
of the impending event. Mandela was described (by an unknown Afrikaner) as “the 
Messiah to lead us out of the wilderness” on Ted Koppel’s ABC Nightline show,115 
which was broadcast for the entire week from South Africa, and “Waiting for Mandela” 
was a standard headline in the days leading up to his release, preparing the ground for 
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some of the central metaphors of the “new” South Africa (e.g. birth, rebirth, miracle and 
dawn).116  
While Scannell claims that Mandela’s release does not quite fit any of Dayan and 
Katz’s media event categories,117 closer examination of the broadcasting context suggests 
that it is in fact a “shamanizing” or “transformative” media event, a special form of 
“Conquest” (see Chapter 1). While other media event narratives can be seen as 
extraordinary and seemingly magical, shamanising media events are even more 
astonishing, as they involve a “discernible change in the realm of the symbolic and the 
real”.118 While “Coronations” and “Contests” are “unquestionably hegemonic”119 in their 
celebration of establishment initiatives, shamanising media events typically serve as 
“harbingers of change”,120 “mobilizing an entire society to accept its acceptability”121 and 
making “formerly unthinkable solutions thinkable”.122 Much of the criticism of media 
events theory overlooks this category (see Chapter 1); the shamanising format refutes the 
interpretation of media events as “times when large societies are ‘together’ but when this 
togetherness is experienced as something positive”.123 Shamanising media events are 
ceremonies “more likely to be conceded than initiated by elites”;124 they are usually 
mounted “in the midst of a long-standing problem”; and they often involve “guest-
leaders”, who do not yet have “any formal power over the society they are addressing”.125 
“On the world stage, transformative events are often gestures of reconciliation. In the 
smaller arena of national politics, they are more likely to take the form of challenges”.126 
This last point is particularly evident in the differences between national and international 
responses to Mandela’s release. In South Africa, high levels of establishment anxiety 
accompanied the televised release. 
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Television had in many (mainly unintended) ways been priming South Africans 
for the inevitability of change,127 and in the months between FW de Klerk’s inauguration 
and his announcement of Mandela’s release, De Klerk had “made certain that every 
careful step he took toward what he called ‘a new South Africa’ was broadcast, often 
live, and reported in press without censorship”.128 The occasion of Mandela’s release, 
which De Klerk “anticipated the mass media would give its full attention to”,129 presented 
him with the opportunity to communicate his commitment to political reform to the 
world, an opportunity that Lee Edwards describes as his “most important act of 
mediapolitik”.130 But the event also presented the state-controlled SABC, not yet up to 
speed with De Klerk’s vision, with an apparent challenge, referred to in government 
circles at the time as the potential “Khomeini” or “Ayatollah factor”,131 i.e., the fear that 
Mandela’s release would act as a catalyst for violent revolution. The challenges facing 
the broadcaster were exacerbated by poor planning and unpredictable logistical 
challenges on the day. According to André le Roux, the political editor at the SABC, by 9 
February, the broadcaster still had little idea of the exact time of the release and so 
planned to present it as an edited news insert later in the day.132 
The SABC managers changed their minds when the prison authorities informed 
them that Mandela would be released at three o’ clock in the afternoon with “military 
precision” and that he would be exiting the prison in a motor car with tinted windows.133 
It was assumed that a mere few minutes of live commentary would be required before he 
was driven to Cape Town’s Grand Parade. The decision to “risk” live broadcasting was 
perhaps also influenced by the SABC’s sense that, as Dayan and Katz point out, 
“television may be said to ‘contain’ public events”, since “social movements take place 
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outside the home, not inside”.134 Indeed, the late announcement of the plans for his 
release was intended to cut short the ANC’s time to prepare mass rallies and 
demonstrations.135 
The SABC’s plans were thrown into disarray when Mandela’s release was 
delayed. With no back-up footage, the resulting coverage – stilted, uninspired 
commentary, widely considered to be of poor quality136 – exposed the insular apartheid 
state’s limited understanding of how to deal with unpredictable events of global 
magnitude. Le Roux later described some of the constraints under which the news team 
was working: 
 
We waffled about the weather and talked about how long 27 years was. 
The top management at the SABC were very jittery about the impact the 
release would have on the national psyche – by that, they meant the white 
psyche. As a result, we had to keep the thing going without talking too 
much about what was actually happening.137 
 
Clarence Keyter, the hapless commentator chosen to report on the release, had the 
unenviable task of ensuring that the event “redounded to the government’s credit”138 with 
few resources at hand. Not only did he have to report in his second language, but he was 
also strictly forbidden from interviewing any of the awaiting crowd or journalists, as 
SABC authorities were worried that doing so would give a voice to ANC followers.139 In 
this respect, the event had much in common with the treatment of the Pope’s visit to 
Poland. Dayan and Katz point out: 
 
When the broadcaster is less free, he takes his orders from the organizer, 
as Polish television did when the Pope first came to visit in 1979. 
Reflecting the mixed feelings of the Polish government, the official hosts, 
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Polish television followed the Pope on his journey through the country but 
understated the euphoria of the crowds that thronged to see him.140 
 
In his attempts not to elevate Mandela in any way, Keyter resorted to describing the 
surrounding winelands in glowing terms: “There is a warm wind blowing in Paarl … The 
sun is not just for the growing of grapes but the sun is shining on South Africa”.141 As the 
delay stretched on, in a “serious case of misplaced eulogy”,142 he referred to Victor 
Verster as “the most beautiful prison in the world”!  
Foreign news reporters did not fare 
much better. Lee Edwards claims that the 
CBS’s Dan Rather and NBC’s Tom Brokaw 
“were so excited that they got some facts 
wrong, misstating that Mandela’s release from 
prison and his Cape Town address were not 
seen live by white South Africans” and that 
while the release was being screened around the 
world, the SABC broadcast a film of white 
people at a party.143 
 Harking back to the moonlanding, 
Keyter also helped to establish one of the 
central images associated with Mandela, 
repeatedly speaking about the release in terms 
of a journey: “A free man taking his first steps 
into new South Africa … walking strongly, step 
by step further into freedom … Mr Mandela has 
walked his first steps into a new South Africa.” 
In many respects, the idea of Mandela’s “long 
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walk” has replaced the Afrikaner nationalist mythology of “the trek”. Interestingly, 
Mandela directed some of this symbolism himself when he laid down some of the terms 
for the release. Though he was unable to negotiate the timing of the event, he bargained 
successfully over the location. De Klerk wished for Mandela to be flown up to Pretoria to 
make his first public appearance, but Mandela insisted on inviting the public to witness 
him exiting the Victor Verster prison grounds.144 The symbolism of this act is played out 
in the title of his best-selling biography, Long Walk to Freedom. 
Ron Krabill points out that, in the case of Mandela’s release, the “less than stellar 
coverage” can be attributed to a fear of the organisational machinery that polices 
producers, editors and journalists.145 The state, via the SABC, in addition to strictly 
forbidding commentators from glorifying the event, seemed intent on claiming some kind 
of ownership of Mandela’s release. De Klerk made certain that everyone knew who was 
responsible for the event by a holding a global news conference the morning before, and 
the first photograph of Mandela in 27 years was taken at Tuynhuys alongside De Klerk 
on the Friday night and released by the president’s office on the Saturday night. Perhaps 
in a last-ditch attempt to assert its authority, the SABC also did not allow the event to 
disrupt ordinary broadcasting entirely, and, in what must have been a frustrating move for 
South African viewers, the live transmission was interrupted for the regularly scheduled 
evening news. Because Mandela was seen as “an unknown entity to thousands of South 
Africans”,146 a specially prepared bio-documentary directed by Wynand Dreyer was 
shown. The documentary, which included interviews with individuals across the political 
spectrum (including Helen Suzman, Margaret Thatcher and Fatima Meer) seemed 
designed to placate white minority fears by emphasising Mandela’s “common sense” 
(Thatcher) and the “enormous contribution” (Suzman) that Mandela was likely to play. 
The rest of the news included a swathe of official statements from homeland leaders 
commending FW de Klerk for his actions. A PR coup included a statement from Bishop 
Stanley Mogoba, leader of the Pan Africanist Congress, who went so far as to say that De 
Klerk “has saved this country”. The news report illustrates Dayan and Katz’s observation 
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that daily news events are primarily conflict-driven. In spite of what in retrospect appears 
like a fairly chaotic affair, Keyter’s live commentary does not emphasise any of the 
apparent chaos of the awaiting crowd, the police presence or the shouts of viva. Instead 
he steers the interpretation towards calm: “Total jubilation. Total excitement. People 
running alongside the car. Pushing, touching the car …”147 In the later news insert, 
however, the commentary is drawn to conflict, and the celebration of the release is 
juxtaposed against the drama of his delayed address: “And later in the day, Mr Mandela’s 
anticipated address to a mass rally at the Grand Parade delayed when his cavalcade failed 
to get through the assembled crowd” (news anchor’s emphasis). The insert also later turns 
to the looting in downtown Cape Town, where a field reporter comments: 
“Unfortunately, the whole scene was marred at six o clock this evening after people 
broke into a bottle store and started raiding it.” After the news insert, however, the SABC 
switched back to the live broadcast, “missing only the opening tributes”.148  
The state broadcaster chose Hendrik Verwoerd, the identically named grandson of 
the architect of apartheid, as the anchorman in the news studio,149 no doubt in an attempt 
to symbolise the current government’s progressiveness. In the end, these attempts were 
not wholly successful; not even De Klerk, “for all his shrewd appreciation of the power 
of the media, was prepared for the apotheosis of Nelson Mandela”.150 The international 
press cropped the NP leader out of the first released photo, and Mandela appears alone on 
many (though not all) of the Sunday-morning papers and, in spite of the SABC’s best 
efforts to downplay the event, the poor quality of the broadcast did not seem to matter; 
Mandela’s release is widely considered to be one of the most memorable moments of live 
television, both in South Africa and abroad. The live transmission of the event probably 
achieved the highest audience rating (AR)151 in South Africa’s television history152 and it 
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attracted millions of viewers worldwide. It also fares favourably in surveys on the most 
watched and most memorable television events of all time. According to a Guardian poll, 
the televised release is considered second only to the moonlanding,153 a d the event came 
seventh in a 2009 survey of Scottish viewers’ most remembered television moments.154  
Seemingly unmediated, uninterrupted broadcasting is in fact integral to the media 
events phenomenon. Rob Nixon states that “when Mandela arrived, the occasion turned 
into an oddly un-mediated un-American political event”,155 linking it to Mandela’s own 
“oratorical style” which brought to mind a “pretech era”. The spellbinding effect he 
describes, however, has just as much to do with the occasion’s manifestation as a 
shamanising media event as it does with Mandela’s own delivery, which is generally 
considered to be quite poor.156 Instead, Dayan and Katz’s definition of the central 
ceremonial figure of shamanising media events – the myth-making “guest-leader” – 
uncannily describes Mandela’s position on the day: “He is a messiah figure, a mediator of 
extreme oppositions, a realistic dreamer, both utopian and practical, shrewd and 
imaginative.”157 
Mandela’s mediation of his image, both on the day of his release, when tensions 
ran high,158 and during and after the course of his presidency, has remained shrewd and 
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imaginative. He well understood what his return to public life signified, as is implied by 
the introductory words of his first words to South Africa: “I stand here before you not as 
a prophet but as a humble servant of you, the people.” Instead of rousing rhetoric, most of 
the speech consists of a long list of praise of numerous anti-apartheid grassroots 
organisations and leaders, perhaps accounting for its underwhelmed reception.159 
Unlike the SABC, Mandela’s intention was to mark the occasion as historic, but 
in terms that hailed the masses. Yet, ironically, like the SABC, Mandela was unable to 
fully dictate the terms on which the event should be interpreted. This is, again, a distinct 
feature of the media event. Foreign channels and the print media framed the occasion 
(and Mandela’s speech) according to their own agendas. This is typical of shamanising 
media events: once broadcast, other readings, particularly those of the real elites, get “the 
upper hand”.160 Nixon points out that Mandela’s litany of thanks to struggle organisations 
was excised in favour of a “one-nation, one-leader brand of Messianic politics”.161 Such 
reactions, it might be argued, did not give sufficient credit to the masses who actually 
“freed Mandela”,162 in spite of Mandela’s attempts to invoke them. In subsequent news 
broadcasts one of the most quoted soundbites, together with Mandela’s description of FW 
de Klerk as “a man of integrity”, came from the speech’s conclusion, in which Mandela 
repeated the already famous lines from his 1964 Rivonia trial:163  
 
I have fought against white domination, and I have fought against black 
domination. I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in 
which all persons live together in harmony and with equal opportunities. It 
is an ideal which I hope to live for and to achieve. But if needs be, it is an 
ideal for which I am prepared to die. 
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The quote was most likely chosen because of its emphasis on racial reconciliation and 
martyrdom, two central concepts that the media attached to Mandela. The BBC evening 
broadcast referred to him in similar terms:  
 
At the prison to greet him, thousands of South Africans, black and white, 
pinning their hopes on a hero, until today a revered symbol of the fight 
against apartheid; from today a political leader they believe commands 
enough support from black majority and white minority to negotiate an 
end to white rule.164 
 
The South African print media (less affected by political control than the SABC) 
followed up the event with equally grand headlines. Beeld, which two years earlier had 
called for Mandela’s release in an editorial, greeted it with an excited “Here He Is!” and 
the Cape Times recalled Martin Luther King with “Free at Last!”165 
He was met with similar adulation in the international press; Timemagazine 
described him as “Hero. Unifier. Healer. Savior”,166 and reports and broadcasts also 
tended to anticipate a collaborative relationship between Mandela and De Klerk, stressing 
that they shared the same vision of a peaceful South Africa.167 Interestingly, both the 
BBC and Time magazine claimed that Mandela toned down the “militancy” of his first 
speech within a matter of days. After a press conference the day after his release, the 
BBC claimed that “on the vital political issues, Mr Mandela seemed more conciliatory 
today than in yesterday’s speech, deliberately making clear he sees no conflict between 
his continuing commitment to armed struggle and an equal commitment to peaceful 
solutions”.168 Similarly, Time quoted very carefully chosen sections of his address to a 
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Soweto rally two days after his release, concluding that the speech “adopted a markedly 
different tone”.169 
This is only partly true. Although the speech does contain some reconciliatory 
sentiments about addressing white fears, Mandela again saluted the Communist Party and 
emphasised the potential need for a continuing armed struggle, both elements of his 
initial speech that Time claimed caused alarm among white South Africans.170 It would 
appear that his vague (even contradictory) comments on nationalisation accounted for the 
interpretation of a change in tenor. In the speech, Mandela acknowledged that much 
debate had been sparked by ANC policies on nationalisation, but was unclear about 
whether the continued commitment to redistribution of wealth would be sought via 
nationalisation:  
 
The ANC is just as committed to economic growth and productivity as the 
present employers claim to be. Yet we are also committed to ensure that a 
democratic government has the resources to address the inequalities 
caused by apartheid.171 
 
There was much focus on Mandela’s call for nationalisation upon his release, and 
journalists frequently asked him whether he had modified his views in any way, framing 
it as a belief standing in the way of a satisfactory settlement and the reasonable logic of 
the Washington Consensus, which Naomi Klein claims the NP later used to its advantage 
in negotiations.172 For instance, at an international press conference held on 13 February 
1990, a reporter asked Mandela: “You have spoken a couple of times this morning of 
your sensitivity to the concerns of the white population. Have you modified in any way 
your views on the redistribution of wealth?” Similarly, in an interview with a 
Johannesburg television service held on 15 February 1999, a reporter framed the question 
thus:  
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Upon your release, sir, you said you are looking forward to the type of 
political settlement that will satisfy both sides, whites and blacks. After 
saying that, you came up with a philosophy of nationalisation that made 
most of the people you wanted to address in the settlement a bit shaky. 
Can you, sir, explain the intentions behind the nationalisation 
philosophy?173 
 
Nixon notes that after Mandela’s release, the term “dignified” was overextended in US 
coverage, arising perhaps from racial bigotry; he asks: “Would reporters have fussed with 
such boundless amazement over the dignity of a European or American politician – 
Mitterrand, say, or Bush – as if they had been expecting Idi Amin to come crashing 
in?”174 A similar point can be made of the emphasis on Mandela’s “pragmatism”, another 
trait frequently invoked in the foreign media, and one tied to his anticipated acceptance of 
popular global economic policies. The news reports went on to lay down some of the 
terms of South Africa’s negotiated transition with remarkable foresight, even though, at 
that stage, South Africa’s future path was by no means clear. 
Within months, the event had come to stand for the end of apartheid in much the 
same way as the televised images of the fall of the Berlin Wall came to signify the end of 
communism. The more radical elements of Mandela’s speech were downplayed; instead 
he was glorified as a forgiving and reasonable saviour in spite of both his and the 
SABC’s attempts to direct the event differently, and his successful negotiation with FW 
de Klerk was in some ways represented as a foregone conclusion.175 While the 
aggrandising of Mandela was of course welcomed by the ANC, the party was still 
anxious to ensure that De Klerk followed through with reform. In some ways, the global 
interpretation of the release overrruled national attempts to control it. Louw argues that 
the release served as a “sort of ‘cathartic moment’ in which US liberals and African-
Americans could imagine themselves to be experience the idealised world they wanted, 
where racial harmony prevailed”.176 In the domestic context, it was more contested. 
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Free at Last? The Release Concert 
Fifty-four days after the televised release, Mandela was again at the centre of a global 
media event – a second pop extravaganza – popularly called the “Release concert” but 
officially and somewhat oddly titled “Nelson Mandela: An International Tribute for a 
Free South Africa”. The concert, a follow-up to the birthday tribute, was held at 
Wembley Stadium, and Tony Hollingsworth was again one of the main organisers. The 
planning around this event suggests that there were various attempts to direct, and regain 
control, of Mandela’s image. Realising the magnitude of Mandela’s global image, the 
ANC had set up an International Reception Committee to capitalise on the political 
opportunities presented by his release. The committee, convened by Archbishop Trevor 
Huddleston, reasoned that a pop mega-event would provide a good opportunity for 
Mandela to articulate the ANC’s political demands to a mass global audience. The ANC 
was now determined to see democracy installed in South Africa, and needed to remind 
the rest of the world that the struggle did not end with Mandela’s release; they needed to 
continue to pressurise the apartheid government. To ensure that the political spirit of the 
event was not neutralised in any way, the committee, together with Mike Terry and the 
anti-apartheid movement, was more involved in the organising of the second mega-
event.177 There were a number of challenges involved in the planning. According to 
Hollingsworth, Mandela’s lawyer, Ismail Ayob, contacted him even before Mandela’s 
release, when rumours of liberation were rife, in order to discuss the possibility of a post-
release concert. The prospect was risky, since Mandela had not yet agreed to the event 
himself, his release date was uncertain, and the success of the show would obviously 
depend on his appearance. Furthermore, there were three conditions, all designed to 
ensure the politicisation of the event, that could prove difficult in negotiations with 
performers and broadcasters and unappealing to audiences: firstly, Mandela should be 
given an unlimited amount of time to deliver a speech; secondly, the speech should not be 
                                                
 











edited on television,178 and thirdly, there should be no attempt to profit from the show; 
instead the production team should simply aim to break even.179 
 Hollingsworth was not too concerned about the non-profit objective, perhaps 
because, like others, he assumed “that the real headliner of the event, Nelson Mandela, 
appearing live at Wembley, would make the concert irresistible to broadcasters the world 
over”.180 (In the end, the concert did make a profit, amassing £100,000, which was 
donated to charity.)181 But the issue of the speech was more problematic, not only 
because lengthy politicised speeches lacked entertainment value, but also because 
Mandela’s oratory style did not lend itself to televised address. Hollingsworth had seen 
“footage of Mandela giving a speech soon after his release from prison and was 
extremely worried that his old-fashioned style would put off an international television 
audience”.182 According to his version of events, he contacted Danny Schechter, who had 
produced the highly respected show South Africa Now in the United States and 
commissioned him to try to give Mandela some public speaking tips and to persuade him 
to adopt a speaking style better suited to a modern audience.183  
As it turned out, this would be the least of Hollingsworth’s concerns. While in 
Sweden, Mandela encountered a number of activists and African leaders who resisted the 
idea of his appearing at Wembley, since the Thatcherite government did not support 
sanctions against the country – an argument that Mandela found convincing. A decision 
not to appear would, of course, be disastrous for the concert’s organisers and, potentially, 
Mandela’s reputation. Some 72 000 tickets had already been sold – selling out faster than 
any other event in the history of Wembley Stadium.184 Schechter found himself in the 
awkward position of having to secure Mandela’s commitment to the event, at a time 
when “a rock concert was hardly uppermost in [Mandela’s] mind … when he had so 
much to do to get negotiations started in an environment that was increasingly uncertain 
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and violent in South Africa”.185 Schechter further suggests that Hollingsworth’s vision 
did not always coincide with those close to Mandela and that there was a good deal of 
personal politics and clamorous rallying following the leader in the days after his release:  
 
Apparently, there was a power struggle underway as their [sic] often is 
among the activists vying to play a key role and have special access to a 
man of power. Many wanted his blessing as if he was their Pope. Their 
power was the power of a courtesan in the Castle, deciding who could 
see the King. Frankly, some resented an independent non-political 
professional show producer [Hollingsworth], maybe because he was 
white, maybe because he was not reporting to them.186  
 
According to Schechter, after much pressurising, Mandela eventually agreed to appear at 
Wembley. He went on to receive a thunderous eight-minute standing ovation before 
giving a 30-minute speech, in which he thanked anti-apartheid activists, the audience and 
performers. He then continued, for some time, to lobby for further action against the 
South African government, declaring that “the apartheid crime against humanity remains 
in place”. Hollingsworth described his speech as “slowly delivered, deliberate, theatrical, 
ponderous. It was delivered in the same style he would have used 27 years earlier, talking 
to a rally from the back of the lorry.”187 There was, however, very little that could be 
done to alter the broadcast. For security reasons, the exact timing of Mandela’s speech 
was not released, which made it difficult for broadcasters to prepare alternative material, 
and ensured that the anti-apartheid movement’s original request – that the speech be 
screened in its entirety – was respected.  
The four-hour concert was screened by 63 broadcasters, including the BBC. Even 
South Africa’s SABC was going to broadcast the concert, but eventually decided against 
it because of opposition from the ANC, which was still strongly supportive of continued 
sanctions and sporting and cultural boycotts. (As we shall see in Chapter 6, however, this 
approach changed fairly rapidly.) 
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As with the birthday tribute concert, however, the United States was the weak link 
in the chain, failing to broadcast the event at all. There are varying accounts of why this 
occurred. Hollingsworth’s version attributes the failure to the expectation that the country 
would hold its own event, claiming that “the prospect of the US event led the US 
networks to ignore the Wembley event”.188 Concert promoter Bill Graham planned to 
stage a US welcome for Mandela, also a concert, a few weeks after the Wembley 
reception, but the concert never happened and he only succeeded in “splitting the artists 
about which event they would attend”,189 as some artists held out for the US event. 
(Graham did succeed in holding a mass event at the Oakland Coliseum, selling over 60 
000 tickets, but the occasion was more of a rally than a rock concert and it did not attract 
the same kind of media interest as the Wembley event.)  
Reebee Garofalo suggests that part of the reason for the US’s non-participation 
had to do with bad event planning on the part of Radiovision, the firm contracted to sell 
television rights in the country, suggesting that Radiovision did not give potential buyers 
enough time to promote the event.190 Some of the US outlets complained that 
broadcasting rights costs were overpriced; yet others claimed they were not approached at 
all. Considering the eventual £100 000 profit alongside the non-profit objective, this 
would appear to be a shortcoming on the part of the event planners, who did not abide by 
the anti-apartheid movement’s original conditions of the event contract.  
But most accounts conclude that the US networks rejected the concert because 
they thought it was “too political”.191 Danny Schechter, who was also attempting to raise 
support for the broadcast, claimed that the broadcasters lacked “consciousness” and did 
not see the significance of the concert, a view that was supported by the US weekly, 
Variety magazine.192  
Another potential reason for the lack of interest on the part of US broadcasters is 
timing. Attempting to stage another media event in the wake of the captivating release 
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may have seemed too soon to broadcasters, who might have been concerned about 
audience buy-in. 
Mandela’s participation in the Wembley release concert helped to cement his 
global popularity and the concert foreshadowed many of his later “performances” at pop 
mega-events, suggesting that he himself approved of the benefits of the shows. In the 
years to come, he would be linked to several mass music events, frequently speaking at 
the Aids-awareness 46664 concerts. Other birthday tributes (such as the 2008 Hyde Park 
90th birthday concert) have also been held, and the date of Mandela’s birthday, 18 July, is 




Mandela’s incarceration and the anti-apartheid movement’s decision to personalise the 
movement through his persona, a strategy that climaxed with the 70th birthday tribute, 
prepared the ground for South Africa’s most important media event: Mandela’s televised 
release. This, in turn, greatly boosted Mandela’s “moral capital”, although not always 
allowing him direct control of his image, demonstrating the extent to which media events 
may be hegemonic but are seldom, if ever, totalitarian. In the case of the release, neither 
the SABC nor Mandela were fully able to secure their preferred reading of the events, 
while the success of the Mandela concerts hinged on a number of sometimes awkward 
trade-offs, culminating in a dilution of the original vision for the event. On the global 
stage, Mandela’s starring role in media events nevertheless did much to promote him as 
the world’s preferred candidate in the country’s first democratically held elections, an 
extraordinary about-turn for an individual the world once considered a terrorist enemy of 
the state.  
The next chapter discusses events in South Africa, where political uncertainty and 
escalating levels of violence complicated matters for Mandela and the ANC. The 
domestic acceptance of Mandela’s new leadership role was greatly assisted by live 















Disrupting the Centre: “Liveness” and the  
Negotiation of Disaster During the Transition 
 
Live television, to a certain extent, likes unexpected events to occur as 
this is the best way to demonstrate that it fulfils its commitments. 
 
– Jérôme Bourdon1 
 
As argued in the previous chapter, even before Mandela’s release a combination of 
factors gave him and the ANC a head start in the race for global recognition. The 
apartheid state’s decision to imprison Mandela in the first place gave the anti-apartheid 
movement the opportunity to use him as a powerful symbol of the struggle. Furthermore, 
the release itself acted as a launchpad for the development of a special relationship 
between Mandela and media events, one that arguably gave him the power to restore 
calm in the turbulent period that followed his release. 
The period between his release in February 1990 and his inauguration in May 
1994 was tumultuous, characterised by unprecedented violence between the Inkatha 
Freedom Party (IFP)2 and ANC supporters in KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng, 
assassinations, sporadic bombings, white right-wing insurgency, massive white flight3 
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and turmoil within the ANC itself, with various factions accusing negotiators of betraying 
the ideals of the struggle. The period played out in the media via images of violence – 
footage of the aftermath of bombings and shootings – punctuated by mini media events, 
revolving around FW de Klerk and Mandela attempting to control the unrest. In addition, 
there were several efforts to disrupt the negotiation process, through attacks on centres of 
power, including the media. Just as anti-apartheid activists had hijacked some of the 
sporting events of the 1980s, so those opposed to the transitional process attempted to 
disrupt the developing alliance between the NP and the ANC. Judging from the number 
of attacks on the SABC and on newspaper houses, it appears that the local media was 
perceived to form a part of the alliance. 
Along with the unbanning of the ANC and Mandela’s release, restrictions on 
foreign journalists in the country were lifted, and South Africa once again featured high 
on the foreign news agenda in the United States and Europe. According to Reuters 
photographer Graeme Williams, images of disaster were initially rejected by newsrooms 
overseas for being too violent but they fast became valuable commodities.4 Trade in 
footage of violence thus led to increasing numbers of photojournalists and cameramen in 
areas of unrest, boosting the media’s status as a political actor. 
Unsurprisingly, the best remembered moments are not images of aftermath but of 
unexpected disasters captured “live” on film and then quickly relayed as news inserts. 
Though these recorded disasters do not constitute media events in themselves, the visual 
and filmic imagery of negative and unpredictable moments in history constitutes an 
equally powerful television genre, and we see in this period not only a struggle for 
supremacy in the negotiation process, but also a jostling to control and frame images of 
disaster, whose unpredictability renders them vulnerable to a variety of interpretations. 
Although we speak of “capturing” or “catching” unexpected events on film, thereby 
implying that reality is frozen in some way, the metaphor belies the lengthier process of 
coding and decoding that lies ahead. Just as images of necklacing could be harnessed for 
both pro- and anti-apartheid causes in the 1980s, so images of widespread violence in the 
early 1990s posed a challenge (and opportunity) to political parties, although, as this 
                                                
 











chapter will argue, in most cases the ANC enjoyed a moral high ground that directed the 
global interpretation of much of the footage. The role of policing – acts of which were 
frequently recorded – takes centre stage in the interpretation of these images, and, to a 
certain extent, the political battle for control of the security forces is played out visually 
on TV.  
The general instability of the period was exacerbated by the changing role of the 
SABC, which at the time was under scrutiny from various newly formed media-
monitoring organisations, as well as the now-audible voices of previously banned 
political parties. Part of the SABC’s attempt to reflect the changing climate (as well as its 
bid to prevent the possibility of propagandistic misuse under a future regime) involved 
transforming TV2/3 (the African language channels) into a single commercial black 
channel, the Contemporary Community Values channel (CCV). In addition to 
restructuring, the broadcaster also changed its approach to news reporting. It was widely 
believed that white South Africans had been sheltered from images of violence under 
apartheid, and throughout the 1990s the SABC used “live” footage of disaster as a means 
of improving its new status in a changing South Africa. Just as De Klerk’s 
communications team recognised the link between perceptions of transparency and live 
broadcasting, so the SABC appreciated the extent to which the televising of unexpected 
events could legitimise its role in the “new” South Africa. The news reports from this era 
are also markedly self-referential, noting (and sometimes illustrating) the extent to which 
journalists clashed with political players, as a means of emphasising their impartiality. 
This chapter discusses several events identified as turning points in the South 
African transition: the Battle of Ventersdorp, the 1992 referendum, the Boipatong 
massacre, the Bisho massacre, Chris Hani’s assassination, the storming of the World 
Trade Centre, and the Battle of Bophuthatswana. Though there were of course other 
(violent and non-violent) incidents of great import in the period, the events discussed all 
involved the “live capturing” of disaster – a trait that inflated their political weight at the 
time and also bestowed them with historical significance. Not only was the footage used 
in the many official inquiries into violent events, particularly investigations into the role 











“often include a chronicle of famous accidents, scandals, insults, fights, which are often 
rebroadcast as specials, thus gaining a special status in viewers’ memory”.5 
 
Disaster as Media Event 
One of the major criticisms of Dayan and Katz’s media events theory is that it omitted to 
examine major news events (see Chapter 1), the kinds of shocking occurrences that 
capture global and national attention (e.g. Kennedy’s assassination).6 Indeed, the 
broadcasting history of the period between South Africa’s two major media events – 
Mandela’s release and inauguration – demonstrates the extent to which our understanding 
of the significance of “liveness” in the broadcasting of history cannot be limited to 
preplanned, hegemonic and celebratory events, but must be extended to include the 
spontaneous broadcasting of historical tragedies. Elihu Katz and Tamar Liebes in fact go 
on to conclude that, in the early years of the new millennium, the live transmission of 
disaster, terror and war upstages traditional media events, stating that “events of the 
ceremonial kind seem to be receding in importance, maybe even in frequency, while the 
live broadcasting of disruptive events such as Disaster, Terror and War are taking center 
stage.”7 While the previous chapter suggested that the issue of ownership of public events 
is always slightly indeterminate, the question of “who’s in charge”8 is the key 
differentiating trait between what Katz and Liebes term “integrative” and “disruptive” 
events. They question the extent to which establishments and the media are able to 
maintain control over traumatic events that are broadcast live.  
The forms of “disruption” discussed in this chapter cannot be considered typical 
televised “disaster marathons”9 – the genre that develops out of the ongoing live 
broadcasting of tragic or catastrophic events. Although some of the South African events 
of the early 1990s are filmed live, so to speak, they are not actually broadcast live in the 
sense of a media event (although, interestingly, as we shall see, critics confuse categories 
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of liveness). This is largely because television technology was not yet as mobile and 
ubiquitous as it would become. Moreover, because television programming was still 
scheduled, the events are carried in prime time news reports rather than as they happened, 
coverage of which involves a good deal of preplanning. Nevertheless, these disruptive 
broadcasting events foreshadow the role that disaster, war and terror would come to play 
in television’s future; they demonstrate the extent to which politicians and broadcasters 
clamoured for control of such footage; and they constitute important narrative turning 
points in South Africa’s recent history and in the formation of a new national identity.  
  
Silencing the Right Wing: Ventersdorp, De Klerk and the 1992 referendum 
As seen in the previous chapter, while celebrated abroad, Mandela’s release and the 
reforms introduced by De Klerk left many (particularly white) South Africans feeling 
uneasy. Although a multi-party forum, CODESA (Convention for a Democratic South 
Africa), had been set up to pave the way for fully democratic governance in the country, 
progress was slow. There was increasing violence in the townships, extreme right-wing 
groups were gaining prominence and the leader of the white Conservative Party, Dr 
Andries Treurnicht, marked De Klerk’s 2 February 1990 speech as the beginning of the 
“Afrikaner’s Third War of Liberation” after British annexation and the Anglo-Boer 
War.10 From July 1990, sporadic bombings targeting locations symbolic of reform started 
to erupt. The bombers chose sites such as a disused school intended for 400 children of 
returning ANC exiles, a museum, several NP offices, a magistrate’s office, progressive 
schools on the verge of opening their doors to black pupils, two post offices (in 
Krugersdorp and Verwoerdburg), the headquarters of the Congress of South African 
Trade Unions and a police training centre. Black-frequented sites were also bombed, 
including a taxi rank and shebeen, giving the attacks an overtly racist slant and attracting 
media attention.  
Rumours of Mandela’s assassination gained momentum when Max du Preez’s 
anti-apartheid Afrikaner newspaper V ye Weekblad uncovered a right-wing plan to 
execute Mandela and De Klerk as well as a host of cabinet ministers (notably Defence 
                                                
 












Minister Magnus Malan and Minister of Law and Order Adriaan Vlok). Two Afrikaans-
language SABC newsreaders, Marietta Kruger and Riaan Cruywagen, were also on the 
hit list, suggesting that the broadcaster was perceived as a central instrument of the 
transition.11 (There were similar attacks on Afrikaner media centres of power; in 1990 a 
bomb was placed outside the offices of Beeld, the paper that two years earlier had nailed 
its colours to the mast by calling for the release of Mandela; and one year later the offices 
of Vrye Weekblad itself were bombed in the midst of its exposure of the existence of a 
covert government hit squad operating out of a farm known as Vlakplaas.) According to 
an affidavit given by the informer Jan Johannes Smith, a former security policeman who 
infiltrated a group of right-wing militants, the assassinations were planned as a prelude to 
a right-wing coup.12 In response, two extremist organisations, the notorious terrorist 
group the Wit Wolwe (White Wolves) and the Farmers’ Army, offered a reward for 
Smith’s capture.13 Between 1990 and 1992, dozens of white supremacists were arrested, 
linking the bombings to a handful of extremist Afrikaner organisations, including the 
Orde Boerevolk (Order of the Boer People), the Wit Wolwe and other radical groups, 
most of which were in turn linked in some way or another to the Afrikaner 
Weerstandsbeweging (AWB, Afrikaner Resistance Movement).  
Throughout the late 1980s and 90s, the AWB attracted increasing media 
exposure, largely because of its charismatic leader, Eugene Terre’Blanche, whose 
persuasive oratory skills were frequently likened to those of earlier fascist leaders. (He 
himself was addressed simply as “The Leader” in AWB circles.) The group also had a 
relatively large membership (by 1992 it boasted between 5 000 and 10 000 members)14 
and its striking red-and-black neo-Nazi branding attracted photojournalists, resulting in 
an array of images that was simultaneously frightening and mocking. Although the media 
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tended to caricature the AWB and its leader, Terre’Blanche seemed unable (or unwilling) 
to change his media image, and he and his followers remained hostile towards Western 
and liberal media platforms.15 While Max du Preez described him as the “South African 
politician who best understood how television worked”,16 his description of 
Terre’Blanche suggests that the leader’s grasp of media framing was limited to cosmetic 
issues such as which camera angles made him appear taller. Terre’Blanche sometimes 
attempted – often to his detriment – to use the media to puff up his political importance, 
and the AWB became notorious for its disruption of public events.  
One of the more successful attempts to dramatise the AWB’s power was a 
conflict, captured live, between followers and police in Ventersdorp on 9 August 1991. 
Ventersdorp was Terre’Blanche’s hometown and an AWB stronghold, and De Klerk was 
due to speak at Kommando Hall, an act that right-wingers perceived as provocative. 
Realising the potential for violence, what was originally planned as a public meeting was 
rescheduled as a private NP meeting for party supporters only.17 But, by then, it was too 
late, and the heavy police and media presence, together with the fact that De Klerk 
entered the town via helicopter, suggest that the NP and news agencies anticipated some 
sort of altercation. According to photojournalist Graeme Williams, who was present at 
the scene, “it was obvious what was going to happen”.18 This was most likely because of 
the AWB’s much publicised (and successful) attempt to break up an NP meeting in 
Pietersburg in 1989 when Pik Botha was due to speak, a tactic for which the organisation 
was developing a reputation. In 1991, however, although the policemen clearly expected 
trouble, they were unprepared for the anger of the some 2 000 AWB supporters armed 
with rifles, pistols, tear gas canisters and knives.19 The event marked a historic encounter 
between the NP’s police force and the paramilitary group, as it was one of the first 
occasions on which white policemen opened fire on white crowds. The policemen, who 
                                                
 
15 See, for instance, Nick Broomfield’s documentary The Leader, His Driver and the Driver’s Wife 
(Lafayette Films, 1991). 
16 Max du Preez, Pale Native: Memories of a Renegade Reporter (Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2003), 244. 
17 SAPA, “Terre’Blanche calls for De Klerk to answer at his amnesty hearing”, 10 May 1999 (Available at: 
http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/media/1999/9905/p99051a.htm – viewed 20 September 2011), no page 
number. 












had orders to “shoot to kill”, shot dead one AWB member and injured 36 others.20 In the 
SABC news report the following evening, billed “Ventersdorp: Reaction”,21 comments 
from a variety of political representatives were given, all attempting to apportion blame 
for the incident. De Klerk stated, “It is a tragic moment for democracy in South Africa, 
but it is not a moment at which we can stop and stand still. We must move forward to 
democracy through negotiation”, while the AWB’s Piet “Skiet” Rudolph utilised 
discourse usually associated with black liberation movements, claiming, “It is quite 
obvious that by his [De Klerk’s] actions he has intensified our struggle”. Mandela, whose 
response to later events such as Boipatong and Bisho was not broadcast by the SABC, 
was also shown, declaring, “This culture of political intolerance on the part of the AWB 
is directly responsible for the tragedy.” The comments were followed up with sensational 
visual footage of angry members chanting “AWB”, while police dogs and white 
protestors clashed in a reversal of the stock apartheid footage of the 1980s in which black 
activists clashed with white policemen. Terre’Blanche was shown addressing policemen, 
demanding (in Afrikaans), “Where is De Klerk? I want to talk to him?” alongside images 
of bloodied protestors. Interestingly, the report diverted attention away from the NP–
AWB conflict by focusing on black Ventersdorp residents, detailing how one of the 
AWB protestors was accidentally killed by a minibus taxi, whose occupants were then 
“attacked by the mob” and shot at, and also commenting on how the AWB “went on the 
rampage”, slashing car tyres, smashing windscreens and firing indiscriminately at passing 
taxis. In one clip, black residents were shown running, terrified, through the town centre. 
The aftermath of the incident was also detailed, with visuals of smashed police vehicles 
painted with the NP abbreviation transformed into a communist symbol as well as black 
patients, presumably victims of the violence, in hospitals. The incident is further 
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influenced by the news insert that follows it, “Right-wingers make use of extreme tactics 
to force a coloured woman from her home.” The SABC’s attempts to characterise the 
AWB as racist extremists were somewhat undermined by the slew of comments from 
white right-wing organisations, all blaming the NP for inciting violence by holding the 
meeting in the first place, a perception that was bolstered by the televised footage of De 
Klerk being escorted to a helicopter in a riot control vehicle. 
Because of the AWB’s sensational media profile and the existence of footage of 
the conflict, the Ventersdorp incident received worldwide coverage. The fact that the 
confrontation was captured live led to an aggrandising of its importance (as was the case 
with many of the events of the transition); although in reality, the incident was little more 
than a half-hour protest that turned violent, its popular title in the media, the “Battle of 
Ventersdorp”, recalls earlier Boer struggles for self-determination and ties in with later 
right-wing attempts to memorialise the occasion, making martyrs of the dead (even 
though there is some confusion over how they died). Although the AWB did not exactly 
stage the conflict – the event “erupted from spontaneous combustion rather than careful 
planning”22 – the images of mayhem and footage of chanting right-wingers served their 
purposes well. The AWB itself saw the encounter as hugely significant; Piet Rudolph, the 
AWB’s secretary general, claimed that it was a turning point for the organisation,23 and  
in response to the incident, the general secretary of the Conservative Party (CP), Ferdi 
Hartzenberg, used the event to emphasise their claims that De Klerk was an illegitimate 
negotiator, stating on national television that “without the majority of the white people in 
South Africa, no agreement can last and be maintained in this country”. The loss of life 
and media coverage only served to encourage right-wingers, and as the New York Times 
pointed out at the time, although De Klerk’s decision to speak in Ventersdorp may have 
been meant as a challenge to the far right, the clash most likely cost him support among 
conservatives.24 
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Yet, much like Terre’Blanche himself, many of the right-wing attacks had more 
bark than bite and they lacked careful strategising; they were intermittent and carried out 
by fragmented groups. Marina Ottoway argues that “an attempt to catalog and list all 
these groups would be futile not only because their importance was limited but also 
because like the pieces of a kaleidoscope they tended to endlessly split and reassemble in 
new combinations”.25 The greater fear was that the extremists would unite with more 
moderate but similarly dissatisfied Afrikaners and that their political alliances would 
secure the loyalty of the security and defence forces. There was a great deal of 
speculation about these possibilities and although Treurnicht tried to distance the CP 
from the bombings and attacks, there were claims that he knew about them all along. 
In an attempt to snuff out the attacks and to redefine the perception of their 
seriousness, De Klerk announced in his parliamentary address in January 1992 that a 
multiracial referendum would precede any major changes in the country. As seen with the 
Battle of Ventersdorp, however, what was really needed to silence dissenting white South 
Africans was an all-white referendum, and the opportunity to hold one arose a few 
months later when the NP was defeated by the CP in a series of by-elections in 
constituencies that were previously considered to be safe NP areas.26 
The most serious of these was the Potchefstroom defeat, when the CP attained a 
surprising 56% victory on 19 February 1992. The result was a blow for several reasons: it 
was widely perceived that, without the working-class and agricultural elements of towns 
such as Ventersdorp, this middle-class town would give a true reflection of the feelings of 
Afrikaners; De Klerk had acquired his education in the university town; and 
Potchefstroom was also the only constituency in which the NP had increased its majority 
over the CP in the previous election. The victory gave Treurnicht’s increasingly vocal 
Conservative Party, which at the time held a third of the seats in parliament, the 
opportunity to call the negotiations into question, threatening to derail CODESA. In 
response, De Klerk took a dramatic risk, declaring on 20 February 1992 that a 
referendum would be held for the white electorate to determine whether or not he had a 
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mandate to continue negotiations on their behalf. He promised that, in the event of a “no” 
vote, he and the NP would resign, forcing a new all-white parliamentary election. 
Treurnicht initially accepted the challenge and then reconsidered, fearing that the NP 
would have the greater advantage because of its perceived ability to manipulate the state 
broadcasting service.27 The CP then agreed to participate on condition that there would be 
equal access to television and radio and that they would have the right to help phrase an 
“honest and clear” referendum question,28 with the power of veto over its formulation.29 
When the NP refused these demands, the CP nearly split over the issue, but eventually 
capitulated. The NP went on to devise the question: “Do you support continuation of the 
reform process which the state president began on February 2, 1990, and which is aimed 
at a new constitution through negotiation?” The answer options were a simple “yes” or 
“no”. 
While the referendum in essence posed a broader question that influenced a 
number of political stakeholders (even if, as the ANC rightly noted, those most affected 
by the outcome were unable to participate), it played out as a contest between the CP and 
the NP, who emerged as the two principal campaigners. The campaign was the first of its 
kind in the country. De Klerk “undertook a successful American-style, countrywide 
‘hearts and minds’ tour to convince voters through personal contact to vote Yes”.30 This 
was supplemented by advertisements in national newspapers and television advertising. 
There was much media focus on the referendum, and the international community came 
out in overwhelming support of a “yes” vote, acting as powerful agents in South Africa’s 
transition. For the first time since its victory in 1948, the NP government welcomed 
foreign interference, using global opinion effectively in its pre-referendum 
campaigning.31 Both the United States and England warned that a “no” vote would see 
the imposition of hard-line sanctions and further isolation. Sweden, Denmark and 
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Norway all promised a further lifting of sanctions in the event of a “yes” vote, and even 
Switzerland – in an unusual departure from its policy of neutrality – threatened to impose 
sanctions if the white electorate stalled negotiations.32 Campaigning for the election 
happened to coincide with South Africa’s controversial participation in the 1992 Cricket 
World Cup (see Chapter 6), held in Australia, and it was widely expected that the 
Springboks would not be permitted to compete in the semi-finals should the white 
electorate vote “no”. De Klerk also warned that forthcoming visits from the Australian 
and New Zealand rugby teams would most likely be cancelled if the referendum results 
were not positive, harnessing the popular support for sport to achieve his political aims. 
The better-resourced “yes” campaign was spearheaded by the NP and supported 
by the Democratic Party (DP),33 the international community, sports personalities, a 
number of prominent artists and celebrities, many large companies as well as most of the 
major newspapers. The campaign adopted a three-pronged approach: some messages 
echoed the threats and promises of the international community; others associated a “no” 
vote with extreme right-wing paramilitants, exploiting the negative media image of 
organisations such as the AWB; and others took advantage of the poor economic and 
political situation by suggesting that a “yes” vote would result in future prosperity. For 
example, one advert made use of an image of an overgrown cricket pitch to show the 
negative consequences of a “no” vote.34 (As John Nauright points out “the return of 
South Africa to international sport was a tangible carrot in which immediate results could 
be seen.”35) Some advertisements and posters sported a balaclava-clad, gun-wielding 
figure in a threatening pose alongside a Swastika-like symbol and slogans declaring, 
“Free with every CP vote, the AWB and all they stand for”36 and “You can stop this 
man”. And a number of (mainly DP) posters utilised positive messages, simply 
encouraging whites to vote “yes” for “jobs” and “peace”. 
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The “no” campaign was led by the CP, supported, most likely to their detriment, 
by the AWB, the Boerestaat Party (the Boer State Party) and the Herstigte Nasionale 
Party (HNP – the Reconstituted National Party). Former president PW Botha also came 
out in support of a “no” vote, claiming that negotiations would see South Africa being 
governed by an ANC–SACP alliance.37 Importantly, since it alleviated the perception that 
“no” campaign only secured white support, the campaign also secured the implicit 
blessing of Mangosuthu Buthelezi, the popular Zulu leader of the Inkatha Freedom Party 
(IFP). Although he did not come out in overt support of the “no” vote, he used the 
referendum as a means of attacking the NP–ANC alliance, claiming that the government 
was “in bed” with the ANC, a charge that became central to the CP’s campaign,38 which 
played on minority fears of ANC rule and characterised De Klerk as a “sell-out”. In 
opposition to the “yes” campaign, the CP printed posters with slogans such as “Stop Nat 
sellout to ANC”, and “Nee vir ANC” (“No to ANC”) and “FW weer glo? Nooit!” 
(“Believe FW again?” Never!”). Just as the “yes” campaign capitalised on the desire to 
join the international community, so the CP made the most of Afropessimist predictions 
of chaos and misrule, printing advertisements declaring that a “yes” vote would see South 
Africa joining the ranks of the impoverished “communistic” countries in “darkest 
Africa”.39 The SABC covered a news conference in Pretoria, in which Treurnicht, HNP 
leader Jaap Marais, AWB Eugene Terre’Blanche and Boerestaat leader Robert van 
Tonder all called for unity among white opposition.40 By this stage, however, the display 
of all-white, all-male Afrikaner speakers was at odds with the changing South African 
zeitgeist – a trend that Treurnicht seemed to anticipate by attempting to include other 
potentially dissatisfied intra-national groups. A “yes” vote, he argued, would not mean an 
end to unrest, because “there would still be whites, Zulus, and other nations in South 




39 Cited in Annette Strauss, “The 1992 referendum in South Africa”, The Journal of Modern African 
Studies, 31 (2) (June), 1993, 340 (originally: Diamond Fields Advertiser, Kimberley, 13 March 1992). 
40 Some of the coverage of the conference has been uploaded on YouTube (although the date is erroneously 
referred to as 1989 instead of 1992); see: “SAUK: HNP, BSP en AWB pleit om Regse eenheid – 1989” 











Africa who would demand self-determination”.41 (As it turns out and as this chapter later 
discusses, he was correct in this prediction.) 
The “yes” campaign responded by employing “scare tactics and doomsday 
scenarios with great effect”,42 playing on more immediate fears of the potential unrest 
that a “no” vote might trigger. An NP spokesperson declared that “a ‘no’ vote would send 
a message to blacks that whites were not interested in their problems and did not need 
them” and that “if you want to say something, go back to the armed struggle and mass 
action”.43 Similarly, a print advertisement claimed that if a “no” vote prevailed citizens 
wouldn’t “have to wait for the results of a white general election to find out how they 
[presumably fellow black South Africans] will react. It guarantees chaos.”44 The 
campaign also spoke to moderate fears of aggressive forms of Afrikaner nationalism and, 
in an allusion to AWB leader Eugene Terre’Blanche, a Business Day editorial claimed 
that the radicals would not be satisfied with Treurnicht as their leader, since they wanted 
a “charismatic leader, a führer or a duce”.45 
The “no” campaign was dealt a further blow when South African branches of 
major multinational corporations such as Anglo American, Barlow Rand, BP, Caltex, 
First National Bank, Toyota, Delta Motor Corporation, Murray & Roberts, Shell and 
Standard Bank all deviated from the traditional practice of keeping politics and business 
separate and appealed to their employees to vote “yes”.46 Some predicted that a “no” vote 
would result in job losses for their employees. For instance, the chairman of Volkswagen 
speculated in Business Day that the sanctions that would accompany a “no” vote would 
jeopardise the jobs of many of those dependent on the company.47 
In addition, although the ANC was uncomfortable with the idea of a racially 
exclusive referendum, Mandela used his influence to back the “yes” campaign, mainly by 
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assuring nervous whites that negotiations would not result in civil servant job loss for 
whites and/or rampant nationalisation. In an interview published in the Star, he claimed 
that “President Robert Mugabe’s plans to nationalise farm land in Zimbabwe had no 
bearing on the situation in South Africa” and that the “whole policy of nationalisation 
was under review”.48 He was joined in his support for the “yes” vote by many other 
prominent black leaders. 
With the support of the international community, the South African media, the 
majority of black South Africans as well as big business, the “yes” campaign enjoyed an 
overwhelming victory, winning nearly 70% of the vote. Voter turnout was just over 85% 
– the highest for an election or referendum in decades49 – and the only constituency out 
of 15 in which the “no” vote dominated was Pietersburg (now Polokwane) in the northern 
Transvaal, with 57%.  
De Klerk ensured maximum exposure of his post-referendum speech, delivering it 
from the steps of Tuynhuys – the presidential residence in Cape Town – leaving nobody 
in any doubt about the legitimacy of his authority. The speech itself described the 
occasion as historic, lauding the white electorate for their role in “closing the book on 
apartheid”: 
 
It does not happen often that in one generation a nation gets the 
opportunity to rise above itself. The white electorate has risen above 
itself in this referendum. The white electorate has reached out, 
through this landslide win for the YES-vote, to all our compatriots, to 
all other South Africans, and the message of this Referendum is: 
Today, in a certain sense, is the real birthday of the real new South 
African nation.50 
 
The 1992 referendum was a triumph for De Klerk for two reasons. Firstly, most analysts 
agree that it had the desired effect of demoralising white conservatives, compelling them 
to reassess their proposal for an independent Afrikaner homeland or volkstaat51 as well as 
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the logic of continuing to shun negotiations about the country’s political future.52 In 
addition, as David Ottoway points out, “the results totally undermined any sense of moral 
legitimacy for the armed resistance the right-wing might have thought it enjoyed among 
whites,”,53 and the AWB fell silent for some time after the referendum. When 
Terre’Blanche sought to reassemble right-wing groups at a special congress in 
Klerksdorp three months later, his threats and promises sounded “exceedingly hollow”.54 
Although the referendum did not quite close the chapter on right-wing opposition – in 
fact their more dramatic attempts to overturn reform were still to come – they were 
increasingly portrayed as blustering buffoons in the media and it was clear that although 
they posed a terrorist threat, the chance of full-scale rebellion against the process was 
diminishing. 
Secondly, Ottoway claims that the referendum served as a display of strength at 
the negotiating table. ANC officials “were terrified by the whole referendum spectacle” 
because “they saw for the first time just how masterful de Klerk and his party could be in 
campaigning” and “they realised what they were likely to face when it became time to 
compete with the NP in the New South Africa”.55 The president used the opportunity – in 
post-referendum negotiations and in the speech itself – to insist on greater co-operation 
from black South Africans, stating, 
 
[T]he result also asks acceptance by the leaders of all the other 
population groups and also asks them to reach out in the knowledge 
that it is only through co-operation, only by meeting one another, only 
through giving and taking, that we shall be able to negotiate an accord 
on which long term stability and security and prosperity may be 
built.56 
 
De Klerk gained confidence from the result since it positioned him as the undisputed 
leader of the white half of the negotiating team, not a claim Mandela could make in the 
midst of escalating conflict between ANC and Inkatha supporters in KwaZulu and in East 
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Rand townships such as Kathlehong, Tembisa, Thokoza and Vosloorus, as well 
increasing unrest in the homelands. A Financial Mail report described the shifting power 
balance at the time: 
 
De Klerk appears to be confident … and is apparently once again 
negotiating from a position of strength … But for Mandela … some hard 
decisions loom: how much longer can he tolerate open defiance of the 
official position from regional and junior leaders? If he fails to muzzle or 
expel them, his own credibility will be affected – and De Klerk’s could 
well be enhanced.57 
 
Boipatong: A Massacre Eclipsed by Its Aftermath 
Indeed, Mandela’s authority faced a host of challenges; in addition to the negative 
publicity around his wife’s 1992 trial for the earlier kidnapping and assault of Stompie 
Sepei, unrest in the townships continued and internal conflict between hardliners and 
moderates within the ANC compromised the party’s position. In addition, just as right-
wing insurgency had unsettled the standing of the NP, so Zulu nationalism unnerved the 
ANC, which needed to legitimise its status as the heavyweight in the negotiating team, 
particularly since its following was based on estimates of support rather than statistics 
gathered at a nationwide poll. In an attempt to put pressure on the NP to force an interim 
government, the ANC called for mass action in the form of a stayaway on 16 June 1992, 
in memory of the Soweto uprising. Rallies were held around the country, and estimates 
suggest that over 80% of the black population participated. The mass action also served 
as a means of deflecting attention away from the ANC’s internal divisions and 
encouraging a public display of ANC unity. According to James Simpson, the NP 
government and the IFP opposed the ANC’s call for mass action, warning that it could 
encourage unrest, and, even before the scheduled day, “all three jostled for position on 
the political stage by blaming any violence that might occur during the mass action on 
their opponents”.58 
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As it happened, the mass action of 16 June did coincide with an outbreak of 
violence. Though conflict between Inkatha and the ANC had been intermittent since the 
late 1980s, matters came to a head in an ANC township on the evening of 17 June 1992, a 
day after the stayaway, when heavily armed men killed 46 ANC members in what 
became known as the “Boipatong massacre”. The perpetrators were Zulu hostel dwellers 
from the neighbouring township of KwaMadala, whom the ANC claimed were members 
of Inkatha. The so-called “black-on-black” violence of events such as Boipatong initially 
played into the NP’s hands, strengthening their appearance of unity in the face of 
fragmented opposition. In addition, increasing violence strengthened the perception (not 
unfounded) that, as leaders, Buthelezi and Mandela were unable to control their own 
supporters. But while Boipatong might have been framed as a threat to the ANC’s 
authority, and/or a direct result of its own call for mass action, in the end it proved to be 
far more damaging to Inkatha and especially the NP. Boipatong is remembered as a 
pivotal moment of South Africa’s transition, not only because of the high number of 
deaths of unarmed persons (including a pregnant woman and a baby), but also because of 
shocking accusations against the South African Police (SAP), which the ANC claimed 
assisted in the attack. The accusation drew strength from what was termed the 
“Inkathagate” scandal of July 1991, when the W ekly Mail revealed, in the midst of NP 
protestations to the contrary, that the SAP had secretly been providing funds to Inkatha. 
The charge of police complicity in Boipatong thus built upon this existing controversy. 
Before this reading became prevalent, however, there were a number of 
contesting interpretations of the sequence of events, and, as with all incidents of violence, 
Boipatong was susceptible to a variety of explanations. Simpson and Rian Malan59 argue 
that the meaning of Boipatong remained unfixed until ANC leaders ushered township 
residents towards an interpretation that served its political purposes. “The Boipatong 
massacre,” Simpson argues, “left in its wake a new opening, an empty metaphor waiting 
to be infused with symbolism. Interested parties plunged into this opening, colliding with 
each other on the political stage in a bid to saturate it with their own meanings.”60 Indeed, 
Joe Slovo, Cyril Ramaphosa, Desmond Tutu, FW de Klerk, Winnie Mandela and Nelson 
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Mandela all made their way to Boipatong shortly after the attack in an attempt to both 
quell and capitalise on the violence. Though other parties also tried to use the killings to 
improve their political standing, the ANC, Simpson goes on to conclude, was the first to 
capitalise on the situation: 
 
The ANC was quick to take control of the media’s interaction with the 
people of Boipatong. On the morning of the 18th, ANC officials went 
around Boipatong instructing residents not to talk to police or 
outsiders. Those wishing to make statements were asked to report to a 
local school, where they found representatives of the HRC [Human 
Rights Commission] and Peace Action. Both organisations monitored 
township violence and included ANC-supporting members. 
Journalists arriving in Boipatong were guided around the township 
and introduced to witnesses, including witnesses who backed claims 
of police complicity.61 
 
While Inkatha was singled out as the main aggressor, this accusation was problematic. 
Some months earlier Buthelezi and Mandela had signed a peace accord, and Buthelezi 
officially distanced his party from the killings, leaving the unsatisfying impression that 
the attack was yet another example of the kind of “revenge” violence that was coming to 
characterise interactions between IFP and ANC members. In answer to a query about 
Inkatha’s role later posed by Time magazine, Buthelezi denied any official links: 
  
We are interested that the people who were responsible be tracked 
down and punished. I have never orchestrated violence, or taken one 
decision for anyone to be killed even on one occasion. The fact that 
members of Inkatha have been sucked into the violence is something 
that I regret.62 
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Initial police investigations concluded that there was no evidence of party involvement,63 
but because most KwaMadala residents were also IFP members it was widely believed 
that Inkatha was responsible. But this accusation was elided by the more serious 
allegation that police vehicles had transported and aided the perpetrators. Subsequent 
investigations contradicted this charge and the actual sequence of events remains 
mysterious to this day. An independent inquiry set up to investigate police activities 
condemned police inaction but did not find that they had been actively involved in the 
killings.64 Several years later, the TRC Special Hearings into the incident shed no further 
light on who had masterminded the massacre,65 with only one out of 16 amnesty 
applicants linking the killings to senior IFP officials and police members.66 Simpson 
insists that “charges of state complicity were highly contentious at the time that they were 
made and … this evidence remains decidedly inconclusive”.67 While this may be so, and 
while the ANC may well have been tactical in its exploitation of the massacre, events 
after Boipatong played into the ANC’s hand, and the charge of police collusion was 
boosted by the NP’s own actions a few days later.  
In response to the developing narrative, De Klerk embarked on a visit to the 
township on 20 June, planning to hold a news conference and meet with bereaved family 
members in a show of support for victims. But what was most likely planned as a public 
relations affair ended in disaster. Having been warned not to enter the township, De Klerk 
travelled in an armoured vehicle accompanied by a bus carrying members of the press. 
But what he found upon arriving did not match his expectations for the visit. An 
antagonistic community awaited, bearing placards with slogans such as “To hell with De 
Klerk and your Inkatha murderers”, “We want police protection not murders”, and “De 
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Klerk, kill apartheid, not us”.68 The situation was so dire that the president was unable to 
exit his vehicle and deliver his planned address. After he departed, violent confrontation 
broke out between the police and community members. While police admitted to 
shooting one man (who was allegedly about to attack a policeman with a panga), Pan 
Africanist Congress (PAC)69 leaders claimed that three persons lost their lives.70 
Community members became enraged after the shooting, and shots were fired when a 
police officer attempted to remove the slain man, generating a return volley of shotgun 
fire. 
In his later reaction to events, De Klerk despaired that news of his visit had been 
“leaked to the press”71 – hardly the case, since journalists were always intended to record 
his actions. The ANC had already issued responses to what they termed his insensitive 
“crocodile tear” visit beforehand;72 his decision to enter Boipat ng was no secret. De 
Klerk also bemoaned the fact that the response to his visit had been “efficiently planned”, 
and here perhaps he was right. The ANC and the PAC, accustomed to staging protest for 
media purposes, appeared to have groomed the community for the president’s visit, 
generating highly charged negative press coverage.  
Indeed, De Klerk’s public image took a beating. The full series of events was 
shown on television news that evening with visuals of De Klerk driving through the 
angry crowds chanting “Go Away! Go Away!”, escorted by police Casspirs, unable to 
even exit his vehicle, alongside signs reading “De Klerk, jy is ’n moordernaar” (“De 
Klerk, you are a murderer”). In an emotional clip, an unnamed grieving woman angrily 
denounces his visit, asking, “What is it going to help of De Klerk coming here? Is it 
going to awaken all those people who have died here?”73  
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De Klerk tried to recover his dignity by holding a press conference in Vereeniging 
immediately after the event, where he condemned the violence sparked by his visit, 
chastised the ANC for suggesting that the government was responsible for the initial 
massacre and announced the possibility of reinstating a state of emergency. Interestingly, 
he commented also on the potential effects of the televising of his visit, asking 
rhetorically: “How can we expect them to act differently, if they see on television, 
leading members of the ANC associating themselves with posters saying De Klerk or 
Kriel [Hernus Kriel, Minister of Law and Order] wanted for murder?” But these political 
tit-for-tat comments were out of touch with the tragic events of the previous few days; 
arguably, what was required at the time was a simple expression of sympathy for those 
who had lost loved ones. The press conference thus served to diminish De Klerk’s 
stature, linking him with earlier oppressive eras and the rhet ric of leaders such as PW 
Botha.  
But it was perhaps the violent televised 
conflict between the police force and the 
community following De Klerk’s visit – 
unplanned, unpredictable and uncontrollable 
– which was most damaging and which 
coincidentally reinforced the ANC’s 
narrative of earlier events in the township. 
Much of the interaction was captured by 
photojournalists, caught on camera and 
televised on the news insert. Photojournalist Greg Marinovich took several photographs 
of police intimidation and described the process of positioning himself in order to acquire 
what became the best remembered image of the violence (see Figure 4.1): “I had stupidly 
been on the wrong side – with the residents – but somehow I got behind the police line 
and photographed them firing round after round at the fleeing people.”74 Marinovich’s 
description suggests a preconceived idea of how events should be framed, one that didn’t 
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Figure 4.1: Police clash with Bopaitong 












favour police presence in the township. Indeed, the televised news report concludes with 
horrific footage of the slain man who allegedly sparked the conflict between policemen 
and community members as well as visuals of bloodied and weeping residents caught up 
in the violence that followed De Klerk’s visit. The reporter also speculates about the 
necessity of the police decision to open fire. The insert illustrated the very real problem 
of community perceptions of police brutality. 
The news report was also at pains to demonstrate the role of the (mainly white) 
SABC reporters, and anchor Veronica van der Westhuizen notes, alongside an image of a 
reporter and resident embracing, that journalists who were trapped in the shooting “burst 
into tears”. She also remarks on the role that reporters played in helping residents injured 
by police, a comment that is accompanied by a visual clip of a journalist kneeling over a 
community member. The SABC’s own attempts to emphasise their standing in the 
community of Boipatong, the president’s harsh press conference response and the 
sensational “live” footage of policemen clashing with wailing residents all combined to 
create a PR disaster for De Klerk and the NP. 
The official inquiry into Boipatong made use of recordings in an attempt to 
determine the sequence of events, concluding, somewhat unsatisfactorily, that either the 
policemen or community members were less than truthful about what had happened:  
 
They [the police] assert that no casualties have been traced from this 
incident and that television pictures showing casualties lying on the 
ground had been fabricated by members of the crowd feigning death 
and injury. The police also allege that members of the press were 
actively inciting the crowd.75 
 
The images of what appeared to be police brutality (whether staged or not) added weight 
to Mandela’s complaint that De Klerk’s police cared little for black security and led 
credence to the eyewitness accounts of police involvement three nights prior. Tainted by 
decades of footage of police action against anti-apartheid uprising in the townships, the 
images of policemen opening fire on angry, unarmed blacks recalled the oppressiveness 
of the apartheid state and cemented the ANC’s interpretation of the massacre. While the 
                                                
 











core events of Boipatong had occurred three days earlier, these remained under cover of 
darkness because they were never recorded or filmed, and, in the end, it was the “live” 
images of De Klerk’s aborted visit to the township that came to be associated with the 
massacre. The actual events of Boipatong were overshadowed by the “live” recording of 
the later occurrences. 
Mandela’s visit to Boipatong the following day contrasted starkly with De Klerk’s 
excursion to the township. He received a jubilant welcome from around 2 000 supporters 
at a militant rally where he announced his decision to suspend talks with the NP 
government. In spite of his triumphant reception, however, Boipatong still presented a 
problem to the ANC, largely because residents sought official approval for further 
revenge attacks. Youths at the rally shouted out demands for arms and held up placards 
declaring, “Mandela, give us permission to kill our enemies.”76 The reaction in Boipatong 
illustrates some of the challenges facing Mandela during the negotiating period: firstly, 
he was required to engage in peace talks and project an image of future leadership to the 
global community, but this rhetoric often conflicted with the more radical demands of his 
impatient supporters; secondly, reporters grew increasingly aware of this and began to 
question his leadership ability.77 
 
Marching Towards Negotiation: The Bisho Massacre  
While the CODESA talks had been precarious for some time, the Boipatong Massacre 
was one of the main reasons why Mandela suspended talks. But later events such as the 
Bisho Massacre awakened the ANC to the need to push ahead with negotiations even 
though the incident saw blame again being apportioned to the NP government. While the 
televising of the “massacre” fed into existing negative perceptions of the apartheid-
established Bantustans, and once again fostered international sympathy for the ANC, the 
party also began to realise that there were limits to this form of framing. The ANC’s part 
in what was termed the “Bisho massacre” emphasised the need for an expiry date to the 
violence in South Africa. 
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In early September 1992, the ANC sent a memorandum to De Klerk demanding 
that Brigadier Oupa Gqozo – the dictator-leader of the Ciskei, one of the apartheid 
government’s supposedly independent homelands – be replaced with an interim 
administration that would oversee the area’s reincorporation into South Africa. Many of 
the homeland leaders, wishing to retain their political power as state leaders, did not want 
to participate in negotiations. De Klerk refused the ANC’s request, claiming that the 
Ciskei was a self-governing state over which he had no jurisdiction. On 7 September 
1992, a group of around 80 000 ANC, SACP and Congress of South African Trade 
Unions (COSATU) protestors demonstrated at a stadium just outside Bisho, the Ciskeian 
capital. The protest ended in bloodshed when a group of radicals, led by Ronnie Kasrils, 
broke away in transgression of the demonstration agreement and entered Bisho. Ciskei 
Defence Force soldiers opened fire on the marchers, killing 28 ANC supporters and one 
of their own soldiers, and injuring over 200. While the subsequent inquiry into the 
killings condemned Kasrils and others for their irresponsible leadership (and the ANC 
became concerned about its apparent loss of control over the mass action campaign), 
Gqozo’s defence force was strongly condemned for firing at the crowd without sufficient 
provocation. 
 This sentiment was not highlighted in the broadcasting of the event. The SABC 
TV1 8 p.m. broadcast referred to the incident as a clash between the Ciskei army and 
“oprukkende”  (“riotous”) ANC supporters and opened with a statement on the 
government’s attempts to restore calm in the region:  
 
Die regering het ’n kompanjie soldate in Ciskei ontplooi om nywerhede 
te beskerm en plundery te voorkom na vandag se voorval waarin 23 
mense dood is. Die kantoor van die Staatpresident sê die stap word 
gedoen met inagneming van die veiligheidstoestand in Ciskei en met die 
toestemming van die land se regering.  
(“The government has deployed a company of soldiers in Ciskei to 
protect industries and to prevent plundering after today’s incident in 
which 23 people were killed. The office of the State President said the 
step was taken in light of the security situation in Ciskei and with the 
agreement of the country's government.”)78 
 
                                                
 











Before showing images of the violence in Bisho, reports (on both CCV and TV1) had 
been careful to screen several government officials’ views on the event, including 
statements from De Klerk, Pik Botha and Hernus Kriel, all of whom blamed the ANC for 
the tragedy. De Klerk claimed that “the role of the South African government has been 
one to avoid just this”, while Pik Botha expressed concern about how the violence would 
be received by the outside world – an increasing concern during the transition period. 
Kriel was more direct, stating: “Die ANC moet die direkte skuld vir die mense wat dood 
dra” (“The ANC must carry the direct blame for the people who died”). Although most 
of the casualties were ANC members, only one ANC official – Steve Tshwete – was 
interviewed.  
While the SABC had made an effort to emphasise its impartiality in its coverage 
of De Klerk’s post-Boipatong visit, there was much criticism f its reporting on Bisho, 
with the Campaign for Open Media (COM) releasing a full report on the broadcaster’s 
framing of the event, claiming the “while Gqoza was murdering peaceful marchers, the 
SABC was murdering the truth” and arguing that the broadcaster had been unclear about 
who was responsible for the massacre.79 The COM and the Anti-Censorship Group 
claimed that both the English and Afrikaans TV1 broadcasts as well as the CCV news 
insert had been selective in airing reactions to the event, paying little attention to the 
ANC’s position even though the party had made itself available for comment. “By 
omitting crucial facts and eye-witness versions of the event, SABC news has manipulated 
the incident into a politically-motivated indictment of the ANC, and has barely stopped 
short of absolving the Ciskei government of all responsibility for the sections [sic] of its 
army.”80 While the COM’s media-monitoring methodology later came under fire from 
several fronts, these criticisms of the broadcaster’s treatment of Bisho were widely 
shared; the Institute for Contextual Theology (ICT) also protested against the SABC’s 
framing of Bisho as “communist-inspired and demonic”, demonstrating outside the 
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broadcaster’s offices and claiming that the media had encouraged the public to believe 
that the organisers of the march were ultimately responsible for the deaths.81 
 In spite of the SABC’s apparent attempts to criticise the ANC, Bisho ended up 
redounding to the party’s credit, particularly on a global level. While the COM report 
made much of the broadcaster’s efforts to create an ideological context for the reception 
of the images of disaster by opening the news inserts with official government comment, 
arguably these official comments were no match for the visual imagery of the massacre 
that followed. Since 1976, the broadcaster had been notoriously suspicious of the 
audience effects of visual imagery, and the SABC’s decision to screen these a  all should 
be seen in this context.  
 Images of injured, bloodied protestors evoked widespread sympathy for the 
ANC, capturing, as it did, the aggression of the armed Ciskeian Defence Force, the panic 
of unarmed protestors running for cover and the slain victims of the aftermath. Moreover, 
as with Boipatong, there was little the NP could do to dispel the perception of the 
violence in Bisho as a catastrophe of its own making, the direct result of its separate 
development policies. Even the CP blamed the government – although for different 
reasons – determining that the NP should never have allowed the ANC to demonstrate in 
the first place.82 As Adrian Guelke points out, the widespread international perception of 
the homelands as illegitimate gave the ANC the moral high ground, again weakening the 
NP’s position:  
 
The televising of the demonstration and its aftermath ensured an 
extremely hostile response in the outside world, for the most part 
directed against the South African government since international 
opinion had long held (rightly or wrongly) that the Ciskei’s 
independence was nominal.83  
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In addition, at the funeral, which also received widespread international coverage, the 
message was clear: mourners used the occasion to express their view of events, with 
some carrying arresting posters with images of De Klerk and Oupa Gqozo and the 
caption, “The Butchers of Bisho … They must go now” (see Figure 4.2).  
 The massacre had the 
added “benefit” of strengthening 
Mandela’s position within his 
own party, silencing internal 
resistance to collaboration and 
giving him more freedom to 
press ahead with negotiations. 
The ANC was also beginning to 
realise that global exposure to 
images of violence, while 
initially strengthening their 
position at the bargaining table, were beginning to eat away at the South African 
economy, meaning that there would be little left for the ANC to inherit should the 
situation continue. This, together with the loss of life in Bisho, compelled Mandela to 
relax the demands he had been making before agreeing to the resumption of talks with 
the NP government. Many critics identify Bisho as a turning point of the transition, since 
it forced De Klerk and Mandela to “recognize their mutual dependency” because “if 
violence went out of control, both would be losers”.84 Shortly after the tragedy, the two 
resumed talks in earnest. 
  
Chris Hani’s Assassination and the Making of a President 
After Bisho, De Klerk and Mandela found themselves evenly matched; as Frederik van 
Zyl Slabbert remarked, “neither could land a block-out blow and, in the end, they had to 
lean on one another to stay upright”.85 Events in 1993 saw a shift in the power balance 
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Figure 4.2: Mourners protest at a mass funeral held in 
honour of Bisho casualties, 18 September 1992 











when Chris Hani was assassinated. Mandela’s role in the aftermath of Hani’s death 
revealed the extent to which De Klerk depended upon him and silenced those who were 
doubtful of his leadership capability. Mandela’s response to the killing also demonstrated 
the extent to which he had begun, very successfully, to project a dual image, charming 
global (and white) audiences on the one hand and appealing to black militants on the 
other. The event was a turning point for the ANC in the negotiation process.86 
 On the morning of 10 April 1993, Hani, the popular leader of the South African 
Communist Party (SACP) and chief of staff of the ANC’s military wing, was gunned 
down outside his home in Boksburg. While there had been numerous assassinations since 
the ANC’s unbanning, this was the first high-profile execution. In addition, while much 
(but not all) of the violence between 1990 and 1993 had been intraracial, Hani’s death 
was the first major interracial political attack, and it fed into white fears of black revenge. 
Hani was a hugely charismatic figure, considered to be the most popular leader after 
Mandela, and his murder, clearly designed to devastate the negotiating process, sparked 
widespread fear of civil war.  
It was clear after De Klerk’s poor reception at Boipatong that there was little he 
could do to appeal for calm and, after several outbreaks of violence (with a death toll of 
four), the NP government had no choice but to turn to Mandela and the ANC to quell 
anger over the shooting. To a certain extent, Mandela complied, delivering a direct 
televised address to the nation on 13 April 1993, a few nights after Hani’s murder, as well 
as a series of radio announcements. Although the televised address does not constitute a 
“media event” as such, figures indicate that it attracted a large national audience, and the 
speech has been identified as a pivotal moment in identity-formation in post-apartheid 
South Africa.87 In addition, the broadcast was frequently referred to as a “live” address, 
suggesting that it was seen as sharing some of the characteristics of live broadcasts, 
particularly a sense of historic importance. As with media events, televised national 
addresses are occasions that call for the simultaneous attention of the nation, they 
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interrupt ordinary broadcasting schedules and they are perceived as pure channels of 
communication.  
Bourdon points out that the “direct address” – and its associative effects of 
immediacy and intimacy – has been important from the first days of television, and we 
are familiar with the its codes as used by news presenters: the “look to the camera”, the 
use of personal pronouns “I” and “you” and sometimes the addition of the word “live” (as 
in “we are coming to you live”).88 Though we are accustomed to viewing politicians and 
heads of state in televised interview situations, it is unusual to encounter them engaging 
in direct televisual address, and such instances identify themselves as important. Apart 
from monarchs, there can have been few individuals other than presidents given the 
authority to address the nation in this way – not only in South Africa but in the world. 
While such broadcasts from heads of state were fairly common during the apartheid era,89 
public broadcasters (into which the SABC was fast transforming), give in to such 
requests only during crises. That Mandela – five years earlier labelled a terrorist by the 
broadcaster – was given this privilege is testimony to the changing nature of the SABC, 
the metamorphosis of his national image and the magnitude of the crisis sparked by 
Hani’s death.  
The framing of Mandela in the address boosted his statesman-like image: against 
the backdrop of a bookcase, his bespectacled and suited appearance is best described as 
presidential. He spoke in racialised but conciliatory terms, framing Hani’s assassin as a 
white foreigner, Polish immigrant Janusz Waluś, and praising the actions of a white 
Afrikaner witness, whom he adroitly situated as a key person in securing justice for 
Hani’s death: 
 
Tonight I am reaching out to every single South African, black and white, 
from the very depths of my being.  
A white man, full of prejudice and hate, came to our country and 
committed a deed so foul that our whole nation teeters on the brink of 
disaster. A white woman, of Afrikaner origin, risked her life so that we 
may know, and bring to justice, this assassin. 
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The cold-blooded murder of Chris Hani has sent shock waves 
throughout the country and the world. Our grief and anger is tearing us 
apart.  
What has happened is a national tragedy that has touched millions 
of people, across the political and colour divide. 
Our shared grief and legitimate anger will find expression in 
nationwide commemorations that coincide with the funeral service. … 
Now is the time for all South Africans to stand together against 
those who, from any quarter, wish to destroy what Chris Hani gave his life 
for – the freedom of all of us. 
Now is the time for our white compatriots, from whom messages 
of condolence continue to pour in, to reach out with an understanding of 
the grievous loss to our nation, to join in the memorial services and the 
funeral commemorations.90 
 
The address relegates the right-wing insurgency at the time to a small sector of the 
population (projecting it onto one man, and an outsider at that). At the same time, 
praising the actions of an Afrikaner woman helped to create a sense of a potentially 
inclusive nationhood under his leadership, and in this sense the address appears to have 
been written with nervous white audiences in mind.91 Mandela’s vision of South Africa 
after Hani’s death – his description of the assassination as a “national tragedy” and his 
appeal to all South Africans, black and white – attempted to transcend racial and political 
identities.92  
Yet, the address also reveals uncertainty about who exactly belongs to the nation. 
There is a hint that the address is partially intended for black South Africans in his 
description “our white compatriots”; by implication “our nation” belongs to black 
compatriots. Although Mandela is clearly striving to achieve a form of inclusive speech 
that addresses all South Africans, the interests and needs of different groups at this time 
frustrate these attempts. This is particularly evident when one compares it to his funeral 
speech (see below), which is more obviously directed at the militant black youth and 
employs anti-apartheid struggle rhetoric.  
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While Mandela’s address had a calming effect on white South Africans, it did not, 
in fact, put an end to the violence. A further 34 people were killed over the next few days, 
and the AWB provoked ire by placing its flag opposite the cemetery where Chris Hani 
was to be buried.93 In response, the SABC decided to broadcast Hani’s funeral live and in 
its entirety on CCV and Radio 2000. This was an unprecedented step; not only was live 
funeral broadcasting usually reserved for heads of state but funerals of slain “comrades” 
had also accumulated immense symbolic significance for black South Africans under 
apartheid. Richard Wilson points out that funerals were particularly powerful occasions, 
interweaving narratives of liberation and martyrdom: 
 
In the 1980s in particular funerals of activist became a form of political 
theater where anti-apartheid groups sought to make as much as possible 
out of the death of fallen comrades. With their coffins lined up in rows, 
and surrounded by dancing and singing activists, mass funerals became 
incredibly important stages to display to the outside world the brutal 
nature of apartheid.94 
 
While foreign journalists descended upon such occasions en masse, the South African 
media, particularly the SABC, paid them scant attention. Thus, the decision to broadcast 
the funeral live must have served as a signal not only of shifts in political power but also 
of the SABC’s implicit support of such shifts. Guelke notes the change in the ANC’s 
status with the broadcaster as a result of the assassination: 
 
Whereas at the start of the year, the ANC had been treated as somewhat 
marginal by a considerable section of the press and by television and 
radio, its status changed dramatically as a result of the crisis. The most 
obvious manifestation of the change was the hours and hours of live 
television coverage given to the funeral of Chris Hani. This was 
followed two weeks later by live coverage of the long funeral service 
for the veteran ANC leader, Oliver Tambo.95 
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The ANC recognised this and appealed to its followers “to provide every possible co-
operation to the media and help them to carry out their duties”.96  
In contrast to his conciliatory televised address, however, at Hani’s funeral 
Mandela articulated the ANC’s demands in divisive racialised terms, placing the 
responsibility for Hani’s death squarely on De Klerk’s shoulders: 
 
Those who have deliberately created this climate that legitimates political 
assassinations are as much responsible for the death of Chris Hani as the 
man who pulled the trigger, and the conspiracy that plotted his murder …  
And nowhere has this attitude of seeing us as the enemy been more 
clearly demonstrated than in President de Klerk’s actions since the 
assassination of Chris Hani. 
His first response was to call a meeting of the State Security 
Council. His second response was to deploy 23 000 more troops, telling 
white South Africans that they had enough troops for them to feel secure. 
But why deploy troops against mourners? 
They say we cannot control our forces. We are not cattle to be 
controlled. And we say to De Klerk: it is your forces that lost control and, 
completely unprovoked, shot innocent marchers in Protea.97 
It is you who have allowed the bullyboy tactics of the AWB to go 
unchallenged. We, the victims of violence, have been blamed for the very 
acts that take our lives. Yet you treat the far right with kid gloves, 
allowing them to publish hit lists when it is a crime to do so. Your police 
do not protect marchers from gunmen who mow them down, as in 
Vanderbijlpark. 
Black lives are cheap, and will remain so as long as apartheid 
continues to exist. And let there be no mistake: there have been many 
changes, and negotiations have started, but for the ordinary black person 
of this country apartheid is alive and well. 
Thousands of us die from TB every year, our children still play in 
open sewers, and die from preventable diseases. Education is still a 
privilege. Our homes remain the tin shacks and overcrowded townships. 
And no black South African has the vote. 
They talk of peace as if wanting peace is pacifism. They paint a 
picture of us as militant youth, or mindless radicals. … 
We want an end to white minority rule now. We want an election 
date now.98 
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The funeral speech doesn’t project the same vision of inclusive nationhood as the 
televised address, clearly opposing the interests of the state (“you” and “they”) and “the 
people” (“we” and “us”), who for the most part are racially split. This is not to say that 
the funeral address is a call to arms; in fact it is strategic in its references to the racist 
expectations of those who hoped for the assassination to derail negotiation processes. By 
summoning these stereotypes, Mandela calls for a channelling of anger through fortitude 
and restraint. But what these addresses show is the subtle privileging of certain beliefs 
according to race: for white South Africans, the assurance of reconciliation, and for black 
South Africans, the promise of shared resources. As Louw has pointed out, Mandela had 
always been skilful at working across two discourses; during the apartheid era “he used 
Marxist-Africanism, an in-house discourse that hybridised Black Nationalism and 
Marxism; but he switched to social-democrat discourses when liberal journalists were his 
key audience”.99 Mandela’s varying responses to Hani’s assassination illuminate some of 
the divisions of the time, suggesting that different groups called for different messages at 
different times. Even when attempting to communicate a single national message, context 
and audience demand different responses, making for an uneasy, sometimes contradictory 
interpellation of national identity. 
One of the central symbols that addressed this problem – the metaphor of the 
rainbow nation – was introduced at the funeral although not by Mandela but by Desmond 
Tutu. The metaphor is effective as a national trope because it speaks directly to the 
different needs of race groups. Its biblical roots in the redemptive parable of Noah 
emphasise the notion of reconciliation and appeased vengeance, while in Xhosa folklore 
the rainbow embodies hope and a bright future.100 Both interpretations place it within a 
mythic dimension – important because, as Benedict Anderson has suggested, successful 
nationalisms are inextricably linked to a belief in the future as well as our religious 
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instincts.101 The rainbow’s association with “new” miraculous beginnings also ties in 
with transition rhetoric about the “new” South Africa.  
Tutu had first used the phrase “the rainbow people of God” during the march of 
church leaders to parliament in Cape Town in 1989.102 He brought the term back with 
him from the United States103 where Jesse Jackson’s National Rainbow Coalition 
possibly served as an influence.104 It is worth noting here that Tutu is much loved by the 
world’s liberal media, and the metaphor perfectly encoded what the world wanted to 
believe about South Africa.105 Most remember the term as being coined at Hani’s funeral, 
largely because, as Philippe-Joseph Salazar points, out the “fiction”, the as-if-ness, of a 
non-racial nation was ironically brought closer by the assassination.106 This sense of the 
impending “freedom” or democracy is reflected elsewhere in Tutu’s speech when he 
declared that “nobody can stop us on our march to victory”. Indeed, the assassination 
finally tipped the balance in the ANC’s favour.  
Whether this is because Mandela’s pleas were directly responsible for putting an 
end to the outbursts is besides the point as well as difficult to prove, in spite of Desmond 
Tutu’s impassioned belief that the country would have “had gone up in flames” if 
Mandela had “not gone on television and radio”.107 Suffice to say Mandela’s comments 
were boosted by extensive media support, including the live broadcasting of the funeral 
as well as the allowance for a week of mass mourning. Hani’s martyrdom was another PR 
disaster for the NP, one that was exacerbated first by violent police reaction to angry 
protesters at Vanderbijlpark and Protea, and later by the discovery that their insistence 
that the assassination had been the work of a lone fanatic was incorrect, when Clive 
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Derby-Lewis, a senior CP member, was arrested for masterminding the assassination. 
Foreign news reports followed these events closely, crediting Mandela with quelling civil 
unrest. Ultimately, the assassination provided an opportunity for a show of leadership,108 
particularly in the eyes of white South Africans; Martin Meredith claims that no other 
event “revealed so clearly to the white community how important Mandela was to their 
future security”,109 and Richard Stengal observes that Mandela’s restraint demoralised the 
white right-wing by undermining their “cohesion, even their reason for being”.110 Further 
blows were delivered after the death of Treurnicht, who died during a heart operation on 
22 April, in the midst of Derby-Lewis’s arrest and two days before Oliver Tambo’s death. 
In spite of the fact that, to appease conservative white South Africans, Treurnicht’s 
funeral was, like Tambo’s, broadcast live (on TV1 rather than CCV, however), the event 
was overshadowed by Hani’s and Tambo’s funerals, which attracted larger crowds, 
worldwide media attention and international delegations.  
 
Storming CODESA: South Africa’s World Trade Centre Attack 
The right wing, however, continued to engage in disruptive attacks, and the formation of 
the Afrikaner Volksfront (AVF) the month after Hani’s death presented an additional 
threat to the transition. The AVF was an umbrella body for disaffected Afrikaner groups 
led by Constand Viljoen, former chief of the South African Defence Force, and three 
other military generals. The generals brought with them a wealth of military expertise as 
well as the potential loyalty of the armed forces. Moreover, the group was said to have 
found “common political ground” with the IFP and with homeland leaders resisting 
reintegration.111 The formation of the AVF thus posed the possibility of a more united 
opposition. In spite of its potential, however, the group’s legitimacy was consistently 
undermined by the actions of its AWB members, and once again these events played out 
before television cameras. 
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The AVF’s first attempt to reverse the thrust towards change involved a protest of 
around 3 000 members on 25 June 1993 outside the Kempton Park World Trade Centre 
(WTC), where CODESA talks were taking place. Symbolic of the heart of the transition, 
with a ready supply of journalists on hand, the WTC had become a popular site for 
demonstrators from across the political spectrum, and the protestors (made up of AVF 
and AWB members) had been given permission to air their grievances, as long as they 
were unarmed and remained within the demarcated area to the east of the WTC. The SAP 
initially deployed 200 policemen to monitor the demonstration but increased the number 
to 700, after reports of support for the protest grew. While the demonstration began fairly 
peacefully – some of the participants even braaied with their families outside the 
building112 – events got out of hand when a breakaway group of armed AWB members 
crashed through the glass entrance to the building in an armoured vehicle. According to 
the inquiry into the event, members of the AWB assaulted policemen who attempted to 
stall their movement into the building, shouted “filthy verbal abuse” at WTC staff, 
damaged property, spraypainted their demands on the walls of the building, and occupied 
the Negotiating Council Chamber.113 Two cabinet members, Minister of Defence Roelf 
Meyer and Mineral and Energy Affairs and Public Enterprises Dawie de Villiers, 
successfully bargained with AVF representatives for the Afrikaner supporters to leave the 
premises, promising that no arrests would be made that day, and the event ended without 
any serious injury. 
Cameramen, who, because of the location, were already present in great number, 
recorded the incident, and, in a broadcasting moment that comes closest to Liebes’s 
“disaster marathon”, a special midday news report was held in the immediate aftermath 
of the invasion. Interrupting usual viewing patterns, the news report features interviews 
with politicians present at the scene together with footage of AWB members occupying 
the negotiating chambers. Because of the potential severity of the situation, the SABC 
agreed to broadcast an impromptu direct televised address, in which De Klerk appealed 
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for calm and stressed that the government was “in control”.114 Appealing directly to 
viewers, the president stated: 
 
The situation gives rise to grave concern. I was informed immediately 
when trouble started. From then onwards, from minute to minute, I was 
kept informed. General van der Merwe is with me; the Minister of Law 
and Order is with me, and we immediately arranged for reinforcements 
to be sent. The reinforcements have already arrived and further 
reinforcements are continually arriving. Therefore the situation is 
basically under control. It is being stabilised at the moment. I want to 
give the assurance that the government is in control.115 
 
The special news insert, the employment of the direct address mode, and De Klerk’s use 
of phrases such as “at the moment”, “immediately” and “from minute to minute” all 
served to create a sense of urgency and liveness, marking the event as historic. In 
retrospect, the invasion has a comical air to it, and there was little to need for the 
extremities of a direct televised address, but the AWB’s disruptive tactics must have 
seemed alarming at the time. Zarina Maharaj, whose husband Mac Maharaj was inside 
the WTC on the day, recalls the experience of watching the news later that day:  
 
During that period, the children and I were watching TV one evening. 
Suddenly footage appeared of the World Trade Centre as it was being 
stormed by the AWB … Intent on derailing the negotiations, 
Terre’Blanche and his cohorts had driven an armoured vehicle through the 
glass walls of the WTC, a shattering sight! Once inside they ran through 
the place as if possessed, looking for the negotiators and their personnel, 
whom they had threatened to take out. 
 It was quite frightening watching them go on the rampage, 
especially as we had to wait on tenterhooks, not knowing whether they 
would find any of the negotiators or their staff.116 
 
The SABC news report centred on the issue of police control, with reporters stating that 
“the police appeared helpless” and various interviewees claiming that the government 
had lost control of the situation in South Africa. The underlying suggestion of these 
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reports, in light of what had occurred at Boipatong and Bisho, was that the NP’s police 
force was treating white protestors differently. De Klerk’s direct address anticipated this 
criticism and he emphasised that police inaction was deliberate, claiming: 
 
The police is [sic] acting in the very same manner as they acted when 
there was serious risk after the late Mr Hani’s death. They are acting so 
as to prevent the flow of blood … The law is not being applied 
differently because today we have to deal with white South Africans in 
mass action. 
 
In spite of De Klerk’s assurance, once again, the official inquiry into the event 
condemned police inaction, a judgment that was very much influenced by the recorded 
imagery of the attack:  
 
One sees from the video films that the perpetrators met with no 
effective resistance at all. The fact that, according to the SAP, some 600 
policemen were present at the relevant times, the manner in which they 
were deployed and commanded is a matter which requires to be fully 
investigated by the SAP. The fact is that they were completely 
ineffective.117  
 
Viljoen insisted that the AVF knew nothing of the attack, claiming that it was a 
spontaneous outbreak of anger, but while the inquiry absolved AVF leaders of 
orchestrating the invasion, it concluded that AWB members had clearly planned the 
invasion in advance. The NP used the invasion to attack Viljoen’s credibility, with its 
Youth Action Wing releasing a statement claiming that he had observed the events “like a 
helpless spectator” and clearly lacked the ability to control right-wing insurgency.118 
This would not be the last time that the AWB’s hotheadedness discredited the 
AVF. 
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Black Backlash and White Fears: The APLA Terror Attacks 
The latter half of 1993 saw an increase in interracial attacks, with several high-profile 
terror attacks carried out by a new political player, APLA (Azanian People’s Liberation 
Army), the military wing of the PAC. Because these were the first attacks in which 
relatively high numbers of white civilians were targeted, they were highly publicised in 
local and international media. In addition, foreigners were often caught up in the 
violence.  
The first APLA attack occurred in November 1992, when gunmen burst in on a 
wine-tasting event at the predominantly white King William’s Town Golf Club and 
opened fire on diners, killing four and wounding 17. This was followed by a similar 
attack on the Highgate Hotel in East London in May 1993, when five were killed and 
seven injured by balaclava-clad men wielding AK47s and hand grenades. One month 
after the invasion of the World Trade Centre, APLA cadres opened fire on attendants of a 
congregational service in Cape Town, killing 11 and injuring 58. Around 150 Russian 
seamen were also attending the service, and four were killed. The target of the St James 
Church massacre – a place of worship and sanctuary – heightened the perception of its 
brutality.  
At the time there was confusion over who was responsible for many of the 
killings, with the PAC denying knowledge of the attacks and some suggesting third-force 
involvement.119 Though top PAC leadership distanced itself from the acts, claiming that a 
race war was politically counterproductive, in some cases APLA cadres were arrested, 
while investigations into others uncovered APLA tactics. In addition, the killings were 
linked to the decidedly brutal discourse of PAC supporters. Notorious for their “One 
settler, one bullet” slogan, popularised in the 1980s, the PAC became known worldwide 
after the murder of 26-year-old American Fulbright scholar and Stanford graduate Amy 
Biehl on 25 August 1993. Biehl’s youth, gender, nationality and liberal views catapulted 
her to the status of a martyr for non-racialism. She had protested against apartheid and 
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spent time registering voters in preparation for the first election scheduled for the 
following year. In addition, she was giving a friend a lift to her home in the black 
township of Gugulethu when the attackers struck. A group of angry township youths, all 
teenagers, hauled Biehl from her vehicle and stoned, kicked and stabbed her to death 
while shouting the PAC slogan “One settler! One bullet”. The suspects, apprehended 
soon after the attack, later claimed that they were motivated to kill Biehl after having 
attended a rousing PAC rally.  
 While the anonymity and hazy objectives of the attacks in some ways 
undermined them and changed their status from political attacks to terror attacks, they 
sowed great anxiety among white South Africans. Citizen editor Johnny Johnson claimed 
that there was a marked increase in letters received from white South Africans at the 
time, stating in a SAPA report on white anxiety, “It’s the most worrying period I've ever 
experienced. People are very angry and scared.”120 The increasing reports and images of 
violence and escalating emigration figures hastened the need to move swiftly towards a 
general election and to see a legitimate government installed. All leaders roundly 
condemned the killing, and, in the midst of this violence, De Klerk and Mandela agreed 
on an election date, a move that was seen as irreversible in spite of the continued non-
cooperation of Buthelezi’s IFP as well as homeland leaders. 
 The international community recognised the leaders’ efforts by jointly awarding 
them the Nobel Peace Prize in December 1993. The international prestige of the prize 
served as encouragement to all South Africans to support their negotiating efforts and to 
participate in the forthcoming elections. While more in-depth interviews with the two 
revealed the extent to which they still distrusted one another, the joint award, 
accompanied by several photo opportunities and tactful acceptance speeches, put on a 
necessary show of unity that belied the true situation, as was starkly illustrated a few 
weeks later when APLA struck again, this time killing four people at the student-
frequented Heidelberg Tavern in the Cape Town suburb of Observatory. 
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The Final Stand: The Battle of Bophuthatswana 
In spite of the sporadic white-targeted attacks, Mandela maintained that the conservative 
white right wing remained the biggest threat to the smooth running of the forthcoming 
election. In an interview with Time magazine, he noted that the 800 000 voters who had 
voted “no” in the 1992 referendum had a substantial portion of the civil service, the 
police force and the defence force behind them and had threatened to take up arms in the 
event of an ANC win.121 In March 1994, on the eve of the election, fear of the white right 
wing threat was greatly diminished during a disastrous attempted coup in  
Bophuthatswana in which the homeland defence force soldiers gunned down three AWB 
members before television cameras. As with the broadcasting of earlier events, live 
recording of the event elevated its importance in the transition period and played a role in 
determining the official version of events. 
In spite of the fact that his support was dwindling, Bophuthatswana’s President 
Lucas Mangope was clinging to power and refusing to participate in the election the 
following month. Similarly, the AVF was still in two minds about whether to participate 
in the elections, wanting to have its volkstaat granted first. Having survived an attempted 
coup in 1988, Mangope’s announcement that he would not participate in the elections 
sparked a civil service strike, which was soon joined by policemen. By 9 March, the 
situation had spiralled out of control, with widespread looting in the capital of Mmbatho, 
staff seizing control of the Bophuthatswana Broadcasting Corporation (headed by 
Mangope’s son) and students taking over the university. At this point, Mangope called 
upon Constand Viljoen to assist the Bophuthatswana Defence Force, stipulating that 
AWB soldiers should not be called on because of their unpopularity in the area. When 
Terre’Blanche got wind of the plan, however, he dispatched his commando units to the 
homeland, contravening instructions from the Volksfront executive to remain on the 
border of the area. When the AWB groups arrived at the air-force base, they discovered 
that they were unwelcome and only agreed to depart after lengthy negotiations with 
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General Jack Turner of the Bophuthatswana Defence Force. As they left, they reportedly 
drove through the streets, abusing journalists, shouting out racial abuse and shooting 
indiscriminately into the crowds, killing civilians. A convoy of trucks opened fire on a 
group of protesting civilians at a manned a roadblock, causing the Bophuthatswana 
soldiers to retaliate. The driver of the last vehicle in the convoy, a blue Mercedes Benz, 
was shot and, after the car drew to a halt, journalists recorded the brutal scene that 
followed. 
 While the driver (Nic 
Fourie) lay slumped on the 
ground, journalists and the 
Bophuthatswana soldiers 
conversed with the remaining 
passengers (Alywn Wolfaardt 
and Fanie Uys) who asked for 
medical assistance. A 
Bophuthatswana policeman, 
Ontlametse Bernstein 
Menyatsoe, asked the two if 
they were AWB members and 
demanded to know what they were doing in “his country”. In anger, Menyatsoa 
proceeded to shoot the pleading men in front of cameramen, 122 some of whom 
erroneously assumed that their presence would deter further violence.123 Numerous 
accounts refer to the “live” televised execution of the men, although, in reality, the 
national broadcaster was more sensitive with editing of the footage; the 6 p.m. SABC 
news that evening showed the slumped bodies of the men and referred to their being 
“gunned down execution style” and “killed in cold blood”, but it did not screen the 
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moment of their actual death.124 Nevertheless, Fanie Uys’s identity was released on the 
news before his widow had been informed of his death and the full footage was shown in 
later documentaries. One of the iconic photos from the incident – in which Wolfaardt 
holds up his arms in a posture of surrender moments before his death – was splashed 
across newspapers the following morning (see Figure 4.3).125 Such images, together with 
the television footage, shocked South African audiences and remain imprinted in the 
national psyche. Allister Sparks sums up the impact of the imagery: 
 
[F]or white rightists everywhere this traumatic experience made a 
tremendous impact. The image of their execution, in all its awfulness, 
had blown away an ancient myth that had grounded generations of 
colonialism and racial domination … The bubble of adventure, the 
heroic re-enactment of historic Boer myths was punctured in a day of 
blood and humiliation.126 
 
Sparks concludes that the incident is the “ultimate irony in the tale of paradoxes – it was 
the very worst of white racists who finally cleared the way for South Africa’s one-person, 
one-vote election”.127 Indeed, the effect of the failed military intervention and the 
televised execution were immediate: both Mangope and Viljoen capitulated within 24 
hours and agreed to participate in the upcoming election.  
 The news report that evening also focused on journalists’ own role in 
Bophuthatswana, dramatising their status. Reporter Estelle Pienaar noted that SABC 
journalists attempting to gain entry to the airforce base were accosted by right-wingers 
manning the entrance, who “sweared at” [sic] and “threatened” the news crew and 
“started assaulting a radio journalist”. By referring to the clash between journalists and 
AWB members, the report distanced the broadcaster from the right-wingers’ actions, 
clarifying its political stance. 
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While Terre’Blanche insisted that the AWB had entered the region with the 
intention of assisting Mangope’s bid to retain independence, the commission of inquiry, 
set up two years later, concluded that there was “overwhelming” evidence to suggest they 
had entered “with the avowed intention of shooting its black citizenry”.128 Once again, 
we see television playing a pivotal role in determining the official version of history. 
Because the AWB generals appearing before the commission refused to give sworn 
statements, evidence against the AWB was also gathered from interviews in other 
documentary news programmes; Terre’Blanche’s comments in another programme, Max 
du Preez’s Agenda, are mentioned in the report. In his summary of events, Terre’Blanche 
insisted that the incident had been a “skitterende oorwinning” (“glittering victory”) for 
the AWB, because it suffered only five casualties in comparison to the “opposition’s” 50. 
The report notes that these causalities were mainly “innocent, unarmed citizens”.129  
 
Conclusion 
The renewed global interest in South African politics and the growing market for images 
of the transition ensured that the early 1990s was one of the most photographed and 
televised periods of the country’s recent history. “Liveness” takes on a different 
significance in this period, with a broadcaster eager to demonstrate its transparency 
through the inclusion of footage that would previously have been censored. In its 
attempts to achieve this, footage of unexpected events became valuable. In addition, as 
seen with the live broadcasting of funerals of ANC leaders and the direct televised 
address of Nelson Mandela, the SABC sought to broaden its target market for media 
events, thus extending the net of national belonging. Just as “classic” media events have 
been seen to boost the status of national broadcasters (Scannell credited the 1953 
coronation with having “made” the BBC),130 so coverage of unexpected events can work 
to overhaul broadcaster reputations. 
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The footage acquired by photojournalists and cameramen was also important in 
establishing a historical narrative of the time, often inflating the significance of events, as 
is seen by their appellations: “battle”, “massacre” and “storming”. As was the case with 
Boipatong, the presence or non-presence of photographers also sometimes changed the 
way in which events were interpreted and remembered, and footage also played an 
important role in the official investigations into the causes of violence. The need to 
control the framing and interpretation of such images was consequently of paramount 
importance, and for the most part we see the ANC establishing its dominance, mainly 
because of a previously acquired moral high ground. For the most part, reports held little 
sympathy for the idea of new independent nations, and Afrikaner and Zulu aspirations 
were cast as an ethnic threat to the civic nationalism of the ANC–NP alliance. Because of 
this, perhaps, journalists and media outlets were also perceived as centres of power, 
subject to attack from both sides. The SABC, eager to dissociate itself from its state 
broadcaster image, took the opportunity to use these attacks as a means of boosting its 














The Televised Birth of the Rainbow Nation: 
The Election and Mandela’s Inauguration 
 
 
The appeal to unity always leaves some people out. 
– Dayan and Katz1 
 
In their analysis of the role of live broadcasting in Czechoslovakia’s transition to 
democracy, Dayan and Katz conclude that “the broadcasts proclaimed that television 
itself was free to say and show what needed saying and showing”.2 Similarly, the 
SABC’s attempts to rejuvenate its image through an association with “liveness”, first 
through a no-holds-barred approach to televised footage of disaster (see Chapter 4), drew 
also, and simultaneously, on broadcasting conventions that had come to be associated 
with Western democracy. These included the televising of live political debate, 
popularised by the concept of the live talk-show in broadcasts such as Nightline, Larry 
King Live and Tonight, the BBC’s coverage of the House of Commons discussions 
(broadcast live since 1989) and the American convention of the pre-election presidential 
debate (first held in 1960).  
In an attempt to persuade audiences (both local and global) that the country was 
transforming into a democratic state, the broadcaster thus displayed all of the television 
conventions of the world’s leading democratic nations. “Liveness” holds the appeal of 
projecting an image of transparency, and De Klerk, like Mikhail Gorbachev, pushed for 
live broadcasts in the belief that it would strengthen his image as a liberal global leader. 
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As with the British and American conventions, however, these live broadcasting formats 
offer both opportunity and risk, which modern politicians need to understand in order to 
harness their power. Added to this, politicians require the cooperation of broadcasters in 
order to access the television platform. From a domestic perspective, De Klerk and 
Mandela were evenly matched as television personae. While De Klerk, as state president, 
dominated national television in the early 1990s, Mandela held more global appeal than 
the apartheid president and, as seen in the previous chapter, the SABC’s approach to 
Mandela altered dramatically during the transition period. This was no doubt in part due 
to the transformation of the broadcaster itself. According to Louw and Chitty, from 1993 
onwards there were significant staffing changes at the SABC, “aimed at achieving a mix 
of pro-ANC and pro-‘reform’ NP people in the key decision-making positions”.3 This 
resulted in a number of live broadcasts specifically designed to promote the ANC–NP 
alliance and the forthcoming democratic election, including the historic, and once-off, 
presidential debate between Mandela and De Klerk before the first election.  
 While live broadcasting in this period allowed for greater national participation, 
exposing audiences to some of the negotiations powering the transition, this still only 
involved parties in favour of the forthcoming elections. As with the negotiations, the 
“new” SABC privileged certain parties and individuals, principally NP and ANC 
representatives who were offered up as the country’s future leaders to the exclusion of 
others.  
The election itself culminated in the inauguration of Mandela, a massive 
Coronation media event that concluded the transition process initiated by his release and 
laid the foundation for the emergence of a new post-apartheid national identity. Just as 
the “nationalist intelligentsia relied heavily upon the newly emergent Afrikaans print 
media to mobilise and construct their ‘imagined community’”,4 so what became known 
as rainbow nationalism owes much to the ways in which the mass media operate. But the 
latter also benefited from the (for South Africa) relatively new medium of television.  
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Debating the Future: Live Talks as Media Events  
Since the much welcomed Nightline debate held between Pik Botha and Desmond Tutu 
in 1985 (see Chapter 2), the state broadcaster had gradually ventured into the arena of 
televised political debate, though prior to 1990 these were limited to “white” parties, and 
thus focused on the tension between the left-leaning DP, the right-leaning CP and the 
governing NP. The most famous televised debate of the period was the landmark live 
1988 debate between CP leader Andries Treurnicht and De Klerk, then Minister of 
Education, in which De Klerk defended the NP’s more moderate position a few days 
before hotly contested by-elections in conservative areas in southern Transvaal. The 
release of Mandela and the unbanning of the ANC and other parties saw an explosion of 
mediated political debate on radio and television involving representatives from a fuller 
political spectrum. In the week before Mandela’s release, Nightline hosted another 
historic debate, which was again broadcast to South African viewers, this time involving 
returning ANC exile Thabo Mbeki, Buthelezi and Pik Botha. But the SABC also began to 
televise and stage its own talks, playing a pivotal role in broadcasting and facilitating the 
debates of the transition. 
 The first major debate to be televised in the post-apartheid period came with the 
official opening of CODESA. In a bid to emphasise its political transparency, the 
broadcaster had opted for several hours of direct transmission of the opening of the 
CODESA speeches on 20 December 1991. The first day of talks on had been tense, with 
the NP and the ANC arguing about the controversial issue of the disbanding of the armed 
struggle. While the NP insisted that no negotiations could succeed while the ANC kept its 
military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), in operation, the ANC claimed that in the 
current political atmosphere the government’s police force could not be relied on to 
control violence, and disarming MK would be tantamount to political suicide. Talks had 
continued until late in the evening, but no resolution was reached. De Klerk had 
reportedly informed the ANC’s negotiating team that he would be raising the issue the 
following day at the plenary session, which was to be broadcast live to the nation, a 
message that never reached Mandela.5 At the same time, De Klerk had requested 
                                                
 











permission to speak last at the conference, a privilege that the ANC had been reluctant to 
grant but which Mandela reportedly persuaded the party to allow.6 While the majority of 
the speeches had been conciliatory, “applauding the spirit of the talks”,7 in his closing 
speech, De Klerk attempted to undermine the integrity of the ANC (and in turn boost the 
legitimacy of the governing NP) by again raising the issue of Umkhonto, claiming that 
the ANC’s stubbornness on the issue was a major stumbling block in the negotiations: 
 
From the government’s perspective there is one major obstacle in the 
way of rapid progress at CODESA. I regret having to refer to it here but 
that is, unfortunately, unavoidable. It has to do with the lack of progress 
by the ANC in coming into line with other political parties and 
movements. It wishes to remain different. The heart of the problem is 
the following: The ANC has not yet given up what it itself has defined 
as the ‘armed struggle’ … there has still not been sufficient progress in 
spite of ongoing efforts on the part of the government.8 
 
It was a tactical error on De Klerk’s part: Mandela was outraged by what he viewed as 
the president’s cynical abuse of the privilege of having the last word, and, in what must 
have been an unexpected retort, he returned to the podium and delivered an impromptu 
but blistering 15-minute response, defending the ANC’s position on MK, describing the 
NP government as an “illegitimate, discredited, minority regime” and exposing what he 
interpreted as De Klerk’s tactical use of the broadcast occasion to gain the upper hand: 
 
I was discussing with him until about 20h20 last night, he never even 
hinted that he was going to make this attack. The members of the 
government persuaded us to allow them to speak last. They were very 
keen to say the last word here. It is now clear why they did so. And he 
has abused his position because he hoped that I would not reply. He 
was completely mistaken.9  
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De Klerk, reportedly “livid” and “pounding his hand on the table”,10 also insisted on the 
right to reply, claiming that the government had reached “an absolute stalemate” in talks 
with the ANC about the arms cache and that the issue was so important it risked 
“inhibiting” progress at CODESA.  
 Mandela, who also understood the need for conciliatory gestures on live TV, 
made an effort to temper his response with a less acerbic conclusion, stating that he was 
nevertheless “prepared to work with [De Klerk] to see to it that these democratic changes 
are introduced in the country”. At the same time he crossed the floor to shake the 
president’s hand, “making sure that the gesture was captured by the same TV cameras 
which recorded his earlier tirade”.11 The gesture was overshadowed by the outburst, 
however, and the full drama of the exchange was broadcast live across the nation on radio 
and television. International newspapers were quick to report on the “bitter parting 
exchange of words” between the leaders, claiming that the disagreement pointed to a 
“rough road ahead”.12 The Washington Post declared dramatically that it was unclear 
how the “quarrel, which involved some of the sharpest public exchanges ever between 
the two men, would affect prospects for the talks”.13  
 The televising of the opening of CODESA was nevertheless lauded as a means 
of enhancing democracy, since it gave viewers the impression that they were glimpsing 
behind-the-scenes exchanges between leaders. Willy Currie argues for the potentially 
positive effect that live television has on political processes: 
 
Nelson Mandela’s dramatic response to De Klerk’s attack on the ANC 
revealed the power of TV to bring people close to the dynamic of 
negotiations, as opposed to the formal speeches which wound their dull 
way through the day. The spontaneity of Mandela’s outburst made it all 
the more regrettable that the subsequent negotiations through the 
working groups at the World Trade Centre were closed to cameras.14 
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While this may be so, there was also the possibility that the constant presence of 
cameramen would have influenced the direction of talks negatively, and the benefits of 
live broadcasting needed to be weighed against its potential costs. In addition to monetary 
costs (which in the mid-1990s were still high), there are several risks of live broadcasting 
in political communication, well illustrated by the arguments made against the presence 
of cameras in the British House of Commons before televising parliamentary debate 
became standard practice. While live broadcasting’s association with transparency might 
enhance the appearance of democracy, it does not necessarily deepen democracy itself. 
Those opposed to media access in the House of Commons argued that it would render 
procedures vulnerable to the “cult of personality” and that it would further marginalise 
already marginalised political parties by creating the perception of a two-party 
adversarial system.15 The CODESA talks were similarly susceptible to such forces. 
Indeed, the exchanges between De Klerk and Mandela, the two most known 
“personalities”, received the most media attention in the wake of the televising of the 
CODESA plenary session, even though a number of other speakers had presented 
viewpoints. 
 
In addition to borrowing from the British model of televising multi-party debate, the 
SABC also loaned formats associated with the United States. Although the political 
landscape of South Africa in no way resembled the US environment, the democratic ideal 
was equated with the American model, and the South African transition involved a fair 
number of American imports. One of these was the current affairs show Agenda, which 
featured live interviews with a range of political representatives (including more 
marginalised figures such as Terre’Blanche) and played an important role in expanding 
dialogue. There was also the expectation that democratic elections would be preceded by 
a “presidential debate”, an American tradition since the 1960s. The South African version 
of the American debate was never to be repeated after 1994, partly because subsequent 
elections were not exposed to the same amount of international scrutiny (and thus did not 
                                                
 











use global discourses to the same degree) and partly because South Africa effectively 
went on to become a one-party state. In 1994, however, the NP was still considered to be 
important, if only because it represented the old regime giving way to the new. 
 The SABC’s first live American-style election debate of the transition period 
was between Pik Botha and Thabo Mbeki in March 1994. Unsurprisingly, the debate 
focused on responsibility for the current violence and the role of the police force, with 
both opponents remaining “calm but apparently friendly throughout”.16 While some 
activists interpreted Mbeki’s response as “too nice”,17 his demeanour fulfilled Western 
expectations of the live televised debate – measured, “gentlemanly” argument. The 
Botha–Mbeki debate was in fact broadcast as a warm-up to a larger media event: the 
debate held later between presidential candidates Mandela and De Klerk.18 In addition to 
local coverage on both TV1 and CCV, the debate was broadcast in 102 countries, with 
CNN devoting a full 90 minutes to the event, which was reportedly watched by millions 
of viewers.19 
 The debate was held during a tense political atmosphere, with the worrying 
failure of a political summit involving Buthelezi, Mandela, De Klerk and Zulu King 
Goodwill Zwelithini. The international mediators of the summit, Henry Kissinger and 
Lord Carrington, left the country on the morning of the scheduled debate after no 
resolutions could be reached on the actual topic of mediation. It was against this 
backdrop of intolerance, which the Baltimore Sun claimed overshadowed the anticipation 
of the debate somewhat,20 that Mandela and De Klerk took to the stage, in part to rally for 
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their respective political parties, but mainly to foster support for the impending election. 
While the two had come to blows on television before, this was the first occasion where 
they were acknowledged as principal opponents, and the debate – preplanned, live and 
remote – had all the qualities of Dayan and Katz’s Contest media event. Described as the 
“country’s first full-throttle sally into American-style television campaigning”,21 as with 
all Contest media events, although the debate had the appearance of conflict, it served a 
reconciliatory function. Contest media events – drawing on Weber’s rational-legal 
authority – involve disciplined opponents competing according to set rules: 
 
Presidential debates … meet the criteria of periodicity, agreed rules, 
evenly matched opponents. The debates pose the dramatic question, 
‘Who will win?’ Their message is that the rules reign supreme, that the 
rules are more important than the will or status of the opponents, that 
the best man will prevail, that the winner will have another chance. 
They transpose conflict from an actual but vaguely defined field of 
battle, one where direct confrontation rarely takes place, to a framed 
arena in which the rivals face each other to sharpen, but circumscribe, 
their differences. … Contests communicate that the other side, too, 
deserves to be taken seriously.22 
 
The televised debate – designed to communicate that the “other side, too, deserves to be 
taken seriously” – served to strengthened the NP–ANC alliance, to the detriment of other 
parties participating in the election. The debate moderator spoke of De Klerk and 
Mandela’s partnership in the future regime as a foregone conclusion when he introduced 
them as “almost certain to be part of South Africa’s new Government of National Unity”. 
Objecting to the political use of television, a few days before the scheduled broadcast, the 
Democratic Party lodged a complaint with the Independent Media Commission, calling 
for the cancellation of the debate on the grounds that it would prejudice minority parties, 
concluding that “the DP feels deeply prejudiced by the direction provided by the 
Nat/ANC dominated SABC board, and calls for redress”.23 The grievance illustrates the 
extent to which, although celebratory, media events are not without controversy, since 
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they infrequently allow for marginal voices to be heard, as the opening quote to this 
chapter suggests. 
 This is particularly evident in the so-called “presidential debate”, rooted in 
American political communication, which in turn has grown out of a two-party-
dominated political system. Recognising the influence of American politics on the 
forthcoming election, the ANC sought the counsel of a number of top US 
communications advisors involved in Bill Clinton’s successful 1992 campaign. Although, 
as Anthony Sampson points out, the ANC had a wider array of politicians who could 
“perform” in English on television than the NP,24 their leader’s poor public speaking 
skills presented a challenge, particularly with live broadcasting. As noted by 
Hollingsworth at the time of the release concert (see Chapter 3), Mandela’s delivery was 
drawn-out, pedantic and stiff, and he had a tendency to exceed his allotted speaking time. 
To help matters, the ANC sought coaching from Clinton’s former advisor, Frank Greer, 
who had also worked with Czechoslovakia’s Václav Havel earlier in the year. Greer told 
Mandela to keep smiling, to talk faster and to avoid wagging his finger, as this was sure 
to remind viewers of PW Botha. His overarching advice was to shake off the image of the 
political prisoner and to “be presidential”.25 On this front, what Mandela lacked in 
oratory skills, he made up for with physical stature. His height and perfect posture were 
accentuated in person and at mass rallies, but this asset would not necessarily translate on 
television. Mark Gevisser described him in an article introducing the debate as “the 
Father of the Nation: regal, statesman-like and almost saintly. The problem is, though, 
that he talks at the measured and pedantic pace of a provincial schoolmaster, and is stiff 
and uncomfortable on television.”26 Mandela, although initially reluctant to rehearse, 
practised with journalist Allister Sparks the day before the debate, a session that did not 
go well, since, according to Stanley Greenberg, Mandela failed to remain cordial in his 
approach, repeatedly raising the issue of the government’s “Third Force” and coming 
across as “defensive” and “arrogant”. The session was recorded, using a split screen to 
gauge reaction and response, and when the team reviewed the video clips it was clear that 
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Mandela sounded “hectoring” when speaking and “slumped and inattentive” while his 
opponent spoke; in short, Sparks “slaughtered” him.27 The advisory team urged Mandela 
to avoid ad-hominem attacks and to remain positive, and a follow-up rehearsal on the 
morning of the debate was more successful. 
 The debate followed a fixed structure, borrowing from the US tradition, with De 
Klerk and Mandela each opening with three-minute statements, after which a panel of 
journalists – Tim Modise of Radio Metro, Ferial Haffajee of SABC radio, Lester Venter 
of SABC television and John Simpson of the BBC – was permitted to pose questions to 
the candidates. Candidates were given a certain amount of time to respond and then 
opponents could rebut the response. De Klerk won the coin toss (the traditional way of 
determining who speaks first), and his opening words were smoothly delivered and he 
managed to keep to time. In spite of this, he was always going to be at a slight 
disadvantage, because history had given the ANC the moral high ground; in foreign 
reports, for instance, De Klerk was often referred to as Mandela’s “jailer”. According to 
Greenberg, every time De Klerk attacked the icon, he ended up scoring points for the 
opposition, arguing that “when the party of the oppressor attacks, you get a protective 
reaction from the people who were oppressed”.28 This was a severe constraint for De 
Klerk and other NP politicians. Because of this, perhaps, the president was less direct in 
his attacks on Mandela and the ANC throughout the exchange. Yet, his attempts to 
project an image of himself as the leader who had dismantled apartheid ended up 
sounding smug and self-congratulatory. In his opening address, De Klerk strove to 
downplay Mandela’s role in South Africa’s transition: 
 
As the state president it had been my privilege to lead the process that 
brought us to this historic moment. In that process I have been assisted by 
leaders from a number of parties – also Mr Mandela here – and I pay tribute 
also to them. I promised, when I took office, to guide South Africa to a new 
era. I promised to end apartheid. I promised to release Mr Nelson 
Mandela.29 
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The statement served only to strengthen the perception of De Klerk as the jailer of the 
oppressed. Similarly, a later comment, “We [the NP] ended apartheid”, did not have the 
desired effect, since the NP was also seen as the party that had installed the political 
system in the first place; as apartheid was detested around the world as an oppressive 
regime, there were no points scored for ending it. De Klerk attempted to circumvent this 
problem by consistently alluding to the NP’s makeover, referring to it as the “new” NP in 
the “new” South Africa at the beginning of a “new” era. 
For this reason, Mandela’s markedly more modest-sounding opening words struck 
a chord. Showing awareness of the reach of the debate, the ANC leader invoked the 
“good work” of the entire nation in bringing South Africa to its present juncture: 
 
I am humbled to represent the work and struggle of s  many people who 
made democracy a reality in our country. It is their good work that 
inspired me every day during those 27 years of my prison life. It is that 
good work that inspires me tonight … Those of you are watching this 
discussion at home, look to us to exercise effective leadership.30  
 
Mandela’s opening also spoke directly to the medium of television, addressing audiences 
and families at home in an attempt to personalise his message. But his delivery was much 
slower than De Klerk’s, and the moderator interrupted him before he could conclude, 
creating an impression of the ANC leader as elderly and incompetent. 
The remainder of the debate did not go according to plan, and Mandela was 
unable to restrain himself from attacking De Klerk or keep his finger-wagging in check. 
“From that point on,” Greenberg recalls, “Mandela was totally on the offensive, hostile 
and disparaging, in ways more pointed – some in the press said ‘pedantic’ – because he 
spoke so slowly.”31 At one point, De Klerk even remarked: “I find the sudden aggression 
of Mr Mandela strange.” Mandela’s mood was not helped by the fact that, as with the 
Botha–Mbeki debate, responsibility for violence dominated the discussion, with Modise 
kicking off with a question about the police force’s perceived inability to maintain law 
and order. The topic, and De Klerk’s response to it, appeared to put Mandela in attack 
                                                
 
30 Nelson Mandela, “Opening statement of 1994 television election debate”, 14 April 1994. 











mode, since he and De Klerk had never been able to resolve their disagreement over the 
NP’s response to “black-on-black” violence in the country. He repeatedly raised the now-
tired issue of Inkathagate and claimed that De Klerk had been “less than candid about 
putting the facts before the public”. 
 Mandela was also markedly weaker on matters related to the economy, 
speaking in broad terms about the “end of the days of the gravy train” and stating that the 
ANC leaders would not “live like fat cats”. While these statements held emotional 
appeal, on detailed economic plans, he could only refer to the fact that the ANC had a 
Reconstruction and Development Programme in place, but he seemed unable to explain 
its rationale. In response to a question on how the ANC would deal with the current 
economic crisis, Mandela declared that he would cut his presidential salary, to which De 
Klerk quipped: “If he thinks that the salary of politicians is enough to solve the economic 
problems of South Africa, he’s in for a big surprise.” The president went on to predict 
that the ANC’s plans would result in a doubling of South African income tax within the 
first year. 
 Both candidates, speaking haltingly in their second language, lacked the flair 
required of effective TV personae, while limited editing and few camera angles 
mimicked the direct address mode rather than the more interactive style that had come to 
characterise American television debate since the landmark Nixon–Kennedy encounter in 
1960. (Even this early broadcast made use of more dynamic editing and intimate close-
ups.) Speaking against dull-blue backdrops in fitted suits, De Klerk and Mandela 
addressed the camera directly, referring to each other in the third person (except on one 
or two heated occasions). In addition, there were few opportunities for television 
audiences to gauge the opponent’s reaction to his adversary’s comments, apart from a 
few clips showing both speakers alongside each other and only one or two moments 
when corner split-screen inserts, usually delayed, played alongside the candidate 
speaking. The SABC broadcast contrasted greatly with that of global networks of similar 
events from the same period; the 1992 Clinton–Bush–Perot debate, for instance, included 
much more shot-reverse-shot editing and many more visuals with candidates addressing 











down. The Chicago Tribune declared, “Great television it was not”;32 similarly the 
Independent concluded, “Clinton versus Bush it was not.”33 
 More interesting than the visuals was the audience commentary that infiltrated 
the broadcast, reminding television viewers that what they were watching was in fact 
live. Here, once again, the risks of live broadcasting were apparent; the theatre/studio 
audience frequently responded to both leaders’ opening comments, with heckles, 
murmurs and titters of approval and dissent. For instance, De Klerk’s description of the 
NP as “the most representative non-racial party in South Africa” was met with a mixture 
of agreement and disapproval, while a voice called out “Nonsense!” when Mandela 
suggested that corruption was endemic in the NP government, compelling Robinson to 
call for quiet. Mandela’s comments appeared to receive less applause and more heckling 
than De Klerk’s, raising the question of how the theatre audience had been selected. By 
all accounts, the NP and the ANC were designated an equal number of seats (25 each), 
but the NP audience members seemed to be more vocal, highlighting moments when 
Mandela was weak. This may have had something to do with the form and setting of the 
debate. Held at the Johannesburg Civic Theatre – a building previously associated with 
whites-only cultural productions – the debate was moderated by the Afrikaans-speaking 
SABC journalist Frederick “Freek” Robinson, known to white South African television 
audiences since the mid-1980s. The venue and moderator thus situated the exchange 
within the cultural domain of the NP and this may have influenced the subdued 
“cheering” of the ANC contingent.  
  In spite of these drawbacks, Mandela managed to conclude on a good note, 
inadvertently revealing what was perhaps De Klerk’s greatest weakness: his inability to 
convince audiences of his sincerity. As Gevisser noted at the time, while De Klerk had 
the advantage of “decades of parliamentary experience” he carried “the aura of 
sanctitude” and his “newly acquired good-ol’-boy affability [did] not always ring quite 
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true”.34 De Klerk, less aggressive than Mandela, spoke frequently of the need for 
reconciliation: “We need each other in the government of national unity,” he said at one 
point. “We will not have peace before there is reconciliation. This election is not about 
the past but about the future.” But such messages did not always sound authentic, perhaps 
because the ANC was tipped to win the elections, and reconciliation was sorely needed 
by the NP (and the mainly white electorate it represented). Mandela’s comments, on the 
other hand, were more spontaneous seeming, his olive branches more unprompted. At 
one point, acting like an “incumbent president towards a junior partner”,35 Mandela 
turned to De Klerk and said, “Sir, you are one of those I rely upon to face the problems of 
this country together.” His final gesture disarmed both the president and audiences 
around the world. In the closing minutes of the debate he took De Klerk’s hand, to the 
president’s apparent surprise, and stated, “I am proud to hold your hand. Let us go 
forward together, let us work together to end division and suspicion.” Many media 
accounts picked up on the gesture, identifying it as the highlight of the exchange. 
Towards the end of the debate, both leaders returned to the amicable spirit of the 
Contest media event, and reports claimed that they appeared more focused on reassuring 
the country of stability and unity than on undermining one another.36 In keeping with the 
Contest “script”, subsequent reports (both foreign and local) likewise stressed unity over 
conflict; the New York Times claimed that the two “squared off”,37 the Baltimore Sun 
stated that they “clashed gently”,38 while the Star declared that the “TV battle” ended “in 
harmony”.39 Various reports also quoted political analysts’ assessment that the debate had 
ended in a draw.40  
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Reports also used the debate as a means of laying the ground for change, 
anticipating a new regime and preparing racial groups for a transition in leadership. As 
the New York Times claimed, the debate “was less the highlight of an election campaign 
than a glimpse of the next Government”.41 De Klerk was described as “the last white 
leader in 300 years of minority domination”,42 and journalists interviewed both black and 
white families on their viewing experiences of the debate in anticipation of racial 
reconciliation and a more inclusive South African citizenship.43 
News reports claimed the debate attracted the largest South African television 
audiences ever.44 But, although it was the most-watched show that week on TV1, this 
claim seems exaggerated. Interestingly, viewership figures show different levels of 
interest among population groups. The debate outstripped other programmes for English- 
and Afrikaans-speaking viewers that week, receiving an AR of 35. Apart from the news 
that preceded it that evening, the debate was also the only programme to receive an AR 
above 30. Statistics for African-language viewers show different patterns, and the debate 
did not feature as the most-watched programme for Nguni- and Sotho-speaking viewers 
on either TV1 or CCV. While it also received an AR of 35 on CCV, it was trumped by 
Bophelo ke Semphekgo, the hugely popular Sepedi drama series (which received an AR 
of 37), and Kululeka, a voter education programme (receiving an AR of 36). In addition, 
several other programmes received similar ratings to the debate (with ARs above 30) 
throughout the week.45 The viewing statistics suggest that the debate did not fascinate 
black audiences to the same extent as their white counterparts. This was perhaps because 
it was by then common knowledge that the ANC would win the election; several widely 
publicised pre-election surveys estimated that the party’s future win hovered around the 
two-thirds mark.46 Towards the end of the debate, De Klerk even conceded that the ANC 
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would most likely be the winning party and needed a strong opposition. The outgoing 
president’s influence was thus less interesting to black South Africans, whereas Mandela 
was still something of an enigma to fearful white South Africans, whose future in post-
apartheid South Africa was uncertain. The debate – a political platform situated squarely 
within their cultural realm – offered an opportunity to size up their future president. For 
international audiences, too, the debate offered a foretaste of the future of the last African 
country to achieve black rule. 
In light of the fact that paid-for television adverts were banned from the first 
election, the debate was seen as “one of the few times TV played a prominent role in the 
hard-fought race”,47 even if it held more interest for white South Africans and 
international audiences. 
 
The “Miracle” Nation: South Africa Goes to the Polls 
The SABC was generally praised for its free and fair coverage of the election, reflecting 
international monitors’ observations of the election itself. Without television advertising, 
most parties spent the bulk of their campaigning budget on radio and print 
advertisements, and the campaigning style was a combination of road shows, personal 
canvassing and massive newspaper and poster advertisements, boosted by extensive 
survey operations. The campaigns of the various parties were for the most part issue-
driven. The NP campaign focused on its conversion to the “new” national party and 
stressed the need for a strong opposition party. The ANC strategy crystallised around two 
slogans: “Now is the time”, drawing on their historical status as a liberation organisation, 
and “A better life for all” – devised by Greer and Greenberg – which was more forward-
looking and sought to emphasise their ability to govern. 
At times, however, both parties employed tactics that conflicted with the 
discourse of reconciliation used when addressing national and global audiences, resorting 
to racial typecasting when communicating with their constituencies. There was much 
uproar over the NP’s campaigning in the Western Cape in particular. While in national 
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addresses, such as the pre-election debate, party leaders tended to employ the language of 
national unity, their attempts to secure the coloured vote saw them returning to the 
blatantly racist “swart gevaar” (black peril) tactics first used in 1948. Playing on 
coloured fears of majority rule, they employed slogans such as “Stop the comrades!” The 
tactic was most prevalent in the publication of a comic book speculating that under an 
ANC government, “Kill a coloured … kill a farmer” could easily become a new political 
slogan. The party managed to distribute over 75 000 copies before the Independent 
Electoral Commission (IEC) finally banned the publication. Mandela attempted to expose 
the hypocrisy of the NP’s discourse by pulling out a copy of the comic book during the 
live election debate on national television, accusing De Klerk and the NP of “promoting 
racial hatred”.  
The ANC’s campaign in the Western Cape initially mirrored its national focus on 
“A better life for all”, but, in response to the NP’s strategy, they, too, turned to negative 
campaigning. Slogans such as “A vote for the NP is a vote for fear”, “Stop the National 
Party”, “This is the reality of 46 years of National Party rule” and “Don’t let them stain 
your hands with the blood of our children” were accompanied by dramatic photos of 
apartheid police brutality and the graves of struggle activists.48 The strategy, however, 
met with little success, as election results later revealed. 
Other areas were more problematic for the NP. While the ANC was able to fall 
back on its massive organisational power (kept alive during exile by organisations such 
as COSATU and the UDF) to galvanise voters, holding successful mass rallies and 
community meetings in rural and township areas, the NP, which had in the past relied on 
a communication infrastructure that addressed minority groups, found it difficult to 
penetrate these locations. The NP accused the ANC of embarking on an intimidation 
campaign and of using strong-arm tactics to prevent their leaders from campaigning in 
certain constituencies, including the Transkei, where they blamed ANC election 
candidate General Bantu Holomisa for their inability to hold public meetings. De Klerk’s 
visit to Postdene, a Northern Cape township outside of Postmasburg, ended ignobly when 
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he was hit by a stone thrown by an ANC supporter. As was seen with events such as 
Boipatong (see Chapter 4), NP leaders were unwelcome in ANC strongholds, making it 
difficult for them to rally support or to defend themselves against ANC claims. Instead, 
they had to resort to legal action – for instance when Holomisa reportedly claimed that 
they were planning on faking votes, and when Allan Boesak spread rumours about NP 
corruption49 – a protracted process that could not, in the time left before the election, 
undo the damage of such accusations. 
There were several incidents of pre-election violence – last-ditch attempts to 
derail the drive towards democracy. Shortly after events in Bophuthatswana (see Chapter 
4), tensions between the ANC and Inkatha exploded on 28 March 1994 in what was 
referred to in the media as “Bloody Monday” and, later, the “Shell House Massacre”, 
when ANC snipers shot at thousands of Zulu protestors marching into downtown 
Johannesburg to demand that the soon-to-be former KwaZulu homeland be allowed to 
transform into a sovereign kingdom. Although reports on the exact sequence of events 
differed dramatically,50 there was general consensus that the blame lay at the feet of 
Inkatha and the Pretoria regime. A New York Times editorial concluded that “the larger 
responsibility for this tragedy lies with Mangosuthu Buthulezi”, described as a “wrecker” 
who “has made common cause with white racists who oppose what South Africa’s men 
and women of good will have sought for generations”.51 Although Mandela’s image was 
tarnished a year later when he confessed to having instructed the snipers to “shoot to 
kill”, 52 at the time, the media was in full support of the push towards the election date. 
Right-wingers engaged in similar attempts to change the course of history. The 
largest bomb ever to explode in Johannesburg was detonated outside ANC offices just 
three days before citizens were due to go to the ballot, killing nine people; election 
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campaigners were murdered while encouraging communities to vote in Natal and the 
death toll steadily mounted in the weeks preceding the election (for instance in just one 
week, between 6 and 13 April, a total of 103 people died in countrywide violence).53 
Fears of further post-election violence were allayed when, dramatically, days 
before the election, Buthelezi, who had consistently refused to participate in the election, 
capitulated, claiming on 19 April that he had “finally managed to negotiate a secure role 
for his majesty the king of the Zulu Nation and the guarantee of the future existence of 
the Zulu kingdom”.54 In reality, no significant concessions had been made; more likely, 
Buthelezi realised that the election was going to go ahead regardless of his requests for 
further negotiations – for the election to be postponed and for an independent homeland – 
and that choosing not to take part would seriously jeopardise his political future. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, there was little media support for proposals for 
volkstaats or independent Zulu nations. Buthelezi’s inept handling of the media and his 
alliance with much maligned right-wing parties cost him dearly; he was consistently 
mocked and grotesquely satirised in cartoons at the time, because, as Louw and Chitty 
point out, the “IFP was concerned with an internal audience not a global one – they spoke 
to the IFP’s own constituency in language that jarred the sensibilities of those 
accustomed to the gentler, preferred discourses circulating within global cities”.55 
Buthelezi’s decision was lauded around the world, adding to the “miracle” 
narrative associated with the election, boosted by leaders’ own responses to the deal; 
Mandela called it a “leap forward”,56 De Klerk claimed it removed “one of the last main 
causes of tension and violence”57 and ANC chief negotiator Cyril Ramaphosa described it 
as a “miracle”.58 CNN reported on “celebrations” breaking out in Zululand in reaction to 
the decision, describing it as “the moment that an anxious South Africa had been waiting 
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for”.59 Sky News claimed that the electoral process had been “saved by a sticker” 
(referring to the special ballot stickers printed to accommodate the party’s late entry) and 
showed images of children on the streets of Thokoza, claiming that they could “play out 
in the open again for the first time in days”.60 The reality was nothing like this, and press 
releases from 20 April, the day after the announcement, tell a very different story.61 S me 
of the worst violence of the period broke out on the East Rand. While some reports did 
mention continuing attacks in Thokoza and Katlehong townships, these were 
downplayed, and the IFP’s decision was narrativised as the solution to pre-election 
violence.  
While Buthelezi’s decision prompted Ferdi Hartzenberg, the new leader of the 
CP, to briefly reconsider the party’s decision not to enter the elections, in the end the 
party refused to participate and the IFP was the only late entry. Special Inkatha party 
stickers had to be printed for the already-printed ballot papers, and the late entry caused 
logistical problems with election stations in the KwaZulu-Natal area and the East Rand, 
where there were complaints about voters not having ID documents. Voting hours had to 
be extended in several parts of the country – a concession that Buthelezi dismissed as 
“meaningless”.62  
As Louw and Chitty point out, by the time of the election, the ANC and the NP 
were effectively jointly ruling the country through the Transitional Executive Council 
(TEC)63 and the “election and Mandela’s inauguration were consequently largely public 
relations hype designed to sell the NP–ANC Government of National Unity (GNU) deal 
to the black masses (and, marginally, to the anti-apartheid activists around the world who 
could now be provided with their emotional payoff)”.64 In spite of the “post-hoc” nature 
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of the election, it was exalted in the media, with the lead-up to 27 April and the coverage 
of the election process providing an epic prelude to the inauguration.  
In addition to running voter education programmes across 22 radio stations and on 
two of the three television channels, the SABC set up four broadcasting units in order to 
devote 24 hours of live coverage to the election process,65 once again employing 
“liveness” to create an atmosphere of transparency and to match the historic magnitude of 
the event. Indeed, anchor Max du Preez remembers the live reporting of the day as one of 
the highlights of his early television career, seeing it as a privilege to be part of the 
“historical process”.66 Of course, the violence that occurred in the days leading up to the 
election increased the tension around the live broadcasting because of the possibility of 
further disaster. Yet, in spite of several hoax bomb threats, voting was relatively peaceful, 
and the voter turnout of over 19.5 million people exceeded expectations. 
Reports recalled some of the metaphors of reconciliation and miracle that had 
attended Mandela’s release, drawing once again on the notion of “waiting” and playing 
on Mandela’s 27-year wait in prison. 
The election was visualised through 
images of long, racially diverse 
queues, symbolic of the triumph of 
non-racialism, but also of the extent 
to which South Africa still needed to 
modernise.67 For instance, while the 
ABC report on voting for the elderly 
(held on 26 April) celebrated the 
momentous occasion for black 
citizens who were voting for the first 
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Figure 5.1: Images of long, racially diverse queues 
became iconic symbols of South Africa’s long-












time, the report also pointed to some of the practical problems that resulted in queues, 
such as lack of pencils and ballot papers.68  
 Overall, however, the images of queues were lauded as a triumph of the people 
and came to represent the day in both local and international media, later becoming a 
national trope of sorts:69 
 
For once there was peace across the land. Despite kilometre-long queues, 
administrative blunders and disappointments, the party mood rarely 
sagged. White and black made friends in the long queues, swapping 
stories and bottles of refreshments. They stood patiently from dawn to 
dusk while the bureaucrats and politicians squabbled. The strategies, 
computers and cellular phones had failed. Only the unflagging human 
spirit made it a day to be proud of.70 
 
The Weekend Star declared the results a “Dream Outcome”;71 the Sunday Times 
announced dramatically that South Africa was now “One Nation”.72 These triumphant 
declarations of the demise of apartheid and the achievement of racial unity were 
premature conclusions in light of the ongoing conflict in KwaZulu-Natal and the by-and-
large ethnically divided election results. Because of the so-called “coloured vote”, the 
Nats managed to win the majority in the Western Cape and managed to prevent the ANC 
from achieving a two-thirds majority, whereas the IFP won KwaZulu-Natal and over 
10% of the vote. 
 
Crowning the King: Mandela’s Inauguration 
The inauguration that followed provided for yet another major televised display and in 
many respects concluded the drama of the struggle against apartheid in the international 
                                                
 
68 See ABC News, “South Africa’s first free elections, 1994” (Available at: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WFD-0Um9FjI&feature=rlated – viewed 2 January 2012). 
69 This image was later appropriated in a number of advertisements. For instance, the International 
Marketing Council (IMC) released their “We’ve done it before” advert in 2007, in which long queues of 
black and white citizens are meant to conjure up the spirit of 1994. Similarly, a 2006 SABMiller advert 
depicts a long line of ordinary South Africans tugging on a rope in order to draw the various continents 
closer, until the Sydney Opera House and Statue of Liberty drift into Table Bay.  
70 Mail & Guardian, “I have waited all my life for this day. No long queue is going to stop me”, Friday, 29 
April 1994. 
71 “It’s a dream outcome”, Weekend Star, 7 May 1994, 1. 











media. While Mandela’s release had created unease for the SABC at the tail end of the 
apartheid era, the broadcaster (now appointed to cover the event by the TEC) was well 
prepared for the inauguration and had by this stage not only aligned its vision of a united, 
multiracial, reconciled South Africa with global expectations but was also able to exert 
more control over its media portrayal around the world. This was made possible through 
the development of an extensively equipped International Broadcasting Centre (IBC), 
which allowed foreign journalists (understandably bewildered by the complexity of 
events in the country) to use readily available SABC-produced footage and to cover the 
elections and subsequent inauguration without ever having to leave their comfortable 
editing suites, except perhaps to take advantage of one of the special deals offered by the 
onsite tourist operators.73 
The IBC was run by former officers of SALTIE (the S uth African Army’s public 
relations/propaganda unit), who were as such ideally placed to synthesise their 
knowledge of foreign affairs public relations and experience of working with state 
bureaucracy.74 André le Roux was, as the main editor of footage, able to give expression 
to his previously frustrated desire to glorify Mandela’s release (see Chapter 3) in a 
televisual extravaganza of the inauguration, which Louw and Chitty argue was conceived 
of as a means of attracting foreign investment to regenerate South Africa’s poor global 
image.75 On a national level, the symbolism of the event suggests that organisers also saw 
the inauguration as a unifying nation-building spectacle, with the potential to engender 
loyalty to the new South African state. 
The event was broadcast on a big screen on the Botha Lawn beneath the Union 
Buildings, allowing an audience of 60 000 to share in and celebrate the occasion. This 
televised display, which received a fair share of coverage in reports, was also no doubt 
devised as a means of generating further spontaneous-seeming festive footage to contrast 
with the solemnity of the swearing-in ceremony. The crowd, replete with thousands of 
multicoloured reproductions of the new flag, gave the broadcaster the opportunity to help 
viewers at home to imagine their fellow citizens and to guide them in their reactions to 
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the ceremony. On a global level, the crowd came to stand for all South Africans, 
engineering scenes of joyous and united celebration. 
The inauguration played itself out as what Dayan and Katz refer to as a 
“Coronation” – a ceremonial media event that reminds “societies of their cultural 
heritage”76 and highlights “areas of continuity between traditional structures and rational-
legal ones, thus demonstrating the persistence of traditional forms in modern societies”.77 
Weddings, funerals and state-organised ceremonies fall into this category, which 
typically involves events that “invite the public to take stock”78 and to “pledge allegiance 
to traditional forms of authority”.79  
In the South African case, this intent was complicated by the need to represent 
both tradition and the credible invention of new tradition, and to ask audiences to pledge 
fresh allegiances by accepting the enactment of a transfer of power. The inauguration 
tackled this challenge mainly by merging old Afrikaner nationalist emblems with struggle 
and new national symbols. The singing of the old national anthem, “Die Stem” 80 (retained 
at Mandela’s insistence81), alongside “Nkosi Sikelel’iAfrica”  linked the apartheid and 
post-apartheid eras, while the abundant presence of the new national flag heralded a new 
beginning. The depiction of cultural heritage, however, was more self-consciously 
African, emphasising the new ownership of the state;82 Ladysmith Black Mambazo83 
gave a Zulu capella performance, while the crowd engaged in toyi-toying.84 
The transfer of power was expressed not only through the location of the 
ceremony, the Union Buildings in Pretoria, but also through the symbolisation of military 
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and rational-legal authority, in line with Max Weber’s and Antonio Gramsci’s claims that 
the successful transfer of authority is tied to legal legitimacy and ownership of the state’s 
coercive capacity. Mandela was sworn in by Chief Justice Michael Corbett, dressed in 
traditional judicial robes, while several white apartheid military generals stood behind the 
new president in a show of support. The ceremony concluded with a military salute and a 
visual display of coercive might from South African Air Force planes, which flew 
overhead in formation, releasing a trail of smoke in the colours of the new national flag. 
Lest this be interpreted as overly aggressive, the military symbols were offset with the 
release of a flock of white doves, symbolising the miraculous reconciliatory achievement 
of the new Government of National Unity (GNU).  
The central focus was of course Mandela, the figure of unity around whom these 
diverse symbols revolved, perhaps the only person able to contain the contradictions of 
the ceremony. Visually elevated and flanked by white apartheid politicians (including De 
Klerk) and an imbongi (praise poet) dressed in traditional Xhosa attire, Mandela absorbed 
the awkwardness of some of the alliances. The merger of discordant symbols was 
harmonised through the official adoption of the miracle discourse, elucidated in 
Mandela’s address, which outlined a new national identity linked to rebirth, 
reconciliation, unity, non-racialism, victory and the myth of the “rainbow nation”:85 
 
Each time one of us touches the soil of this land, we feel a sense of personal 
renewal. The national mood changes as the seasons change.  
We are moved by a sense of joy and exhilaration when the grass 
turns green and the flowers bloom.  
That spiritual and physical oneness we all share with this common 
homeland explains the depth of the pain we all carried in our hearts as we 
saw our country tear itself apart in a terrible conflict, and as we saw it 
spurned, outlawed and isolated by the peoples of the world, precisely 
because it has become the universal base of the pernicious ideology and 
practice of racism and racial oppression. … 
The time for the healing of the wounds has come.  
The moment to bridge the chasms that divide us has come. … 
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We enter into a covenant that we shall build the society in which 
all South Africans, both black and white, will be able to walk tall, without 
any fear in their hearts, assured of their inalienable right to human dignity 
– a rainbow nation at peace with itself and the world. … 
Never, never and never again shall it be that this beautiful land 
will again experience the oppression of one by another and suffer the 
indignity of being the skunk of the world.  
Let freedom reign.  
The sun shall never set on so glorious a human achievement!86  
 
While the notion of triumph courses through the address, the nation’s defeated enemy is 
described in abstract terms (as “racism”, “oppression”, “deprivation”). Interestingly, 
perhaps because of the very obvious connection to many of the beneficiaries of the 
power-sharing deal, not once does Mandela use the term “apartheid” in his address. The 
transference is most evident in the comments on the security forces, whom he praises for 
having played a role in “securing our first democratic elections and the transition to 
democracy, from bloodthirsty forces which still refuse to see the light”. The enemy, “the 
bloodthirsty forces” over which the nation has triumphed is defined, then, not as 
apartheid but as those opposed to the negotiated transition. The media, which has a 
tendency to exhibit “collective amnesia about current events”,87 also displayed a 
remarkably short memory. Although some of the current contradictions were noted, few 
reports analysed them, commenting on the irony of the situation in wondrous rather than 
critical terms; that Mandela should be standing alongside representatives of the 
government that imprisoned him for 27 years was depicted as a miraculous triumph, 
achieved against all odds. The BBC, for instance, referred to the Union Buildings as “the 
place where apartheid was conceived and administered”, but made no attempt to 
highlight the presence of persons linked to that administration. (In fact, only Winnie 
Mandela’s presence was singled out as awkward in the insert.) Similarly, an SABC news 
insert pointed out that Mandela had “pledged to be faithful to the same republic which 
once jailed him for high treason”,88 and described the event as “the greatest story ever”,89 
a claim made for other scripted media events.90  
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In some ways, the uneasiness of the symbolic merger suited the Coronation 
narrative, which deals with the “mysteries of rites of passage”. Dayan and Katz point out 
that “the tension of Coronation has to do with the magic of ritual: ‘Will it work?’ Or will 
it be undermined by some ceremonial slip?”91 In the post-apartheid context, particularly 
in the wake of pre-election turmoil, and against the odds of its divided history, this 
tension was heightened. The execution of the ceremony was unanimously considered to 
be successful, and it was really only after the inauguration that South Africa’s standing as 
“the miracle nation” entered into the global imaginary.92 It required the official ritual of a 
scripted Coronation, in which Mandela – who by this stage had accumulated a saintly 
image as a kind of “miracle maker” – was installed “before God”, in the presence of the 
world’s leaders, and, via television, the world. 
This global “witnessing” was highlighted in reports on the event, which emphasised 
South Africa’s shedding of its pariah status, quoting UN Secretary-General Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali’s comment that “South Africa regained its rightful place in Africa, in the 
UN, and the family of nations”. The celebratory reception of the “new” South Africa 
gives credence to Benedict Anderson’s claim that nations “wish to be recognised and 
respected by ‘other nations’”.93 The inauguration was reportedly graced with the presence 
of more heads of state than had been together at any time since John F Kennedy’s 
funeral, and the parade of celebrated leaders provided a “visual demonstration of South 
Africa’s triumphal return to the world of nations”.94 South African newspapers took 
particular pride in this, declaring that “We’re on top of the world”,95 and “The World [is] 
at Mandela’s Feet”.96  
Because it had yet to establish the terms of its shared nationhood, the presence of 
other nations also provided South Africa with other identities against which to pit its 
own. In this respect, Fidel Castro and Yasser Arafat were singled out by the local and 
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international media, which took the opportunity to emphasise global reconciliations in its 
own attempt at enemy-sublimation. Both were framed as the defeated (but now relatively 
harmless) former enemy in many reports. Castro had played a direct role in South African 
and African history because of the presence of Cuban troops in the Angolan War, and 
Business Day noted that “Years of enmity end as Castro meets De Klerk and defence 
chief”,97 while the New York Times, one of the few publications to treat the inauguration 
with caution, noted that Castro was the only foreign dignitary to receive cheers of 
“Viva!” from the crowd.98 South Africa’s racial reconciliation became a microcosmic 
metaphor for the larger issue of the country’s integration into the global democratic 
world. Indeed, Time magazine’s description of the event likened it to the destruction of 
the Berlin Wall: 
 
Here was a spectacle of true transformation. For the first time, South 
Africans of all races were citizens. Apartheid was gone, reduced to rubble, 
as if in one of those slow-motion demolitions that bring down massive 
obsolete monstrosities to make way for new construction.99 
 
Some of the underlying drama of the election and inauguration, such as the Berlin Wall 
analogy and the casting of Castro and Arafat, suggest that South Africa’s transition to 
democracy played itself out as another chapter in television’s enactment of the global 
victory over communism, a trend in media events at the time.100 In spite of this narrative, 
which took on the appearance of a “miracle play, where a cancerous body politic was 
healed through the intervention of the invisible hand of the world market and electoral 
therapy”,101 South Africans did not constitute one nation, a reality made clear by 
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continuing post-inauguration violence in KZN (which received less critical coverage after 
the inauguration),102 eruptions in prisons across the country and continued white flight.  
The viewing statistics for the inauguration also show noteworthy disparities, 
indicating that some South Africans invested more in the new nation than others. While 
audience figures for black South Africans suggest mass viewership (peaking at an AR of 
35 and 34 for Nguni- and Sotho-speakers), these were not matched by their white 
counterparts, which peaked at an AR of 25 and 26 for English- and Afrikaans-speakers 
respectively,103 who were perhaps alienated by the Africanist aesthetic of the event. The 
figures suggest that while Mandela and the ANC had succeeded in attaining general 
acceptance of his leadership, they still had to engender loyalty from minority groups. 
Mandela and his advisors responded to this challenge almost immediately. For 
instance, in his first State of the Nation speech on 24 May 1994, also broadcast live, 
Mandela quoted sections from a poem by the late Ingrid Jonker, the darling of the 
Afrikaner literati, inviting Afrikaners to identify with the “new” nation. His use of 
Jonker’s poem “Die Kind” operated as an instance of rhetoric that Philippe-Joseph 
Salazar claims was “even better than real images” because it offered an “internal vision 
of nation-building”.104 The choice of poem is important as it serves as a kind of 
cenotaph,105 inscribing the unknown dead into South Africa’s vision of itself. As 
Benedict Anderson points out, the tombs of Unknown Soldiers serve as “arresting 
emblems of the modern culture of nationalism”, as they are “saturated with ghostly 
national imaginings”.106 In contrast to the popular and fantastical visions of the 
inauguration and many subsequent rainbow nationalist texts, which lacked the 
imagination to conjure up suitable images of the past (such as the Rugby World Cup 
1995 opening ceremony – see Chapter 6) the speech serves as a rare moment in the 
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history of nation-building discourse in the country. The idea to open the address with an 
Afrikaans poem was in fact Thabo Mbeki’s,107 but, as discussed in the next chapter, 




Television played an increasingly important role in the development of South Africa’s 
post-apartheid national identity, with live media events once again plotting important 
narrative turning points. Symbolically, the timing and framing of the pre-election period 
had much in common with the situation in Eastern Europe. Dayan and Katz’s description 
of the role of television as integral to the coming of democracy there is equally 
appropriate to the South African situation: 
 
[T]elevision served as a herald, reporting on the revolution in progress; 
it served to temper the threat and anxiety of outside intervention; it 
offered itself as evidence that civil liberty and freedom of speech were 
now reinstated; it moderated the debate between old and new 
leadership; it celebrated the ‘decoronation’ of the Communist party and 
the promise of free elections.108 
 
Yet, in spite of the NP’s supposed “decoronation”, the outgoing party was not in fact as 
marginalised as some might have expected. Mandela appointed FW de Klerk as a deputy 
president (alongside Thabo Mbeki) and several NP cabinet ministers retained their posts 
or were redeployed in other cabinet positions (including Pik Botha, Roelf Meyer and 
Derek Keys). But the push towards the election and inauguration left smaller parties by 
the wayside. The CP’s decision not to participate left it with no parliamentary 
representation, whereas the Democratic Party and the Pan Africanist Congress hardly 
fared better; both achieved less than 2% of the vote. Similarly, although the IFP’s win in 
KwaZulu-Natal was hailed as a victory and Buthelezi was appointed as Minister of Home 
Affairs, his political shelf life clearly had an expiry date and he grew increasingly 
frustrated with the ANC’s attempts to defuse the IFP’s political power base by forming 
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an alliance with the Zulu monarchy, thus splitting Zulu cultural and political ambitions. 
His exasperation was most memorably displayed in September 1994 when he and his 
bodyguards burst in on a live Agenda television interview and accosted Sifiso Zulu, a 
supposed Zulu “prince” whom Buthelezi regarded as an ANC puppet. His actions were 
strongly condemned by several political parties and media organisations and he 
increasingly found himself out in the cold. 
 While mass support formed the most obvious base for political power in the 
new era, leaders’ statuses also drew from their ability to partner with media institutions 
and to utilise television platforms to their benefit. De Klerk and Mandela both had 
strengths and weaknesses as television “performers”; De Klerk lacked believability 
whereas Mandela projected a wooden image; De Klerk enjoyed more exposure on 
national television because of his position as state president for most of the early 1990s 
but Mandela’s global profile overpowered De Klerk’s, largely because of the series of 
media events that had worked to elevate his public image. As Greenberg points out, 
“Mandela’s charisma derived from his whole life, that moment in history and his personal 
relationship with the audience, not from the eloquence of his words or delivery.”109 
Indeed, by the end of the transition period, boosted by the spectacular inauguration – a 
massive media event – Mandela emerged as the true post-apartheid king on the global 
stage, but one who still needed to secure the loyalty of minority groups in the nation. 
                                                
 














 South Africa’s Return to the Global Fold 
and the Making of Madiba 
 
 
 Sport often offers the only arena in which nations can redress feelings of marginality 
and bask, however fleetingly, in the sensation of a being a global force. 
– Rob Nixon1 
 
Sport speaks a language which reaches areas  
where a president and politician cannot reach. 
– Nelson Mandela2  
 
 
While the election and inauguration presented the transforming South African state with 
the opportunity to formalise the identity of the new nation, other, popular media events of 
the transition were equally helpful in consolidating a new national identity. While the 
previous chapter looked at state-controlled political events, this chapter returns to some 
of the popular televised occasions involved in South Africa’s transformation during the 
transition period. 
A few years before the election and for the first time in decades the country was 
permitted to participate in international contests such as Miss World (in 1991), the 
Olympics (in 1992) and the Cricket World Cup (also in 1992). Thus, even before the 
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apartheid government had officially been voted out of power, global organisations 
“rewarded” South Africa for taking steps towards democracy – first by allowing it to 
participate internationally and later allowing it to host mega-events within the country 
itself. While withholding media events had served as a means of “punishment” during the 
apartheid era, they now played a role in rewarding South Africans for supporting reform. 
Various political parties tried to take ownership of these events, positioning themselves 
as the gatekeepers to reward as a means of increasing their own popular appeal.  
There was extensive debate within the ANC over whether to support the country’s 
return to the global stage and organisations such as COSATU and individuals such as 
Hassan Howa protested against what they saw as the premature and inappropriate 
celebration of a new post-apartheid national identity. Indeed, these celebratory contests 
occurred, somewhat incongruously, alongside highly violent events such as Boipatong 
and Bisho and even within volatile regions such as Bophuthatswana.  
 In addition, South Africa’s participation in these events, although widely 
celebrated, showed signs of awkwardness and made explicit the lack of a shared national 
identity. The transition period was characterised by a number of debates on national 
symbols and sporting quotas, all of which fed into larger discussions on issues such as 
national heritage and affirmative action. The question of divided loyalty – apparent in the 
viewing patterns of media events such as the inauguration discussed in the previous 
chapter – were also evident in the debates that led up to South Africa’s readmittance to 
international competition. The behaviour of sportsmen and fans – often highly visible, 
and nationally embarrassing, on global television – laid bare the faultlines of the 
emerging nation and emphasised white recalcitrance in particular. 
On account of this, on several occasions the ANC was tempted to withdraw 
support for the country’s return to media events, but it quickly found that once South 
Africa had set foot on the global stage, it was extremely difficult to withdraw. In the end, 
the party was more or less compelled to support South Africa’s readmittance to the 
family of nations. 
Mandela, however, remained a firm supporter of South Africa’s re-entry to 
international competition and, from early in the 1990s, he played an important role in 











went on to solidify his reputation as a unifier who presided over the reconciliatory 
metaphor of the rainbow nation. His presidential image borrowed readily from sport, an 
arena set up to recreate warring nations, in which the highest call of patriotism, to fight 
for one’s country, can symbolically (and lightheartedly) play itself out. Referred to as the 
“people’s president”, he was much adored by the nation and the world. Mandela’s status 
was boosted by the fact that he was seen as the key to South Africa’s much desired 
reconciliation with the rest of the world; perhaps more than any other individual, he 
helped to rid South Africa of its pariah status. This was largely because he was careful to 
lend support to global media events for which white South Africans were hungry.  
There were several key international events that played a role in directing the 
emerging national identity of post-apartheid South Africa before the 1994 election, 
including Miss World, the 1992 Olympics, the 1992 Cricket World Cup and the Wallaby 
and All Black tour of the country in 1992. In 1993, South Africa was awarded the honour 
of hosting the 1995 Rugby World Cup, and it was this event, more than any other, that 
helped to iron out some (but not all) of the contradictions of the country’s new identity.  
 
Waiting in the Wings: South Africa Returns to Miss World 
The first competitive body to permit South Africa’s return to the global fold was Miss 
World, with whom post-apartheid South Africa and Mandela went on to forge a new and 
lasting relationship. The South African delegate from 1991, Diana Tilden-Davis, a tall 
blonde bombshell from a wealthy family, whose half-sister, Janine Botbyl, had won Miss 
South Africa three years earlier, was hardly representative of the changes that were 
supposedly taking place in the country. While her crowning as Miss South Africa in 
August did not raise too many eyebrows, when she came third in the international Miss 
World Contest later that year, there was much uproar over the fact that she had been 
allowed to compete in the first place. While for years, the domestic contest had simply 
been dismissed as a whites-only cultural spectacle (there had never been a black winner), 
international competition again raised the question of Miss South Africa’s suitability as 
her country’s representative. South Africa’s participation in the competition, for the first 
time in 14 years, meant that the country was judged not only according to international 











to the Miss South Africa selection process and the Los Angeles Times reported that only 
50 of the 500 Miss South Africa 1991 contestants were black, all of the 12 finalists were 
white and only one of the nine judges was black.3 (This was not strictly speaking true; 
Amy Kleinhans, who would go on to become the first “non-white” winner of the contest 
the following year, was first runner-up.) 
The ANC Women’s League objected to South Africa’s inclusion, not only 
because they saw the contest as “degrading”4 to women but also because they did not 
believe that Tilden-Davis represented the majority of women in the country. Some black 
publications also noted the discord; a Sowetan editorial, for instance, claimed that 
although it wished it “could share in the joy of Miss South Africa … sadly, her good 
performance (in the Miss World pageant) leaves many black South Africans cold”.5  
The ANC nevertheless tolerated the Miss World contest invitation, realising that 
denying white South Africans their hunger to compete internationally could damage the 
organisation’s attempts to build a reputation as a liberal global party capable of governing 
the country. For the most part, the local media welcomed South Africa’s readmittance to 
the competition (splashing triumphant photos of Tilden-Davis with Foreign Minister Pik 
Botha across its pages in the days before she left for Atlanta), and the SABC broadcast 
the final pageant live to the nation at four in the morning and then reran it that evening 
for viewers who might have missed it.6  
Tilden-Davis’s victorious crowning as second runner-up attracted further 
controversy after she reportedly told Miss Nigeria during the competition that the lack of 
black contestants in the Miss South Africa contest was due to the fact that most black 
girls fell pregnant by the time they were 15 and were thus disqualified from entering. The 
remark highlighted her unsuitability as the country’s ambassador and, although she later 
denied making the comment, it was widely reported, first in the Sowetan and then 
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internationally, and drew attention, once again, to the awkwardness of South Africa’s 
participation in international competition while its politics were racially skewed. 
The scandal did not dishearten the contest organisers, however. Either they were 
confident that a new political era was about to dawn, or the contemporary political 
situation did not matter to them. Either way, the following year, somewhat surprisingly, 
husband-and-wife duo Eric and Julia Morley, owners of the Miss World copyright, 
decided that South Africa could in effect host the competition for the following three 
years, an honour that would attract the gaze of over 80 participating nations. The 
extraordinary decision came as a result of a three-year deal struck with Sol Kerzner, CEO 
of Sun International, which owned Sun City. Kerzner paid a one-off sum for the chance 
to host and produce the show, and received television rights in return. As Zoë Heller 
pointed out at the time, the contract was mutually beneficial, based on the shared 
“empathy of pariahs”.7 Sun City’s location in Africa and Kerzner’s talent for staging 
spectacle promised to rejuvenate the pageant’s waning popularity; the Morleys had been 
unable to get a British terrestrial channel to televise the contest since 1988, and the 1991 
contest in Atlanta lost them money. The Morleys were hopeful that the contract would 
restore Miss World’s reputation, surmising that the makeover would ensure its return to 
BBC or ITV.8 In return, the high viewership and glamour of the contest would secure 
three years of global marketing for Kerzner’s Sun City.  
 But, as seen in Chapter 3, Sun City had a dubious reputation as a white pleasure 
resort, and Bophuthatswana was a troublesome political hotspot during the transition 
period, when the area’s indeterminate political status became a source of great anxiety for 
inhabitants (and apartheid puppet leaders), resulting in massive unrest (see Chapter 4). 
While the South African government still recognised Bophuthatswana as an independent 
homeland, the rest of the world did not (Miss Bophuthatswana was not even allowed to 
enter the contest) and, as seen by events in areas such as Bisho earlier that year (see 
                                                
 
















Chapter 4), the homelands were a major cause of political grievance among political 
parties. The decision to hold the event there was thus politically insensitive, to say the 
least. The pageant organisers attempted to overcome this perception by emphasising Miss 
World’s humanitarian role – “Beauty with a Purpose” had been the motto of the contest 
since the 1970s – and they arranged various photo shoots with poverty-stricken African 
children and donated a portion of the profits to Operation Hunger. 
 These attempts to revive Miss World’s reputation could not escape the 
discomfiting fact that Sun International – the pageant’s effective partner – was engaged 
in a battle with COSATU over its exploitation of black labour. COSATU demanded that 
the hotel group recognise the South African Commercial, Caterers and Allied Workers 
Union in Bophuthatswana, something the corporation had managed to avoid doing under 
apartheid because of Bophuthatswana’s status as an independent homeland, but which it 
was now under pressure to change. Realising the potential for attracting worldwide 
attention, COSATU threatened to disrupt the competition.9 Similarly, the ANC planned a 
march on the Saturday morning of the pageant from the southern Free State township of 
Botshabelo to Thaba’Nchu in Bophuthatswana. Using the anticipated media event as a 
platform to air their grievances, the march was planned to demand free political activity 
in the area, the release of all political prisoners in the homeland and the cancellation of 
the Miss World contest,10 which they saw as inappropriate in light of current events. 
Fearing a repeat of events in Bisho, the government declared the march illegal and 
heavily armed border patrols were set up.  
 In anticipation of hosting the media event, held for the first time on African soil, 
the judges of the local Miss South Africa competition were more politically correct when 
selecting the country’s representative, and Amy Kleinhans, the first ever “non-white” 
Miss South Africa, was crowned.11 But despite being a step in the right direction, 
Kleinhans’s representation was compromised by the fact that post-apartheid South Africa 
was stuck in an interregnum of sorts. She chose to appear under the Miss World and Sun 
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International banners instead of the South African flag, claiming diplomatically, and in 
the apolitical spirit associated with the pageant, that contest brand and hotel group 
“deserved the recognition for staging this wonderful event”.12 More likely, of course, she 
was aware of the negative symbolism of the oranje-blanje-blou, as the flag was 
affectionately known to Afrikaner nationalists, and her decision drew attention to the 
country’s indeterminate national identity during the transition period. Her stance led to 
increased debate about the suitability of the flag, and the PAC capitalised on the event, 
releasing a statement in support of her choice. Describing her as “the great daughter of 
the soil” they claimed her decision was “correct, brave, honourable, informed and wise” 
because the South African flag was “not an independent flag but a combination of the 
British colonial and Dutch colonial flags”.13 The South African national anthem was 
another awkward symbol emphasising the country’s non-nationhood. Instead, the two-
hour pageant featured a rousing, upbeat version of “Nkosi Sikelel’iAfrika” – dubbed 
“South African’s national anthem in waiting”14 – as part of the entertainment.  
 In spite of the politically insensitive choice of location and Miss South Africa’s 
contradictory nationhood, the event was a sterling success. Miss South Africa was a 
semi-finalist, a strong police presence managed to keep protestors at bay, and the live 
broadcast was watched by over 800 million viewers in 73 countries, more than ever 
before in its history.15  
 In 1993, somewhat surprisingly, the ANC looked more favourably upon the event, 
investing in South Africa’s participation early on. This had much to do with the party’s 
prior negotiations with Miss South Africa organisers and with the eventual winner of that 
year’s national contest. The ANC Youth League, led by Peter Mokaba, contacted the 
sponsors of the Miss South Africa contest (the Sunday Times and Rapport) to dispute the 
politics of the competition when only three black finalists (out of twelve) were selected. 
The sponsors responded by condescending to set up a training fund to give future “non-
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white” finalists special grooming for the contest, a move that the Youth League described 
as “a major breakthrough for the oppressed masses of our people” in a secret memo sent 
to the ANC.16 The memo was leaked to the press, which in turn resulted in complaints of 
political interference, particularly when Jacqui Mofokeng was selected as the first ever 
black Miss South Africa. Rapport was reportedly inundated with irate calls from 
television viewers within minutes of the judges’ announcement, and letters pages in the 
subsequent week declared that the contest was “rigged” and a form of “window-
dressing”.17 Mofokeng also endured a slew of disparaging remarks, challenging her to 
declare that she really was as beautiful as the white semi-finalists and claiming that her 
crowning was a form of tokenism.18 
 But Mofokeng’s crowning – which was swayed, the judges claimed, by her 
politically enlightened comments on violence in the townships and not her race – paved 
the way for a closer relationship between the Miss World Contest and ANC leadership. In 
spite of the fact that the pageant was again held in conflict-ridden Bophuthatswana, and 
again attracted would-be protestors, this time the ANC endorsed the Contest. Mandela 
came out in Mofokeng’s defence, “gratefully” seizing the opportunity to pose in photos 
with her and claiming that she was “a good ambassador” to South Africa.19 To some, 
supporting the Miss World Contest and taking up the cause of a beauty queen might have 
seemed incompatible with the image of an African liberation movement, but, as Bill 
Keller of the Los Angeles Times pointed out at the time, such actions “proved that the 
African National Congress has an uncanny sense of what matters to South Africans”.20 
During the transition period, the ANC increasingly associated itself with global media 
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events to boost its own popularity and reputation. Rita Barnard argues that Miss World 
offered too great a marketing opportunity for a government in waiting:  
 
It is in the light of the symbolic politics of visibility – the transformation 
of South Africa in the national and global gaze – that we might view the 
ANC’s sanction of the three Miss World pageants held in Sun City (from 
1992 to 1994). Despite the notoriety of the resort – which, like the 
Springbok rugby team, was a major target for international boycotts – the 
pageant, with its estimated global audience of 1.2 billion, was irresistible 
as a stage for recasting South Africa’s image. While the ANC Youth 
League’s lobby took care to emphasize their more politically correct 
demands (such as the training-school for black contestants, competitively 
disadvantaged by their economic circumstances) in negotiations with the 
contest’s sponsors, their investment in these matters would have made no 
political sense whatsoever were it not for the possibilities offered by the 
beauty contest for symbolic and spectacular representation (especially 
once a black woman was chosen to represent Miss South Africa).21 
  
By 1994, the gamble with Kerzner had paid off and the Miss World brand benefited from 
South Africa’s reputation as the world’s “miracle nation” and Mandela’s spectacular 
inauguration (see Chapter 5). South Africa’s newly liberalised status also provided the 
Miss World organisers with an opportunity to expand into new markets, which it sorely 
needed to do, since, for some years, the contest’s popularity had been on the wane in the 
West.22 (This factor no doubt also influenced the judges’ choice of winner in 1994, Miss 
India, and in the previous year, Miss Russia.) The move, by all accounts, was successful, 
as figures indicate an increase in viewership from 1.2 billion to 1.8 billion between 1992 
and 1995.23 In 1994, Mandela personally congratulated all of the finalists in Pretoria, 
stating, “It is a wonderful thing for South Africa to play host to young ladies from more 
than 80 countries,”24 and marking the beginning of a long-standing association with the 
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contest. (To this day Mandela sends an official message to the Miss World finalists.) By 
1995, with South Africa’s final staging of the contest, the former pariah of the world had 
become the nation to host the contest the most times outside of Britain. 
 
Batting for Change: South Africa and the Cricket World Cup 
When it came to sport, the ANC was quicker to take advantage of the hunger for 
international acceptance to further its political aims, and cricket was the first sport to 
benefit. ANC sport spokesperson Steve Tshwete led the process that culminated in the 
formation of the United Cricket Board (UCB) – a multiracial body representing South 
African cricketing interests – in December 1990, and the party lent support to the UCB’s 
attempts to gain worldwide acceptance for the team. On 10 July 1991, because of the 
changes ushered in by De Klerk and because of the UCB’s wn proactive attempts to 
nurture the sport at grassroots level, South Africa was formally readmitted to the ICC, 
just in time, many hoped, to allow for the country’s participation in its first ever Cricket 
World Cup the following year. As seen in Chapter 2, South Africans believed that their 
team could prove itself the world leader in cricket if only it were given the chance to 
compete internationally. Much of the cricketing world, it seems, was equally keen to test 
South Africa’s talent; the British government openly supported the country’s 
readmittance, and India was the first country to resume international cricketing relations 
with the team. The South African bid for global exposure at the World Cup had much 
marketing potential,25 as there was intense interest in the team’s abilities after so many 
years of isolation; many even thought of the 1992 World Cup as the first “real” World 
Cup. As English entrepreneur Don Bailey claimed, cricket “needed” South Africa as the 
“Springboks would fill grounds everywhere”.26 Presumably the interest extended to 
television viewership, increasing business opportunities for television rights. Australia 
and New Zealand, the co-hosts of the contest, openly supported South Africa’s 
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participation from an early stage and were able to secure a lucrative deal from the official 
sponsors of the competition, Benson & Hedges.  
Although it was generally assumed that South Africa would compete after joining 
the ICC (particularly since the World Cup Committee backed readmittance), there was 
some reluctance on the part of the ICC, largely because of resistance from the West 
Indies and Pakistan. There were obvious problems with the country’s re-entry: it was 
politically risky (there was always the chance that De Klerk’s government could 
backtrack on reform), racially insensitive (images of black victims, still suffering under 
apartheid-created systems, dominated international news) and overly hasty (after all, 
Mandela could not yet vote in the country). Norman Cowans, a Jamaican-born English 
cricketer, announced in July 1991 that he would not play the country until apartheid was 
abolished, and West Indian Clyde Walcott complained that the ICC decision was 
rushed.27 But, for the most part, the return to international sport had widespread support 
and those who voiced their political opposition to readmittance risked being labelled 
“spoil sports”.  
The bid to play was greatly assisted by the ANC itself, led by Mandela and 
Tshwete, who positioned the ANC as the party that had “the power to offer South Africa 
an entry ticket to the World Cup”.28 As Aurelia Chapman points out, politics and sport 
became intertwined during this period and, ironically, the ANC emerged as the 
champions of the country’s reacceptance: 
 
They purposefully used sport as a tool to negotiate a new South Africa. It 
was a way in which to communicate with White South Africa. By 
supporting the South African cricket team, they were winning the hearts of 
many Whites and other South Africans.29 
 
Mandela’s backing had the potential to sway opposition, and Ali Bacher, president of the 
UCB, arranged a meeting between the ANC leader and Clive Lloyd, the former captain of 
the West Indian team (one of the teams most opposed to South Africa’s inclusion) – a 
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meeting that was also attended by a large Swedish delegation together with media 
representatives. When Mandela answered “definitely, yes” in answer to a Swedish 
journalist’s question about whether he supported the country’s bid to play in World Cup, 
news of his endorsement travelled around the world.30  
Mandela, a keen sports fan and a boxer in his youth, used his symbolic capital to 
support reintegration at every opportunity. Before readmittance to the ICC, he phoned the 
Jamaican prime minister to request the country’s backing,31 and in support of South 
Africa’s participation at the World Cup, he wrote to the ICC, arguing that if South Africa 
was permitted to play it would “enhance the process of unity in sport as well as the spirit 
of national reconciliation” in the country.32 For some, the idea that an all-white cricket 
team could reconcile South Africa was absurd and counterproductive; Nigel Carter 
argued in the Caribbean Times, for instance, that the ANC’s m ve was “a huge political 
clanger”.33 Yet, Mandela’s approval effectively silenced reservations. It was difficult to 
argue against the wishes of the very persons the boycott had been designed to support, 
and, as Douglas Booth points out, non-racial sportspersons were “loath to question 
publicly the headlong rush to international sport or to challenge all-white national teams 
out of respect to Mandela”.34  
Eventually, in October 1991, the ICC capitulated, announcing, to much jubilation, 
that the country could compete. Kepler Wessels came out of retirement to captain the 
team, a move that emphasised South Africa’s reintegration into world sport because, like 
Zola Budd and Basil D’Oliveira, Wessels had left South Africa in order to compete 
internationally under the banner of another nation (see Chapter 2). Having previously 
played for test cricket for Australia, he had a wealth of international sporting experience, 
and his return to South Africa was seen as a reclamation of sorts. Indeed, the South 
African team was referred to in media reports as “cricket’s prodigal son” returning from 
“the wilderness”. The team did not disappoint, excelling in its international debut match 
on 26 February 1992, defeating Australia by an impressive nine wickets. Nobody 
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appeared more delighted that Tshwete, who was photographed, tears rolling down his 
cheeks, embracing the Afrikaner Wessels in the dressing room after the match. 
Photographs of Tshwete embracing the white Afrikaner Wessels, other members of the 
team and even the previously outcast Mike Gatting (who had earned international 
condemnation for ignoring the boycott and undertaking “rebel tours” to South Africa – 
see Chapter 2) dominated media reports, boosting the perception of sport’s ability to 
integrate racial groups within South Africa and also its role in reconciling South Africa 
with the rest of the world. As Chapman points out, the iconic photo “did as much for the 
cause of South African cricket, if not more, than anything else the UCB had tried to do in 
the past”.35  
Although the next two matches were less impressive – with losses to New 
Zealand and Sri Lanka – the South African team went on to play the West Indies, 
Pakistan, Zimbabwe, England and India, losing only to England and earning themselves a 
place in the semi-final. It was at this point that the global contest became deeply 
influential on political occurrences back home. 
The ANC was not the only party to capitalise on the World Cup. After the 
Australia win, De Klerk broadcast a congratulatory message to the team on the main 
national news,36 declaring, “Your victory is a victory for all of us over years of isolation 
and rejection”.37 As seen in Chapter 4, the contest became a political tool when it 
coincided with the all-white referendum. Just as South Africans had been given a taste of 
the gratification of international competition, De Klerk hinted that the country’s 
participation in the semi-final (against rival England) depended on a positive response to 
proposed change. In a form of political communication that seems both brilliant and 
inconceivable in today’s world of professional sport, political banners, purchased by 
South African businessmen supporting De Klerk’s campaign, were displayed around the 
field at some of the matches involving the country’s team,38 securing a mass audience 
that was highly impressionable. At the Sri Lankan match, for instance, South Africans 
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were urged to “vote yes”, at the very same time as they engaged in the pleasure of 
watching their team compete internationally39 – one of the concrete and immediate 
“rewards” of reform. This practice was eventually discontinued, however, when on the 
eve of South Africa’s match against Zimbabwe, a telephone caller complained, arguing 
for an equal platform for the “no” campaign, and the Australian Capital Territories 
cricket authorities removed the banner to avoid becoming involved in political 
controversy.40  
But this did not put an end to cricket’s involvement. The team members, realising 
the importance of the referendum, released a statement publicising their political views, 
revealing that all 13 would vote in favour of reform,41 and special embassy arrangements 
were made so that the players could vote. In addition, after Jonty Rhodes established 
himself as the South African player in several matches, the campaign made use of his 
heroic image, printing adverts on the eve of the referendum, asking South Africans to 
“imagine how far he would go with the ‘yes’ vote”.42  
Although it is impossible to measure the impact of the World Cup on the 
referendum outcome, many critics claim that the desire for international acceptance in the 
cricketing world (and the Wessels–Tshwete photo specifically) positively influenced the 
results.43 The NP campaign cleverly used the Cricket World Cup media event platform 
(and all of the pleasure associated with it) for political leverage. At the same time, the 
ANC established itself as the gatekeeper to the country’s return to international 
competition. 
There were, however, risks associated with the televised return to international 
sport, and although the ANC was willing to rally for the country’s return, compromises 
had to be made. Stephen Wagg argues that while national symbols were incapable of 
being truly representative in post-apartheid South Africa, sport “could potentially draw 
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people from all sectors of society together”.44 (Indeed, the racially unifying effects of 
sport were seen as early as 1973 with the South Africa Games – see Chapter 2.) Yet, 
while this may be so, teams also serve as embodiments of national symbols and, as with 
Kleinhans’s Miss World flag controversy, there was some discomfort around who or 
what the cricket team should represent. Because of the negative associations of the 
Springbok symbol (after all, for decades, only white sportsmen were permitted to achieve 
Springbok status), there was much resistance to the idea of the cricket team competing as 
Springboks – a factor that the ANC and cricket officials could not overlook, even if most 
white South Africans supported the Springbok symbol. For this reason, the team manager 
Alan Jordaan explained the players’ rejection of all of the symbols associated with 
apartheid – the Springbok, the flag and the national anthem; instead the team played as 
the Proteas (South Africa’s national flower), used the UCB’s banner (as it had when it 
competed against India) and elected not to sing the national anthem, because of the 
“sensitivity” around these issues.45 
There was, however, little officials could do to prevent South Africans in the 
crowd from waving the “old” South African flag or from holding up controversial boards 
in defiance of the spirit of reconciliation – acts that often ended up embarrassing the 
country on television. At one match, for instance, a South African supporter held aloft a 
defiant banner declaring, “South Africa: World Champions, 1971–1992”.46 Such acts 
undermined attempts at using sport to unify before an estimated global television 
audience of one billion in 29 countries.47 
Similarly, the issue of racial representation undermined the ANC’s endorsement 
of the country’s return to cricket. When the inclusion of two black team players was 
announced, there was outcry. The Citizen called the decision “ridiculous” while the 
Financial Mail claimed that the UCB had “undermined the principle of fairness”.48 These 
reactions, together with discord over national symbols, compromised the sport’s ability to 
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serve the interests of racial reconciliation and also emphasised the uncertainty around the 
emerging nations. Ultimately, the country’s return to international cricket was fraught 
with contradictions that revealed many of the racial tensions that would later come to 
characterise post-apartheid South Africa. 
 
From Boipatong to Barcelona: South Africa Returns to the Olympics 
Perhaps because cricket was traditionally the sport of white English-speaking South 
Africans (whose investment in the apartheid state had always been limited), there was 
less controversy over national symbols than with other sports. When it came to the 
country’s next international global contest, however, the problems with post-apartheid 
national identity were even more visible. The furore over apartheid symbols reached a 
head when South Africa was invited to participate in the Olympic Games for the first 
time since 1960.  
Talk of South Africa’s participation commenced early in 1991, and the IOC 
restored South Africa’s membership on account of the repeal of a number of apartheid 
laws. In July, an official invitation was suggested as a reward for the country if it made 
sufficient progress towards the racial unification of its various sporting bodies. To this 
end, the National Olympic Committee of South Africa (NOCSA) was formed, under the 
leadership of former sports activist Sam Ramsamy, who had campaigned for South 
Africa’s exclusion from sporting events in the past. Some were sceptical of this move; 
Joe Ebrahim, president of the South African Council on Sport (SACOS),49 for instance, 
said that the IOC was “out of touch” and that the scrapping of the Population Registration 
Act did not make him a full citizen.50 The PAC accused NOCSA and Ramsamy of giving 
in to white South Africans and international pressure, while Treurnicht’s CP accused the 
NP government of selling out to black South Africans, claiming that tolerance of 
interracial sport amounted to the acceptance of black majority rule.51 For the most part, 
however, the news was celebrated, with newspapers screaming “We’re back!” around the 
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country.52 Even the president of the National Olympic Committee of Africa, the Congo’s 
Jean-Claude Ganga, applauded the move, describing the readmission as “a political 
decision to help point them (the South Africans) in the right direction” and anticipating 
the effects of the decision in overly simplistic and emotional terms: “We will know we 
have succeeded,” said Ganga, “when we see a black South African win a race and watch 
the whites cry when they see their flag raised and their anthem played.”53 As it turned 
out, this was a hopelessly optimistic view of events. 
The ANC played it safe initially. Although the party accepted the IOC’s 
conditional invitation, they had reservations about the speed with which South Africa was 
being granted full international status. Tshwete stated that “integration of sports must 
begin at the bottom, and this is not something that can be conveniently hurried”, but he 
also dismissed the idea that all sanctions should be maintained until full civil rights were 
restored.54 
Eventually, on 7 November 1991, it was officially announced – via live broadcast 
on national television – that South Africa would be permitted to compete.55 But 
celebration over the world’s acceptance of the country turned sour when NOCSA 
announced later that month that the South African athletes would not be competing in the 
Springbok colours, that the flag would be replaced by a specially designed neutral 
Olympic flag, and that Beethoven’s “Ode to Joy” would be played for South African gold 
medallists instead of “Die Stem”.56 NOCSA tried to sweeten the news with the launch of 
a national competition to choose a new mascot to replace the Springbok, but white South 
Africans were not so easily placated and were virtually unanimous in their condemnation 
of the decision.  
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FW de Klerk came out in support of the dearly loved Springbok, claiming that it 
had “nothing to do with apartheid,”57 that it had “a proud history” and that it was 
“shortsighted to disregard these facts and trample a proud tradition underfoot”.58 
Realising the immense popularity of the “Bok” – the symbol’s term of endearment – he 
was also quick to deflect any blame that might have been directed at the NP on account 
of the condition, stating, “This is one thing for which you cannot blame the government 
or the National Party.”59 The CP, of course, did just that, claiming that the NP of being 
ultimately responsible for the turn of events, stating that the Springbok’s culling was “the 
logical outcome of the road” taken by De Klerk.60 
 The Springbok’s popularity among white South Africans quickly became evident. 
In a poll conducted by the Sunday Times, a national English-language paper, a startling 7 
452 out of 9 000 surveyed readers (around 80%) stubbornly claimed that athletes should 
forego the opportunity to compete at the Olympics rather than abandon the country’s 
national symbols. Rapport found that its readers were similarly outraged.61  
In addition, the national hunt for a new mascot was treated with disdain. While 
Allan Hendrickse, leader of the mixed-race Labour Party, took the search seriously, 
suggesting that the Springbok be replaced by the zebra, his suggestion was rejected 
because of the overly distinct nature of the black and white stripes, which might be seen 
as alluding to separate development rather than racial harmony. Other mascot suggestions 
were more tongue in cheek. Vrye Weekblad offered up the hippopotamus, claiming that it 
would likely be “the only animal upon which this divided country could possibly agree”. 
In a letter to the Citizen, a reader from Botswana suggested the ostrich since the “bird 
best portrays your national character over the last four decades and more”.62  
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 Additional disappointment arose with the team announcement, both because of 
the fact that over 80% of the team was white (only 11 players of the 96-member team 
were black) and because national discussion among whites on quotas and team selection 
was vehemently opposed to the idea of selection based on anything other than merit, in 
spite of the fact that few resources had been pumped into black sport over the decades. 
Ganga’s hope that the Olympics would serve as a unifying event – with black South 
African athletes doing their white compatriots proud, making them “cry when they see 
their flag raised and their anthem played” – seemed more and more distant. Few blacks 
would actually be competing and the beloved anthems and flags had been dumped. 
As violence in the country escalated, further problems arose. One month before 
the Olympic athletes were due to leave for Barcelona, the Boipatong Massacre plunged 
the country into disarray, suspending talks at CODESA (see Chapter 4). It seemed 
increasingly inappropriate for South Africans to enjoy the “relief at being once again part 
of the international community”63 when events at home were still so clearly abnormal. In 
response, Desmond Tutu called for South Africa to be suspended or to voluntarily 
withdraw from the Olympics, declaring that “those who choose to insulate themselves 
from the suffering and grief caused by this horrific slaughter must realize they cannot 
have both a Boipatong and a Barcelona”.64 The issue of the team’s participation was 
more controversial than with the Cricket World Cup because it hinged on the suspected 
activities of De Klerk’s police force (with many believing that the ANC had in fact 
fomented the violence) and not on the combined voice of the white electorate. 
Furthermore, Tutu’s standing in the global community added greater thrust to the threat. 
 Although Steve Tshwete chastised Tutu for not consulting with the ANC before 
going public with his views,65 the ANC soon found itself embroiled in a debate over the 
wisdom of abandoning the sports ban. In a series of mixed messages it, too, made noises 
about opposing the country’s participation in the Barcelona Olympics (and other 
international sporting competitions) unless there was significant political progress, calling 
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on athletes to boycott the Games. The PAC accused the party of “blowing hot and cold” 
over the issue,66 and, as Booth points out, the ANC soon realised that “they could not turn 
the boycott on and off like a tap”.67 It became clear that using sport as a post-Boipatong 
bargaining tool would result in deep displeasure on the part of the white South African 
electorate especially – which the ANC was, after all, trying to woo. It was also evident 
that, after decades of exclusion, there were few athletes willing to boycott the Games, and 
viewers were hungry to see how athletes such as Zola Budd would fare. Black sports fans 
also stood to lose, since the Cameroonian football team was due to tour the country, and 
reimposing the moratorium would have meant the cancellation of the much anticipated 
tour. Eventually, Mandela intervened to ensure that the Cameroonian tour took place.68
 The ANC met with various sporting bodies and reached a compromise. In a 
document titled “Position of South African sports bodies on how to assist in hastening the 
establishment of democracy and peace in our country”, NOCSA agreed to “use all forums 
to publicise the call for democracy” including utilising the lighting of a torch at Jan 
Smuts Airport (now OR Tambo International) as “lighting the flame for peace and 
democracy” and requesting athletes and NO SA officials to wear stickers “when giving 
media interviews, especially TV interviews to South Africa and abroad”.69 The measures 
were all intended to draw attention to the fact that events in the home country were far 
from settled. 
 Once participation in the Olympics was assured, however, the measures were 
more or less overlooked; reports tended to focus on the existence of the conditions rather 
than their symbolic meaning. The New York Times, for instance, reported that athletes did 
not take the condition to heart, stating that most South African Olympians “tended to 
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agree with the white rugby player who told reporters that he would wear a pink tutu if 
that was what it took to get him back in international competition”.70 
The unsuccessful attempt to politicise South African’s return to the Olympics was 
partly because the country’s situation was far too complex to be explained in a media 
event context, and partly because of the ANC’s own failure to distance itself from the 
Games. Instead, largely because of the overwhelming presence of Mandela, the unifying 
and reconciliatory discourse of the Olympics remained prominent. As an in-depth study 
on the reporting of the event found,  
 
[i]ronically, the international media offered a chorus of celebration for 
the return of South Africa and demise of apartheid in their 
commentaries without any reference, whatsoever, to the continuing 
domestic crisis in the country. Rather, the presence of South Africa was 
presented – and symbolized by commentators through the stadium 
presence of Mandela – as a victory already won.71 
 
Yet, while the ANC may have failed to use the Games as a means of voicing its domestic 
grievances, the event did situate Mandela as the de facto leader of the country. De Klerk 
did not receive an official invitation to the Games;72 instead it was Mandela who sat 
beside the other heads of state, and his presence at the Olympics was singled out as a 
highlight. Described by the Los Angeles Times as “impossible to miss”,73 the ANC leader 
was associated with South Africa by nearly all broadcasters,74 and most newspapers 
quoted his reconciliatory statements, which harmonised with the Olympic vision, whose 
1992 slogan was “friends forever”: 
 
All I want to say is that our presence here is of great significance to our 
country, a significance which goes beyond the boundaries of sport. Our 
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country has been isolated for many years, not only in sports but in other 
fields as well. We are saying now, ‘Let’s forget the past. Let bygones 
be bygones.’ I want to tell you that we respect you, we are proud of all 
of you and, above all, we love you.75 
 
Would a statement against the actions of the NP back home have received the 
same amount of coverage? Most likely not. As we have seen, while broad 
symbolic gestures work well in a media event context, there is little space for 
intricate political infighting. This was clearly well understood by Mandela; 
while his statement contradicted the harder line that the ANC had been taking 
in the aftermath of Boipatong, it secured his reputation as the country’s true 
leader and charmed international audiences. As was the case with Miss World, 
Mandela went on to forge a lasting relationship with the Olympic “brand”, 
appearing in subsequent years in the IOC’s “celebrate humanity” advertising 
campaign.76 
 Yet, in spite of Mandela’s claims of national unity, as with the Cricket 
World Cup, dissenters in the crowd waved the near-banned South African 
flag.77 All of the well-meaning debate over appropriate national symbols that 
had preceded the event was undermined when the incident was broadcast by 
RTO’9278 and officials were unable to stop it.79 The presence of global 
broadcasters, of course, turned what was an isolated incident into a memorable 
moment – watched as it was by millions of viewers – thereby playing into the 
hands of the spoilers. 
In addition, the global power and pleasure of the Olympics relies, largely, on 
television access, and in South Africa in 1992, this was racially skewed in favour of 
                                                
 
75 Cited in Johnson, “The presence of Nelson Mandela marked the momentous return of a former pariah”. 
76 The advert can be viewed on YouTube; see: “Celebrate Humanity – Olympics – Nelson Mandela” 
(Available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LAjKoYIwsfA – viewed 2 January 2012). 
77 Cora Burnett, “South Africa” in Matthew Nicholson, Russell Hoye and Barrie Houlihan (eds.), 
Participation in Sport: International Policy Perspectives (New York & Oxford: Taylor and Francis, 2010), 
128.  
78 Radio Television Olimpica (RTO ’92), formed in 1992, was the first host broadcaster to be part of the 
Olympic Organising Committee (OOC). In the past, broadcasting was assigned to a domestic rights holder 
or a consortium of international broadcasters. This trend of merging broadcasting with the OOC continued 
until the new millennium. 











whites. According to Eric Louw, at the time only 25% of South Africans owned 
television sets and the languages of the broadcasts (English, Afrikaans and Xhosa) were 
limited to 36% of the population, meaning that the Olympics was aimed at a 
“Westernised” South Africa.80 The reality would likely have been better than this, 
however, since many Nguni-speaking black South Africans would also have been able 
to understand Xhosa. The issue of exclusion was nevertheless picked up by global 
media reports. The Los Angeles Times, for instance, reported that “black townships 
don’t have a high percentage of TVs because of lack of electricity” and thus only a 
lucky few were able to enjoy the symbolic display of the black South African flag 
bearer, marathoner Jan Tau, in the opening procession.81 
 Full participation in the event was also threatened by an ongoing dispute 
between the SABC and the Media Workers Association of S uth Africa (MWASA). 
Since May 1992, the mainly black MWASA members had been striking for higher 
wages, and the responses and threats employed by both the SABC and the union drew 
attention to the racialised viewing patterns of the nation and the fact that there were few 
media events that truly united all citizens. The SABC claimed that the strike had reduced 
its ability to operate, but, somewhat suspiciously, the first services to suffer were those 
enjoyed by black South Africans. CCV-TV programming and radio services in African 
languages were decreased,82 urging MWASA to complain about the broadcaster’s general 
“insensitivity” to black viewers, who, they argued, could not get the news or their 
favourite sports coverage.83 In response, the union threatened to approach the IOC in an 
effort to have broadcasts of the Olympics blacked out.84 As in the past, the global event 
was perceived as a means of punishing white South Africans and drawing attention to the 
grievances of black victims in the country. While the dispute was settled before the start 
of the Games, in the end the Cameroonian match – played three weeks before the 
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Olympics – wasn’t broadcast by the SABC because of the strike, and MWASA members 
also prevented its transmission by the Bophuthatswana Broadcasting Corporation.85 
 These and other events suggest that the Olympics played a more important role in 
the global narrative of apartheid’s demise than in the country’s own processes of 
reconciliation. Thus, while the country’s return to the Games was celebrated in reports 
around the world, on the domestic front it revealed awkward differences rather than unity. 
Ultimately, the Olympics, like the Cricket World Cup, was a mixed experience for the 
emerging nation, not only because the team performed poorly (bringing home only two 
silver medals) but also because celebration over global inclusion was tempered at every 
turn by the political reality back home and by polarised racial disagreements. Moragas 
Spà et al. conclude that the return to Games was a mixed blessing: 
 
The result was that, rather than a unifying experience, the Games 
provided one after another reminder of the painful transition the 
country had been going through. As such, the Olympics became 
part of the domestic crisis – the struggle among groups to define 
just what South Africa should be. In this sense, South Africa’s 
return to the Games in 1992 was ultimately bittersweet.86 
 
The Last Outpost: Winning over Rugby Fans 
The ANC’s dithering over Olympic participation was most likely also influenced by 
concurrent events in rugby. As numerous critics have pointed out, when it came to 
transformation in sport, rugby – although initially a frontrunner in negotiations over 
ending isolation – dragged its heels.87 Targeted by boycotters under apartheid (see 
Chapter 2) and generally regarded as the sport of the Afrikaner, South Africa was 
nevertheless never formally expelled from the International Rugby Board (IRB). But, on 
the domestic front, transformation was slow. Talks between the whites-only South 
African Rugby Board (SARB) and the non-racial South African Rugby Union (SARU) 
broke down early in 1991, largely because Danie Craven, president SARB, tended to act 
unilaterally and because of the board’s lack of commitment to development in 
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disadvantaged communities.88 Talks were only resuscitated when Mandela and Tshwete 
intervened, leading to the establishment of SARFU (South African Rugby Football 
Union), a more racially representative national sporting body, in March 1992. The first 
“reward” for progress in the sport came with the announcement of an international tour in 
July and August, with tests against both New Zealand (the All Blacks) and Australia (the 
Wallabies), who were the reigning world champions. 
 The ANC had initially considered disallowing the first international rugby tour 
in the wake of Boipatong, but as with the Olympics, the organisation capitulated, with the 
proviso that visiting teams visit Boipatong, games be preceded by a minute’s silence in 
memory of victims of the massacre, and none of the national symbols associated with 
apartheid be used. Yet, while small pockets of supporters flouted similar conditions with 
the Cricket World Cup and the Olympics, things were different with sporting contests 
held on home soil where white South Africans dominated the crowds. 
 The most memorable display of defiance came on 15 August 1992, the date of 
South Africa’s official return to world-class rugby since the disastrous 1981 tour of New 
Zealand (see Chapter 2). The Springboks were again playing the All Blacks and the 
incident was again marred by controversy. The occasion was expected to raise awareness 
– through messages visibly displayed on programmes and banners – of sport’s 
commitment to peace and democracy in South Africa and its condemnation of violence.89 
Instead, as Nauright notes, the game “presented whites with a cultural event entrenched 
in social and individual memories which provided comfort as political power was being 
negotiated away”.90 
In the time allocated for a minute’s silence for the victims of Boipatong, the Ellis 
Park crowd of 70 000 reacted by spontaneously starting to sing “D e Stem”,91 leaving the 
commentator at a loss for words. Instead of remarking on the incident, he simply 
pretended it didn’t happen, stating, “Having observed that, they’re now having the 
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national anthems.” This was also contrary to expectations, as it had been announced 
earlier that no national anthems would be played; but at Transvaal Rugby Football Union 
(TRFU) President Louis Luyt’s instruction the old anthem came blaring through the 
loudspeakers, clearly disorientating some of the Springbok players. As the cameras swept 
over the team, instead of belting out the verse with pride, it is clear that some team 
members seemed confused about whether to sing or not. (Indeed after the match, 
Springbok captain Naas Botha summed up their position, claiming that while it had been 
“ lekker” (nice) to sing the anthem, his team would rather not do so if it became “a 
problem”.92) The commentator, however, did not hold back, stating, “Well, if you’re 
South African, if you don’t have a lump in your throat you’re not human.” Fans also 
starting waving the “old” flag, reportedly when it was announced that De Klerk and his 
wife had arrived at the match. According to reports, in spite f special requests, 
“spectators with South African flags ran onto the field and police had their hands full in 
trying to remove them”.93  
 Widespread debate broke out among political parties and in the media. The 
ANC was outraged, claiming that the crowd’s behaviour suggested “that they were 
identifying themselves with the call made by the Conservative Party and Afrikaner 
Weerstandsbeweging for defiance of the [sporting] Agreement”94 and the organisation 
threatened to withdraw support for the rest of the tour, a move that would likely have 
resulted in the cancellation of remaining matches. Tshwete, who had been so influential 
in advancing the country’s return to international sport, reportedly voted for the 
subsequent match against Australia to be cancelled. He was most likely also responding 
to the personal humiliation he must have felt when several spectators approached him, 
asking him to sign their oranje-blanje-blou flags.95 
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 The CP came out in support of the crowd’s reaction, and Andries Treurnicht 
congratulated the spectators for rejecting what he termed “sports terrorism”.96 The NP, on 
the other hand, found itself in a difficult position, as it needed to appeal to more 
conservative white South Africans as well as its partners in the negotiation process. It 
ended up condemning the crowd’s behaviour, but also referring to it as a “peaceful 
display of mass action”.97  
 Perhaps more telling were the reactions from national newspapers. The 
Afrikaans-language Rapport applauded the defiance of the spectators, describing them as 
patriots proudly announcing, “Here is my song, here is my flag. Here I stand and I will 
sing it today.”98Similarly, as Nauright notes, the discourse in English-language papers 
demonstrated the extent to which the crowd’s behaviour reflected the tenacity of the 
wider white South African public. The Citizen sported headlines for editorials and letters 
such as “Anthem brought lump to throat”, “Good sense” and “We’ve had enough”, while 
the Star argued that the singing of the anthem could not be expected to stop when large 
white crowds were gathered.99 This argument likely stemmed from the widely quoted 
comments of former New Zealand coach Ivan Vodanovich, made in defence of the 
crowd’s behaviour:  
 
When 70 000 people get together they will sing. It does not matter who is 
in power, there will be nobody in the world that can stop them from 
singing. They will sing if Nelson Mandela is the state president, if FW de 
Klerk is State President they will sing and if I am state president they will 
still be singing. It is certainly going to be very hard to stop them. It is 
impossible for someone to tell such a huge crowd not to do this or not to 
do that.100  
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SARFU, eager to see the tour continue, was quick to release an official statement denying 
its involvement in the playing of the anthems and distancing itself from the fans’ 
reaction. It called “on the public of South Africa not to embarrass or in any way destroy 
our relationships with Australia and New Zealand as they are completely innocent in this 
unfortunate affair”.101  
 But even Wallaby and All Black teams could not avoid getting caught up in the 
sporting debates. When the Wallabies arrived at Cape Town airport in anticipation of 
their first international match against the former pariah state, they were greeted by 
protestors bearing placards reading “Go home Aussies” and “Stop racist tours”.102 
Similarly, in what was probably an unrelated incident, when a man was reportedly shot 
by a security guard outside the stadium after the All Blacks’ first match in South Africa – 
played against the provincial Durban side on 1 August – Halt All Racist Tours (HART) 
sent a fax to captain Sean Fitzpatrick requesting that the All Blacks compensate the 
family in some way and accusing the team of being pawns for De Klerk’s government: 
“He (De Klerk) has used the All Blacks as publicity bimbos on television, radio and in 
newspapers across South Africa and outside the country to reflect positively on himself 
as kingmaker of their tour.”103 
But De Klerk was not the only politician trying to position himself as “kingmaker 
of the tour”. In fact, while De Klerk’s reforms might have provided the initial trigger for 
the country’s return to international sport, negotiations over the continuation of the tour 
were more directly linked to the ANC; Joe French, president of the Australian Rugby 
Football Union, reportedly assured Steve Tshwete that if the ANC withdrew its blessing 
the tour would be cancelled,104 and amidst all of the controversy over national symbols 
and crowd behaviour, it was Mandela who continued to preach the message of sports 
reconciliation. Just prior to the infamous match, he had met with the Australian captain, 
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claiming, ironically, one day before the Ellis Park display of defiance, that sport had 
finally been “normalised” in the country.105 He gave no official response to the crowd 
behaviour, and the ANC threats to cancel the remaining tours were never directly linked 
to him. This was possibly because, by this point, Mandela’s status has benefited greatly 
from the “personalised power” of a series of successive media events. As Dayan and Katz 
point out: “The heroic status bestowed by media events gives leaders an increased 
freedom of decision and action, a sense of liberation from everyday dependence on their 
advisor, parties, bureaucracies – even from the policies – to which they are normally 
committed.”106 
 
The 1995 Rugby World Cup and the Making of Madiba 
In addition to his role in leading South Africa out of the sports-boycott wilderness, early 
in his presidency Mandela identified inclusive (and highly visible) nation-building efforts 
in order to tackle the problem of divided loyalty and as a means of stalling white flight, 
particularly with regard to Afrikaner culture. He publicly reassured Afrikaners of the 
sanctity of their language on a number of occasions, and Anthony Sampson makes the 
point that Mandela was also “in no hurry to rename the streets, suburbs and airports 
which commemorated Afrikaner heroes like Botha, Strijdom or Malan, the old hate-
figures of the black majority, or to rename the Verwoerd Building, which housed 
government departments in Cape Town”.107 Perhaps most famously, in the first year of 
his presidency, he travelled, with journalists in tow, to the Afrikaner enclave of Orania108 
to visit the home of the widow of Hendrik Verwoerd, the architect of apartheid and posed 
alongside a small statue of Verwoerd after the meeting. Thabo Mbeki notes that Mandela 
saw his principal role as having to “reassure white society” to “maintain the greatest 
possible cohesion in the society so that it doesn’t break apart”.109 
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But it was arguably sport that gave him the most leverage in this task, and his role 
in South Africa’s first sporting mega-event significantly boosted his status among white 
South Africans. The Rugby World Cup of 1995 has firmly rooted itself in the nation’s 
memory as one of the pivotal turning points in its reconciliation. While the sport 
remained somewhat divisive in the early 1990s, in January 1993, before South Africa had 
even set an election date, the IRB announced that the country had won the honour of 
hosting the Rugby World Cup in 1995 – the world’s fourth-largest televised sporting 
event.110 As with Miss World, this meant that the global gaze would be fixed upon South 
Africa – a privilege that would have been unthinkable even five years earlier. 
One of the problems, of course, was that rugby supporters still clung to the 
divisive symbols associated with Afrikaner nationalism and, in spite of the establishment 
of SARFU and the adoption of a new national flag and anthem in the period between the 
RWC announcement and the commencement of the tournament, little had changed since 
the Ellis Park debacle of 1992. While SARFU unveiled an interim logo incorporating a 
Springbok, a rugby ball and four proteas (considered a “major concession” on their part), 
the debate over the Springbok’s continued existence was essentially deferred until after 
the Rugby World Cup, largely because of the symbol’s marketing potential.111 While this 
may have been so, the Springbok tended to conjure up a range of other problematic 
symbols that did little to foster racial unity. Writing for the Sowetan just prior to the 
World Cup, journalist Sharon Chetty’s description of the test between South Africa and 
Western Samoa sums up prevailing perceptions: 
 
Holding aloft the old South African flag, the rugby die hards sought 
momentary refuge in the confines of Ellis Park. [When] Nkosi 
Sikelel’iAfrika started up you could count the numbers who bothered to 
even keep still. But when Die Stem was played they stood to attention 
and sang with gusto – their voices in unison. Barring the good natured 
vendors … the number of darkies at Ellis Park could be counted on one 
hand. … Rugby it seems is the last white outpost …112 
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The trajectory of events during the World Cup, three months later, brought about 
seemingly radical changes in response, particularly in the “black” press,113 and the 
opening-game victory against Australia, the reigning title-holders, “engendered perhaps 
the first palpable sense of nationalism among South Africans”.114 That South Africans 
found common pride in such a historically controversial sport as rugby (with a nearly all-
white team) was deemed an “impressive feat”,115 made all the more meaningful because 
the game was watched by an estimated worldwide audience of 300 million television 
viewers.116  
As Lynette Steenveld and Larry Strelitz117 point out, World Cup constituted 
another media event – a Contest with elements of the shamanising script – and it is 
frequently identified as a key historic moment in South Africa’s nation-building history 
by academics and citizens alike. Contests “pit evenly matched individuals or teams 
against each other and bid them to compete according to strict rules”;118 they are a 
“training ground for the construction of social institutions based on rules”;119 and they 
invite audiences to act as both partisans and judges.120 In 1995, the stakes were extremely 
high, as audiences were assessing not just the team’s performance in the various games 
but also the display of South Africa’s new national identity, which also required the 
fostering of new allegiances. 
SARFU was well aware of this, and Albert Grundlingh points out how, after the 
announcement that the country would be hosting the event, the organisation had been 
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repackaging its ideology, especially with the appointments of Edward Griffiths as 
SARFU’s CEO and Morné du Plessis as the team’s manager.121 While Griffiths, an 
English-speaking sports journalist from Zimbabwe, worked impressively as a spin doctor 
for the event, Du Plessis had previously declined captaincy under apartheid because of 
the boycotts and thus had the necessary liberal background to serve as the team’s 
manager. Griffiths saw the Springboks as being in the “entertainment industry”122 and 
understood that the team needed to appear “humble, excited and unashamedly proud of 
their democracy”.123 Du Plessis took special trouble to improve the Springboks’ etiquette 
in addition to their sporting prowess. The team was given coaching on how to sing “Nkosi
Sikelel’iAfrica”,124 with lessons in pronunciation from an African-language expert from 
Stellenbosch University.125 They were also taken on a trip to Robben Island, where 
Mandela had been imprisoned for 18 years,126 and players, with journalists in tow, visited 
African townships in support of the Masakhane (“let us build together”) campaign.127 In 
addition, the selection of Chester Williams, a coloured wing referred to as the “black 
pearl” in the media, helped to dilute the whiteness of the team. Williams’s selection was 
compromised, however, when he was injured and replaced by Pieter Hendriks, returning 
the team to its all-white status. When Hendriks was eliminated because of dirty play, it 
meant that Williams, who had since recovered, could return to the tournament, and it was 
rumoured that Griffiths offered Hendriks a bribe of R15 000 not to appeal against his 
expulsion.128 Whether true or not, Williams’s return was widely celebrated and he rapidly 
became an “emblem of achievement” for rugby and the nation,129 i dicating the extent to 
which multiracial representation in the media event mattered to the authorities. 
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As with the other mega-events hosted in the country, coverage of trade union 
activity was strictly controlled, and groups seeking to use the event to air their grievances 
to the outside world were discouraged from doing so for the sake of the “national 
interest”.130 Threats from the Post and Telecommunication Workers Association 
(POTWA), for instance, were widely condemned.131  
The event was launched with a carefully staged opening ceremony. It is here, 
traditionally, that the host nation’s identity is unveiled during World Cup contests. For 
post-apartheid South Africa, this was an important historical moment. As hosts of the 
event, which had the distinction of being the first Rugby World Cup in which all games 
were played in a single country, as well as the first World Cup held in Africa, South 
Africa’s global transformation from pariah state to “miracle” nation was once again 
broadcast to the rest of the world, and this time in more popular terms than the 
officiousness of the inauguration. The timing and narrative of the 1995 event provided 
nation-builders and the media with the opportunity to inscribe it into a new South African 
epic tradition. A mixing of cultural practices, in keeping with what would become the 
“unity in diversity” preamble of the new Constitution, characterised the event. The Zulu 
song “Shosholoza”,132 popularised on air in the days leading up to the occasion, was 
chosen as the unofficial fan anthem for the event. The song choice was fitting, as many 
white male conscripts (fervent rugby supporters) had sung it during their time as national 
servicemen.133 Thus, while foreign audiences may have seen it as “African”, and while it 
allowed for black South Africans to feel included in the spectacle, for many white males 
it would also have represented continuity with their past in the apartheid army. Culturally 
diverse artists were also selected to perform. The World Cup anthem, “The World in 
Union”, was sung by the white English-speaking singer PJ Powers with the backing of 
Ladysmith Black Mambazo, who had performed at Mandela’s inauguration, and the 
lyrics echoed the official slogan, “One team, one country”:  
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Gathering together  
One mind, one heart  
Every creed, every colour  
Once joined, never apart  
 
The “oneness” espoused by the song is fairly standard nationalising discourse, but in the 
context of South Africa’s early democracy, it takes on a deeper symbolic meaning, and 
lines such as “We must take our place in history” read as if they were written specifically 
for the occasion of South Africa’s return to the world stage.  
But, like the inauguration, the World Cup opening ceremony struggled to 
reconcile South Africa’s divided cultural and political heritage, to the extent that it 
avoided the issue altogether, electing, as JM Coetzee points out, to be “history-less” 
instead: “It presented a dehistoricised vision of Tourist South Africa: contented tribesfolk 
and happy mineworkers, as in the Old South Africa, but purified and sanctified by the 
Rainbow”.134  
Further contradictions of the ceremonial representation were highlighted by “off-
stage” events in relation to the “Coon” or Cape Carnival. The decision to include the 
carnival, no doubt as a means of representing the coloured strand of the rainbow nation, 
is controversial in itself, since the coon image has an uncomfortable history of popularity 
with white audiences and has long been abused by racists.135 Jacqueline Maingard points 
out that on the day the Cape Carnival sequence appeared unrehearsed, and as “an 
inauthentic copy abstracted from its original practice”.136 She attributes this to the 
subversive potential of carnival, realised because of organisational assumptions about the 
meaning and structure of what, in spite of its popularisation, is actually a deeply 
embedded cultural practice. Although professional troupes “had been approached by 
rugby organisers to perform at the opening”, they were “undercut by a loose amalgam of 
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untrained African township children, enticed with promises of food and clothes”.137 The 
children later claimed that they had not been rewarded for their efforts and went on to 
protest at the next rugby match at the gates of the Cape Town stadium where the opening 
ceremony had been staged. Maingard notes that  
 
the confusion suggests that the stadium organizers assumed that a carnival 
would be by definition disorganized and amateur whether performed by 
established troupes or street children, and they therefore appropriated only 
the surface images rather than the full practice of the Cape carnival.138  
 
The climax of the World Cup ceremony, meant to display a single encapsulating image of 
South Africa, is deplored by Coetzee: “The solution has an air of desperation about it: 
cute black pikkies in mine overalls and helmets”.139 The choice was most likely quite 
deliberate. The use of children has a long history of association in nationalist imagery, 
and while the image may have skirted all the contradictions and difficulties of South 
Africa’s past, it presents a clever embodiment of its future: black, but non-threatening 
and full of potential. As Grundlingh points out, “the public representation of society 
might have been a parody, but it was not a departure from the norm as far as such 
sporting occasions are concerned”.140 Most likely the ceremonial displays of numerous 
nations are afflicted with similar inconsistencies. 
In spite of its shallow showiness, the opening ceremony was generally considered 
a success, and the national importance of the mega-event escalated throughout the 
tournament. The new South African flag, which had debuted at Mandela’s inauguration, 
was waved enthusiastically141 and fans, most of them in green Springbok attire, refrained 
from engaging in any confrontational acts of defiance. This was due, in part, to the 
deliberate mobilisation of the players and supporters for the purposes of nation-building, 
but the event’s significance was also boosted by South Africa’s sterling performance 
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throughout the tournament. After its opening-game victory over Australia, the Springboks 
went from strength to strength, happily winning all of their games, which led to 
escalating interest in their standing in the competition. 
Thus, by the time of the final match against the All Blacks, the nation’s eyes were firmly 
fixed on the Boks, and Nelson Mandela took advantage of the occasion to overhaul the 
image of the Springbok and to secure white support for his own image by entering the 
stadium before the match adorned in Pienaar’s no. 6 Springbok jersey. The crowd was 
delighted – erupting into chants of “Nel-son, Nel-son” – and Mandela’s presence did 
much to restore the racial imbalance of the team. When the Springboks defeated their 
rivals (in extra time thanks to a last-minute drop goal), the response around the country 
was euphoric and by all accounts “unprecedented”.142 Mandela again appeared in the 
Springbok jersey to hand over the trophy to Pienaar and his embrace of the white 
Afrikaner captain serves as perhaps the most memorable image of reconciliation of the 
era (see Figure 6.1).  
In a rare historical moment of national unity, celebrations spontaneously erupted 
in the streets in both black and white areas throughout the country; Pienaar’s subsequent 
comment “We didn’t have 60 000 
South Africans supporting us today 
… we had 43 million …” was 
emblazoned across newspapers 
nationwide; and the political 
ramifications of the event caught 
the attention of international 
authors and film directors.143  
Although Grundlingh 
argues that the Springboks 
probably needed Mandela more 
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Figure 6.1: The iconic photo of Mandela congratulating 












than Mandela needed the Springboks,144 the new president’s image also benefited from 
the association. Rita Barnard makes the point that Mandela’s image was frequently 
rejuvenated by photo opportunities with beautiful women – the beauty queens of the Miss 
World contests, as well as female celebrities such as the Princess of Wales and the Spice 
Girls.145 As the chief representative of the nation, Mandela’s advanced age presented a 
challenge. “The real nation,” Benedict Anderson comments, “is always young”146 and as 
the “face” of the new rainbow nation, the ageing Mandela had to continue to inspire hope 
in its citizens. Similarly, while Mandela’s popularity may have exceeded that of the 
Springboks (and other sportsmen with whom he frequently posed) his own image was 
invigorated by their youthful presence. Indeed, he emerged as the real “star” of the show, 
and the Rugby World Cup directors went on to attribute the success of the event, which 
attracted an increase in overall viewership of 55% compared to the previous World Cup, 
to Mandela.147 
Although not extensively covered in the US media, British and Australian 
coverage also celebrated the final game, and the Sydney Morning Herald made great 
claims for the effect of the World Cup, stating that “South Africa became ‘one team, one 
country’ yesterday”.148 Desmond Tutu announced his (surprised) support for the 
Springboks in rapturous terms:  
 
I did not expect this, but I am proud to wear [a Springbok jersey], when a 
few years ago, even a few months ago, it was an anathema.… this thing, 
that was a very divisive and ugly symbol, could in fact have magically been 
used by God to weld us together. No one of us could ever in their wildest 
dreams have been able to predict that rugby could have this magical 
effect.149  
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The religious overtone is to be expected from Tutu, but it is also reflected in general 
media coverage,150 which tended to quote the adulatory responses of black South 
Africans in particular. The Sunday Times front-page article quoted Isaac Chokwe’s 
statement, “I did not care about rugby before … I did not even like it. But now I am a 
believer”.151 In some cases, the apparent celebratory response from black citizens “was 
the news”,152 made possible perhaps by the “black” press’s embrace of events.  
The black press’s “conversion” is partly attributable to what Booth refers to as 
“linguistic nationalisation”153 – important because “defeat of the other”, although central 
to the creation of a national epic,154 only goes so far in explaining the event’s effect on an 
emerging South African nationalism. Whereas previous attempts to nationalise the 
Springboks had not met with much success,155 the coining of the term Amabokoboko156 in 
the Sowetan “gave blacks a stake in the emblem for the first time”.157 (The term was 
coined by Mike Tissong,158 under the editorship of renowned nation-builder Aggrey 
Klaaste, after the opening match against Australia.) Jane van der Riet notes that later 
media publications also began fusing struggle rhetoric with sports discourse,159 so that 
even the normally reserved City Press, which earlier in the month had resolutely 
maintained that “there was no reason to retain the Springbok emblem”,160 gave in to 
“Viva Amabhokoboko! Viva South Africa!” on the Sunday after the final. 
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The overwhelming response to the match suggests that the World Cup served as 
yet another shamanising media event, with Mandela playing the central role as 
charismatic leader, crossing frontiers and conjuring real change. 
But although the 1995 Rugby World Cup was perhaps an extremely powerful 
Contest media event, the transformation associated with it was fleeting, perhaps even 
overstated. As Grundlingh points out, while there was much celebration of black support 
for the event, the “dynamics” of that support have seldom been explained and it is 
possible that the renationalisation of the Springbok was interpreted differently by black 
and white South Africans. On the one hand, Mandela’s donning of the Springbok jersey 
was interpreted as a form of ownership of the team – a portrayal that benefited from his 
already paternal image.161 The Economist, for instance, went on to refer to “Mandela’s 
’Boks”,162 and an association between the two was forged. This had, by all accounts, been 
Mandela’s intention all along; he later told John Carlin in an interview that he wanted to 
create the perception that “the Boks belonged to all of us now”.163  
For white South Africans, however, Mandela’s interaction with the Springbok 
team (and with the symbol itself) was interpreted not so much as a form of ownership as 
a profound reconciliatory gesture. Carlin sums up some of the symbolic effects of the 
game:  
 
What surprised and gratified [Mandela] was the degree to which he had 
ended up being the focus of attention. For he understood that behind the 
spontaneous clamour from the white Ellis Park crowd – that ‘Nelson! 
Nelson!’ – lay eloquent and convincing evidence that his hard toil had 
paid off. In paying homage to him, they were rendering tribute to the high 
value of ‘non-racialism’ for which he had endured twenty-seven years in 
prison. They were crying out for forgiveness and they were accepting his, 
and through him, black South Africa’s generous embrace.164 
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Though it is difficult to be cynical about this response, there are some obvious problems 
with it. Something of Noam Chomsky’s “irrational jingoism”165 appears to have attended 
the reception of the event. Some critics have pointed out that the media was careful to 
note that black South Africans celebrated the victory,166 perhaps overstating the shared 
magnitude of the event. As was the case in other arenas, the civil religion appears to have 
been interpreted differently, with black South Africans staking a claim on national 
resources, while white South Africans sought comfort in the much desired reconciliatory 
symbolism of the event. 
Viewing statistics and national pride surveys lend some support to this reading. 
Although many more (almost double) Nguni- and Sotho-speakers watched the final in 
comparison to other games in the tournament, these figures still paled in comparison to 
those for English- and Afrikaans-speaking viewers.167 Similarly, while the game most 
certainly increased national pride, the degree to which it mattered for different race 
groups differed. While, overall, sporting achievements (at 24%) outperformed other 
categories in a 1996 survey – followed by the rainbow nation metaphor (17%) and then 
world acceptance/recognition (13%), the categories showed discrepancies for racial 
groups. For white citizens, sporting achievements ranked at a whopping 60%, followed 
by world acceptance (20%) and then the rainbow metaphor (6%); while coloured and 
Indian citizens tended to mirror their white counterparts, for black South Africans, the 
rainbow metaphor led (19%), followed by politically established institutions and 
programmes such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (16%) and the 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (15%).168 Sport tied with the degree of 
pride elicited by the RDP. The outcomes suggest vastly different degrees of investment in 
sport for the purposes of nation-building. 
Indeed, the unifying after-effects of the event were short-lived, as is evidenced by 
the resurfacing of calls for the replacement of the Springbok emblem. A mere four 
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months later, Aggrey Klaaste, a pioneering proponent of non-racial nation-building, 
claimed that “the Springbok reminds me too much of the old South Africa when the race 
wars were everywhere including on the sportsfields”169 and, to this day, debates over the 
future of the Springbok continue.170 The attachment to apartheid national symbols also 
flared up from time to time and during a 1996 All Black tour some Bloemfontein fans 
again waved their old South African flags in the crowd.171 The appearance of unity 
among the players was also questioned; after the excitement of the tournament subsided, 
reports of locker-room racism emerged. Chester Williams later claimed that the sense of 
unity elicited by the event lasted for only a week, after which his teammates (particularly 
fellow wing James Small) were racially abusive.172  
In addition, Mandela’s symbolic captaincy of the team was brief. Although after 
the World Cup he fought for the retention of the Springbok rugby symbol – in spite of 
“every single member” of his organisation being “up in arms”173 – by 1998 it was evident 
that his “ownership” of the Springboks would not be tolerated by rugby officials; when 
government wished to set up a commission to investigate accusations of racism in rugby 
hierarchy, the move was opposed by Louis Luyt, and Mandela was subpoenaed as a 
witness to justify the appointment of the commission. 
For white South Africans, many of whom now reflect on the Rugby World Cup 
with sentimental nostalgia, it seems possible that the event succeeded only in shoring up 
fears of marginalisation under black rule. Nauright points out that “the support of 
President Mandela for the 1995 Rugby World Cup allowed whites to mask their cultural 
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insecurity a little better” even as they remained “deeply concerned about the prospects for 
a post-Mandela-led South Africa”.174 
 
Conclusion 
After decades of isolation bearing the burden of its pariah status, South Africa’s return to 
the global fold was widely celebrated, particularly by white citizens, and media events 
became a strong source of national pride. As the opening quote to this chapter notes, 
international mega-events allowed South Africans to bask, albeit for a brief period, in the 
sensation of being a global force. The pleasure associated with media events served as a 
kind of “reward” for reform in the country, and various political parties, particularly the 
ANC, capitalised on their power over South Africa’s participation in televised contests.  
Yet, as soon as sporting and cultural boycotts were dropped, the ANC found it 
difficult to maintain its influence, again highlighting the power of global forces in South 
Africa’s transition. Media events, although hegemonic, sometimes take on a life of their 
own, are difficult to direct and their consequences are frequently unpredictable.  
The global televised events of the early 1990s were also problematic because of 
their prematurity, coinciding as they did with political violence in the country as well as 
heated and racialised debates over national symbols. In a sense, the South African nation 
that returned to the global stage was not yet a nation, and the country’s “debut” 
performances were hampered by the larger questions over what the “new” South Africa 
should be like. The need to stage spectacles based on shared political values arguably 
hastened the move towards an accepted sense of nationhood. 
Many of the tensions over national identity were resolved with the 1994 election 
and the inauguration of Nelson Mandela, when the metaphor of the so-called rainbow 
nation took effect, and some of the post-1994 events (such as the Rugby World Cup) 
helped to consolidate these metaphors and symbols. The new national symbols that 
eventually emerged suggested that there was much that was old about the “new” South 
Africa, with one of the more divisive emblems, the Springbok, enjoying a renewed 
popularity in spite of its historical association with white identity and apartheid.  
                                                
 











As an immensely powerful symbolic figure, Mandela’s symbiotic relationship 
with media events continued to flourish, and his reputation was enhanced on a global 
level (and among white South Africans) first because of his role in ending isolation and 
eventually because of his appearances in many of the televised broadcasts that resulted 
from his backing. Mandela’s symbolism suited the media event genre perfectly. 
Associated with humanitarianism and reconciliation, his presence most likely served to 
strengthen the desired interpretation of events such as the Olympics and Miss World. At 
the same time, the president’s ageing image was rejuvenated by the youth and perfection 













In the contest for ownership, media events lend themselves to a rich 
grammar of appropriations. They fall prey to entities that are neither their 
organizers nor their publics. They may be subverted (denounced), diverted 
(derailed), or perverted (hijacked). They may be used as Trojan horses or 
placed under threat of a sword of Damocles. These multiple tensions and 
the event’s charisma ask the question of ‘legitimate ownership’ and 
appropriation. Can anyone own a public event? 
– Daniel Dayan1  
 
In February 2010, the South African media united in a series of celebrations over the 20-
year anniversary of Mandela’s release from prison. Newspapers published special 
commemorative supplements including images and remembered accounts of the 11 
February 1990 as well as interviews with key politicians; UNESCO declared the Groot 
Drakenstein (formerly Victor Verster) Prison a heritage site; and an independently funded 
film festival, “Free at Last”, invited viewers to “relive 11th February” by watching 
documentaries and raw footage of the day in venues around the country. The release has 
clearly gone down in national history as one of post-apartheid’s defining moments, and 
certainly South Africa’s great television moment. Realising this, and capitalising on the 
“marketing” potential of the occasion, the ANC-led government synchronised the 
anniversary of the release with the annual State of the Nation address, and, together with 
the SABC, embarked on an overt attempt to channel the power of the original event 
towards the controversial presidency of Jacob Zuma. The broadcaster screened three 
hours of celebratory live footage before the direct transmission of Zuma’s first State of 
the Nation address. During these hours, SABC journalists interviewed crowds and 
struggle stalwarts as, in typically nationalist fashion, they re-enacted Mandela’s journey 
from the Groot Drakenstein Prison to the Grand Parade. These seemingly spontaneous 
celebrations, although they did not constitute media events themselves, give some insight 
                                                
 











into the powerful effects of the initial event and the extent to which ownership of the 
power of the televised release – South Africa’s symbolic turning point – remains highly 
desirable. In 2010, during the 20-year celebrations, De Klerk spoke instead of the 2 
February as a momentous historical moment, but to the world, and to the South African 
media, Mandela’s release is treated as the more memorable day as it has become 
associated with the nation’s freedom, just as Mandela’s narrative forms the central strand 
of the new national mythology. 
Because of their power, the question of ownership is central to media events. As 
the opening quote suggests, in spite of their seemingly integrative effects, media events 
can sometimes be vulnerable to a variety of readings. The South African context sheds 
light on the precarious nature of media events; as Dayan and Katz have noted, although 
vulnerable to exploitation, mass televised events depend on the approval and co-operation 
of a variety of participants. Because they are difficult to stage, media events serve as a 
subtle and therefore potentially more powerful means of maintaining hegemonic power. 
Similarly, because they can appear spontaneous, they can serve as powerful drivers of 
socio-political change. 
As we have seen, in the case of Mandela’s release (as well as for the pop music 
concerts held in his honour) several organisations clamoured for ownership of the event, 
though in the end, no single party was able to fully dictate the terms of its interpretation, 
which remained true only to the aesthetic requirements of the media event genre. As the 
South African case illustrates, the work of Dayan and Katz goes a long way in helping to 
predict the likely readings and potential effects of televised events of this nature. 
Would the release have accumulated such symbolic power had it not been 
televised live? Most likely not. The moving images of Mandela’s final steps to freedom, 
combined with the knowledge that the rest of the world’s gaze had shifted, at precisely 
the same moment, to our little corner of the earth, meant a great deal to South Africans – 
more than the NP anticipated.  
While the apartheid government, quite rightly, feared the racially integrative 
effects of television, nobody predicted the role that exclusion from worldwide media 
events would come to play in South Africa’s political transition. Just as the country 











root, meaning that TV could serve as a powerful instrument of punishment and 
banishment. At points, media events were also “diverted” and/or “perverted” to suit the 
agenda of anti-apartheid activists, as was the case with the Hamilton rugby match, and as 
was illustrated by the protests held in the wake of violent conflicts such as Boipatong. 
There are few studies on the potential of media events to serve the political interests of 
non-participants, but, as the South African case illustrates, this is one of the factors that 
renders them vulnerable and bears out Dayan and Katz’s claim that they are seldom 
totalitarian. 
 For this reason, perhaps, the apartheid government’s attempts to use television for 
its own purposes – first by staging its own media events and, when this proved 
unsuccessful, through imposing various forms of censorship – tended to backfire. The NP 
was ultimately unable to control the country’s image abroad, and the increased sense of 
South Africa’s pariah status added to the mounting dissatisfaction with the political 
situation in the country, contributing to the change in white South Africans’ attitudes to 
the possibility of a future beyond apartheid. The impasse of the late 1980s led to a 
reversal of opposition for reform. While in 1987, the CP overtook the liberal PFP, 
becoming the government’s official opposition, by 1992, De Klerk had managed to 
persuade nearly 70% of white South Africans to vote “yes” in favour of transformation. 
While there are of course many factors responsible for this shift, several are relevant to 
the role that media events played in South Africa’s reform.  
The first came in the form of Nelson Mandela – an apotheosis of the NP’s own 
making. Just as their attempts to control television backfired, so their efforts to banish 
Mandela from political life led to his resurrection as a messiah figure with enormous 
charismatic power and “moral capital”. Mandela’s international celebration benefitted 
greatly from the power of television and from media events specifically. Beginning with 
the release concert, peaking with his watershed televised release from prison and 
consolidated with the 1995 Rugby World Cup, Mandela’s status swelled with each 
successive televised event. While globally he was depicted as a kind of saint, responsible 
for South Africa’s “miracle” transition and reconciliation (see, for instance, Time 
magazine’s cover from 9 May 1994), locally, he tended to take on royal status: 











politician”.2 Mandela went on to develop a unique relationship with media events, one 
that he appeared to foster personally, and which was likely part of his seemingly 
deliberate attempts to charm the media.3 His 1998 marriage to Graça Machel, the widow 
of former Mozambican president Samora Machel, also increased his kingly status and 
was, as Philippe-Joseph Salazar has pointed out, another instance of reconciliation.4 
Although the matrimonial ceremony was a private affair, it would surely have rivalled 
Charles and Diana’s wedding as one of television’s major media events if it had been 
broadcast live. Even the live coverage of the fundraising wedding banquet, held the 
following day, managed to attract a television audience of around 150 million viewers 
worldwide.5 In addition, the 46664 pop concerts 6, drawing on the existing legacy of the 
birthday and release concerts, have continued 
the trend of combining humanitarian causes 
with popular culture in the new millennium. 
 But an even bigger Mandela media 
event awaits. In anticipation of Mandela’s 
death and funeral, broadcasters have already 
started installing television cameras in Qunu, 
Mandela’s home village, where he is likely to 
be buried. The funeral of the man frequently 
voted as one of the world’s greatest leaders is 
set to manifest as yet another mass global 
media event, one that will likely match some 
of the recent televised occasions that have 
enraptured global audiences, such as 
Obama’s victory speech, and one that will 
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Figure 7.1: Time magazine’s depiction of 












likely see a number of parties competing for ownership of the event. These broadcasts 
suggest that the world has not yet seen the last of the media event genre – though it has of 
course mutated somewhat to take account of technological developments – and it will be 
interesting to evaluate the effects of Mandela’s funeral. The occasion is likely to serve as 
a deeply unifying event for South Africans, even if it is complicated by the fact that kings 
and royals usually require a “descendant” or “heir”.7  
 The second televisual trend relevant to the period links to the issue of “liveness” 
and disaster and not to media events specifically, although, as many critics have pointed 
out, and as Dayan and Katz have conceded, the broadcasting of unplanned, non-
integrative events shares many of the characteristics of classic media events. During the 
South African transition, this is seen in the effects of the broadcasting of some of the 
violent clashes in the period leading up to the first democratic election. Televised footage 
of events such as Boipatong and Bisho were extremely influential on political processes 
and shaped the way in which history has been remembered. Not only did they provide 
trusted footage for official inquiries into events, but their televising and visual nature also 
fostered their mythologisation. Although primarily packaged as news inserts, in 
combination with some of the planned media events of the time, these broadcasts 
nevertheless attracted large audiences and ultimately helped to curry support for the 
ANC–NP alliance.  
Katz and Liebes8 have argued that footage of disaster is even more vulnerable to 
polysemic interpretation than traditional media events, but the South African case 
suggests that context will strongly influence the ways in which audiences read footage. 
Much of the coverage of violence during the transition was damaging to the NP, while 
the moral standing of the ANC, and its global reputation at the time, meant that it tended 
to benefit from the broadcasting of unplanned disaster.  
The televising of disaster, captured “live” so to speak, like the transmission of 
planned live media events, also helped to improve the poor reputation of the SABC. In 
many respects, the early 1990s served as a golden period for the broadcaster, whose 
reputation has subsequently declined because of poor financial management and the 
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widespread perception that it has not fulfilled its public interest mandate. Increasingly, 
the SABC has been accused of serving as a mouthpiece for the ruling ANC, but at the 
time, the broadcaster served, perhaps for the only time in its history, a more independent 
agenda. 
 The transition period also saw some unique broadcasting occasions, as the ruling 
alliance used media events associated with the liberal Western world to emphasise, to 
South Africans and the rest of the world, that the country was in the process of 
transforming to democracy. Televised events such as the election debate and the efforts 
made to cover the CODESA talks live clearly contributed to the atmosphere of 
participatory democracy sought by the SABC and the NP–ANC coalition. While this 
trend was most likely not strategically orchestrated, it reveals the extent to which early 
post-apartheid South Africa sought outside approval and tail red its national image to suit 
global expectations.  
 Awareness of global perceptions was also evident in the initially complicated 
response to South Africa’s return to the global stage, close analysis of which reveals 
many of the early conflicts over national symbols and what the “new” South Africa 
should mean. Approval was eventually secured, largely because of the desire to return to 
international competition. This in turn led to swifter acceptance of new national symbols 
– visibly displayed and often celebrated on television sets across the world. The gradual 
unveiling of the nation’s new identity took on greater significance because of the decades 
of exclusion that preceded it.  
 
Afrikaner nationalism sought to “build a nation from words”,9 harnessing the power of 
print media to establish the myths and narratives of its national identity. Like earlier, 
European versions of nationhood, Afrikanerdom drew meaning from the events of the 
past.  
Post-apartheid South Africa, on the other hand, was at pains to break from its 
divisive past, which after all recounted the history of a nation at war with itself. Instead, 
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the “new” South Africa (as its appellation suggests) sought to emphasise its reborn status 
and its location in the present, and it relied heavily on the symbolism of contemporary 
visual imagery. For this reason, perhaps, television played an important role in the 
creation of the new post-apartheid mythology. The South African case suggests that 
“liveness” is frequently equated with transparency and “newness”. Media events, more 
than any other television genre, literally brought the nation together and played a pivotal 
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